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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The thesis investigates the intersections between the migration regime and the care regime in 
South Korea. The research is designed as an in-depth policy-oriented case study and adopts 
documentary analysis and expert interviews as research methods. From the mid-1990s Korea’s 
transition to a migrant destination country within Asia became evident and the migration 
inflows have been gendered and ethnised as well as classed. In response, Korea has developed a 
highly instrumental and differential migration regime: circulatory, anti-settlement policies for 
non-professional labour migrants in general but supportive and integrative for co-ethnic 
migrants and marriage migrants. Care, on the other hand, has become a major social policy 
issue since the early 2000s, facing a care crisis represented by population ageing and the low 
fertility. While the state began to assume a greater responsibility for care, care demands for 
children and older people have been differently addressed, and the distribution of care 
responsibility between genders within home remains largely unchanged. Consequently, home-
based (child)care and eldercare areas tend to leave greater room for migrant care workers to get 
involved in. The government has facilitated co-ethnic migrant workers to work for the care 
(service) sector through various policy renovations. The Korean government has also supported 
female marriage migrants to successfully act as wives, mothers and daughters-in-law, who 
assume indispensable roles to maintain and regenerate the family. This research has shown that 
the Korean productivist/social investment welfare state has been operating on the transnational 
level to help secure reproductive labour. The Korean case of the intersections between the 
migration and care regimes complements the existing knowledge of care-migration nexus not 
only by broadening the regional application of the migration-care intersection scholarship to 
East Asia and its welfare regimes, but also by extending the theoretical application to new 
routes/patterns of migration - co-ethnic migration and marriage migration. 
 
Key words: South Korea, Care, Migration, Gender, Regimes, Intersections 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Finding Connections: Migration and Care 
 
This research is about the relationship between migration and care. Over the past couple 
of decades, researchers have documented a trend whereby migrants, predominantly 
females, from poor(er) countries are meeting the growing demand for various types of 
care work in rich(er) countries (Anderson, 2000, 2014; Cox, 2006; Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild, 2003; Hochschild, 2000b; Kilkey et al., 2013; Lutz, 2002, 2008a; Parreñas, 
2001; Yeates, 2006, 2009, 2011). In other words, we increasingly witness that care 
work is being arranged beyond the national boundaries through cross-border migration, 
i.e., the trans-nationalisation of care. This interesting connection of migration and care 
outsourcing has been analysed by a series of conceptual innovations as follows. 
 Parreñas (2001) constructed the concept of ‘the international division of social 
reproductive labour’ among women in different geographical locations, applying 
Glenn’s notion of the racial division of reproductive labour to an international context 
(Glenn, 1992). Drawing on the work of Parreñas (2001), Hochschild (2000b) coined the 
term ‘global care chains’ to refer to “a series of personal links between people across 
the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring”. She typified how these chains 
might work: “An older daughter from a poor family in a third world country cares for 
her siblings (the first link in the chain) while her mother works as a nanny caring for the 
children of a nanny migrating to a first world country (the second link), who, in turn, 
cares for the child of a family in a rich country (the final link)” (Hochschild, 2000b: 
357). These chains of care transfer constitute what she labels an invisible “human 
ecology of care” (Hochschild, 2000b: 357), in which care workers are not just 
networked geographically but interdependent in a hierarchy of power and resource, just 
as in any ecologies in the natural world. The concept of global care chain has proven to 
be an effective tool not only to link personal/household level of care activities to the 
transnational/global level (Williams, 2010), but also to analyse broader social relations 
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around care (and welfare) in the context of migration (and globalisation) by placing 
‘care’ as a key dimension of reproductive labour (Yeates, 2012).  
The original conceptualisation of global care chains acknowledged that care work 
involved in the care chains can be both paid or unpaid, and be both for childcare and 
eldercare (Hochschild, 2000a, 2000b). Despite its broad analytical potential, the concept 
of global care chains tended to be applied in a rather limited scope by privileging both a 
specific migration pattern (South to North) and certain types of care workers (less 
skilled paid care/domestic workers in private homes) (Kofman and Raghuram, 2012; 
Yeates, 2012). This issue of the limited scope has been addressed to some degree by 
subsequent research. For example, skilled care workers and new types of care 
occupations began to be analysed by the global care chain frame (Yeates, 2004a, 2009), 
and the analysis was extended to include the cases of male care workers, more recently 
(Kilkey, 2010b; Kilkey et al., 2013). 
While the global care chain theory has been substantially pushing its analytical 
boundary to include different care occupations in varying skill levels and different 
genders, attempts to expand its geographical application invited new challenges. 
European countries do share some of the social changes with the USA that Hochschild 
(2000b) attributed the growing demand for migrant care workers to: women’s rapid 
move into paid work, shrinking family care resources and a consequent difficulty 
balancing paid work and care responsibility as a new social risk (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
Nonetheless, Williams and Gavanas (2008: 14) observed that the situation in Europe 
“does not fit” the typical scenario the global care chain concept envisages; instead, they 
found significant national differences even within Europe in the way migrants are 
involved in care work. The role of state policies was not clearly identified in the original 
conceptualisation of global care chains, arguably because the concept was developed in 
the USA where collective provision of care is virtually absent (Kilkey et al., 2010). 
However, it is essential to examine the national dimension on which ‘policies, 
regulations and discourses’ are formulated so as to capture variations in the mode of the 
migration-care relationship, and this is especially the case in the European context due 
to the considerable variability in welfare-care regimes (Kilkey et al., 2010; Williams, 
2010).  
Recognition of the importance of institutional aspects in understanding the 
relationship between migration and care has led to the emergence of a new body of 
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research, to which this thesis aims to contribute, focusing on analysing the intersections 
of care (including gender, more broadly) and migration regimes. The term ‘regimes’ is 
typically used to refer to “a complex of legal and organizational features” which are 
“systematically interwoven” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2). By dominant patterns and 
logics of such features identified against certain agenda, countries may cluster (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 26; Lister et al., 2007: 2; Williams and Gavanas, 2008: 15). Care 
regimes and (im)migration regimes are directly concerned with state policies related to 
care provision and entry, stay and settlement of (im)migrants, respectively. Besides the 
formal rules and regulations, however, social, political and cultural norms and practices 
are also often taken into consideration in the analysis of care and migration regimes. 
The analysis of intersecting regimes provides a ‘meso level link’ between the micro-
level of individual/household and the macro level of transnational migration, enabling a 
more complete understanding of how the relationship between migration and care is 
constructed, mediated and experienced (Williams, 2010, 2012, 2014). 
An early contribution to the intersection research is a study by Williams and 
Gavanas (2008) on the employment of home-based childcare in UK, Sweden and Spain, 
where they showed how the intersection of migration regimes with childcare regimes 
shaped the phenomenon of migrants in care work in different ways in different countries. 
They emphasised the importance of institution by arguing that “it is not simply the 
absence of childcare services for working mothers, but the nature of those services that 
stimulates particular sorts of demand by working mothers” (Williams and Gavanas, 
2008: 25, emphasis in original). Comparative studies like this are rare, but empirical 
case studies have been added to the intersection research, for example studies on Italy 
(Scrinzi, 2008), Greece (Hantzaroula, 2008), Spain (León, 2010), Portugal (Wall and 
Nunes, 2010), Germany (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010), Poland (Keryk, 2010), 
UK (Anderson, 2014; Kilkey, 2010a) and Austria (Bauer et al., 2014) (refer to Chapter 
2 for more detailed review). 
While studies on regimes intersecting are increasing in volume and scope, at least 
three limitations remain unaddressed. First of all, not all welfare state (or care) regime 
types have been evenly explored. Instead, studies have been limited to Europe, and even 
here research has focused predominantly on the countries clustered in the ‘Southern 
European family welfare (care) regime’. Other regime types outside Europe or North 
America have been largely ignored. It is a very recent development that a small number 
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of studies, either case studies (Um, 2013) or comparative ones (Michel and Peng, 2012; 
Song, 2015), started to document the experiences of East Asian welfare states, yet in 
only limited scopes (refer to Chapter 2). Secondly, even the intersection research, as in 
the case of global care chain research, has been confined to labour migration routes (for 
paid care work), leaving family migration routes out of scope as a consequent (Zhou, 
2013). This is a serious lacuna when considering that by its definition care should 
comprise both paid and unpaid work performed in both formal and informal settings. 
Thirdly, related to the second point, existing research has so far covered the limited 
range of care jobs and employment settings, mainly domestic work and childcare in 
private homes. Thus, cases of migrant workers for eldercare either in domiciliary or 
institutional care settings have remained largely under-researched except for a few 
recent additions e.g., Shutes and Walsh (2012). The next section will clarify in what 
ways the South Korean case can make a pivotal case in addressing these limitations. 
 
 
1.2. The South Korean Case 
 
South Korea1 (hereafter ‘Korea’) has experienced two parallel yet deeply connected 
shifts over the last few decades: the development of the welfare state and the transition 
to a migrant-receiving country. These are the result of a rapid economic and social 
transformation of Korea. Despite its long record of an independent nationhood tracing 
back to over several millennia, Korea as a constitutional nation state only began with 
the end of the Second World War when it was liberated in 1945 from the 35 years of 
Japanese colonisation. Yet it was not until the 1960s that Korea finally started to 
recover from the total devastation of the Korean War (1950-1953). However, ever since 
the 1960s, economic and social development has been staggering, often expressed as a 
‘miracle’. To illustrate, the per capita GDP in 1960 as measured in current USD was a 
mere 155 USD (one of the world’s poorest) but it reached 25,976 USD in 2013 (ranked 
30th richest in the world, while UK occupies 26th position in Purchasing Power Parity 
terms).2 Along with the huge economic growth, there has been a marked increase in 
crucial indicators of social development. For example, life expectancy rose from 53 in 
                                                         
1 The official name of the country is The Republic of Korea.  
2 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
 5 
 
1960 to 81.37 in 2012 (comparable to Japan’s 83.1, one of the longest in the world).3 
The Korean society underwent all of these dramatic economic and social changes within 
only about a half century; an experience, appropriately termed as ‘compressed 
modernity’ by Chang (1999). 
Although challenged during the Asian economic crisis in 1997, characteristics of 
the ‘developmental state’, as a type of economic development and governance strategy, 
along with some social, cultural and political factors have been commonly attributed to 
Korea’s exceptional economic and social development (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000: 
Chapter 10). Building upon this economic and social confidence as well as political 
democratisation, Korea has been quickly transformed into a welfare state4 and the 
growth of the welfare state was strong especially since the mid-1990s. As a policy 
orientation, developmentalism has characterised the Korean welfare state regime 
emphasising productivist and social investment approaches (refer to Chapter 6). At the 
same time, the fast industrialisation has exerted a profound impact on family formations, 
gender relations and demographic composition (population ageing), which in turn have 
altered the way in which (social) care is demanded and supplied. 
In the meantime, Korea’s integration into the global economic, social and political 
communities was also accelerated. Korea began to experience all aspects of the 
globalisation process and increased human mobility was not an exception. Korea has 
long maintained racial/ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Statistically speaking, Korea 
used to be virtually a zero immigrant country before 1990. The total number of 
immigrants, including the undocumented, was estimated at less than 50,000 (0.1 percent 
of the total population). The number, however, grew astonishingly 32-fold in the next 
25 years. Within less than two decades, Korea has transited from a dominantly migrant-
sending country to a dominantly migrant-receiving country (Castles, 2014; Castles and 
Miller, 2009). As of 2015 migrants make up around 3 percent of the total population in 
Korea. Compared to major immigrant destination countries in the West, the number is 
much lower but it is growing quickly and the economic and social implications of 
Korea’s migration transition are as equally significant.  
                                                         
3 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN/countries/KR?display=graph 
4 The term welfare state is used to refer to ‘a nation which has at least minimum level of institutionalised 
provisions for meeting the basic economic and social requirements of this citizens’ (Bryson, 1992: 36). 
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Korea receives migrants mostly from nearby Asian countries including China. 
Especially those who have the same ethnic origin of Korea or, ‘co-ethnic migrants’ I 
refer to throughout this thesis, have formed the biggest flow to Korea. Ethnicity is often 
constructed out of such elements as “language, religion, culture, appearance, ancestry or 
regionality” (Nagel, 1994: 152-3). In a similar vein, researchers of international 
migration in Korea have used the term ethnicity to highlight cultural distinctiveness, 
including language, of a certain migrant group in order to separate it from others (see M 
Kim, 2013; Y-J Lee et al., 2006). However, unlike a more legally defined notion of 
‘nationality’, ethnicity can be a very arbitrary, situational and dynamic concept subject 
to constant redefinition and reconstruction (Nagel, 1994). The Korean (im)migration 
policies have utilised the idea of the same ethnicity or ‘co-ethnicity’ in order to 
differentiate migrants by verifying the direct ancestral links between migrants and their 
parents or grandparents (refer to Chapter 5). The current study in the main adopts this 
approach when it discusses the co-ethnic migration policies in Korea. However, it 
should be noted that the Korean government often extends the scope of ‘co-ethnicity’ to 
include migrants even without the proof of the direct ancestral ties (refer to Chapter 5 
again). In this case, the boundary of ‘(co)-ethnicity’ is negotiated based on a broader 
notion of cultural proximity and shared ancestral roots and regionality regardless of 
migrants’ actual nationality status. 
The immigration growth in Korea is primarily a consequence of changing demand 
for migrants due to Korea’s rapid economic expansion and its changing economic status 
in the region over decades. Migrants started to find jobs at first in typical industrial 
sectors such as manufacturing and construction but later in service sectors including 
care jobs as well. Labour migrants constitute the majority but family migrants, 
especially ‘marriage migrants’, are also significant. The salience of female marriage 
migration is one of the defining characterises of Korea’s (im)migration regime. In this 
way, Korea has conformed to at least two features of the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and 
Miller, 2009: 10-2): the proliferation of migration transition and the feminisation of 
migration (emphasis in original). 
Then, against this background, specifically how can the Korean experience 
contribute to expanding the current understanding of the relationship between migration 
and care, and the role of institutional factors? To begin with, the Korean case adds a 
new welfare/care regime type to the existing intersection research. Despite national 
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variations, researchers have found a certain degree of convergence in experiencing care 
crisis and care outsourcing across Europe (Bettio et al., 2006; Williams, 2012). How far 
can this convergence be generalised by experiences of other welfare (care) regimes 
outside Europe (or western countries)? The Korean case can allow a unique chance to 
critically interrogate this question in several ways. Korea is identified along with Japan 
and Taiwan as the ‘productivist’ (Holliday, 2000) or ‘developmental’ welfare state 
regime (H-j Kwon, 2007a), adding to the conventional ‘three worlds of welfare 
capitalism’ articulated by Esping-Andersen (1990). This regime type has rarely been 
dealt with in the care-migration intersection scholarship. In addition, the Korean case 
can widen the analytical range of migrant care work research by integrating under-
explored patterns of migration - co-ethnic migration and marriage migration.  
 
 
1.3. The Research 
 
1.3.1. Purpose and Questions 
 
As was indicated earlier, a central motive of the current research is to address the 
limited coverage of current migration-care policy (regime) intersection research. The 
purpose of the research is to enrich knowledge of the relationship between care (regimes) 
and migration (regimes) by analysing how the migration regime and the care regime are 
intersecting in Korea with regard to care provision. It adopts ‘care transnationalisation’, 
a form of care outsourcing as its analytical frame. Drawing on the existing intersection 
theories, hereby I can make an initial assumption that the Korean case will support the 
‘care transnationalisation’ thesis in that Korea has suffered from worsening care deficit 
and the government has developed a specific migration regime to facilitate migrants to 
fill the gap; however the nature and types of care migration will differ from those of 
western countries, reflecting Korea's distinctive economic, social and cultural legacies. 
This study not only provides empirically rich data on migration (policies) and care 
(policies) in Korea, but it also offers a chance on the theoretical level to test out the care 
transnationalisation thesis with the Korean case. 
My research has been organised and conducted to address the following three 
questions. I firstly ask an ontological question: “What are the characteristics of the 
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migration flows to Korea and the drivers/motivations propelling the flows?” This 
question requires the quantification of the migration growth in Korea and an analysis of 
socio-economic and policy factors from both sides of migration. The second question 
focuses on the national policy configurations: “What are the features of the regimes of 
migration and care in Korea, and how are they [regimes] interconnected to facilitate 
migrants’ involvement in care in Korea?” This question is interested not only in the 
contents of specific policies, but also in rationales prompting development and changes. 
It leads to the third question from a theoretical perspective: “To what extent does the 
Korean case prove or disprove the ‘care transnationalisation’ thesis?” This last 
question is seeking to find out in which way the Korean experience can give new 
insights to the existing research on the relationship between migration and care in 
welfare states, which will be the primary contribution of this research project.  
 
1.3.2. Research Strategies 
 
To accomplish those aims the research employs the following two strategies. First, it 
adopts a broadened definition of care to capture the diversity of care work by migrants. 
Here I define the work of care as (social) reproductive labour (refer to Chapter 2 for 
further discussion). Adopting the concept of ‘social reproduction’ as an analytical lens 
to examine the activities of migrants yields a few but crucial benefits. First of all, it 
allows a wider perspective to appreciate different types and arrangements of care 
activities: paid and unpaid forms of care work in different settings, including the 
reproduction of human being itself (Lan, 2008). In addition, it gives an equal grounding 
on which reproductive roles against productive roles of migrants are evaluated. It is a 
much required and timely balance when reminded of the fact that a production system 
cannot operate without a reproduction system as Truong (1996) pointed out, and that 
migrants’ productive roles have thus far dominated migration research in Korea. For 
these reasons, the family migration routes were incorporated into the research. On top of 
that, the research examines not only typically researched areas of childcare and home-
based settings but it also covers eldercare and institutional care settings.  
Secondly, the research focuses on the analysis of migration and care ‘regimes’ in 
Korea. In doing so, the research draws on analytical indicators for the regime analysis 
developed by Williams (2012), as charted in Table 1.1. These indicators range from 
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laws and policies (formal institutions) to culture and norms (informal institutions) to 
policy histories. Such a comprehensive approach to care regime and migration regime 
seems to be in line with two strands of ‘new institutionalism’, namely ‘historical 
institutionalism’ and ‘sociological institutionalism’ (see Hall and Taylor, 1996). This 
research is concerned not only with the formal organisations, rules, and the historical 
legacies or ‘paths’ of care and migration policies in Korea, but also with, to a lesser 
extent, cultural and ideational aspects embedded in those policies (refer to Chapter 3 for 
related discussion). This (new) intuitionalist approach I found particularly useful for 
appreciating the role of the state since it has played critical roles in the policy making in 
Korea. As a specific point, Williams (2012) placed ‘the employment regime’ in a 
separate category to highlight the importance and the previous neglect of it. This thesis, 
however, sticks to the division of the migration regime and the care regime as in the 
early intersection research because the regime regarding the employment of care 
workforce can also be discussed together when analysing the care regime and the 
migration regime, for example, within the indicators (d) and (h) in Table 1.1 below. 
 
Table 1.1: Indicators for the analysis of care and migration regimes 
 Care regime Migration regime 
Analytical 
indicators 
(a) The extent of care provision for 
children, older and disabled people 
(b) The balance between formal and 
informal care or the balance among the 
state, the market and families  
(c) Instruments of care provision (for 
example, direct payments, care 
allowances, cash benefits, tax credits) 
and the conditions attached 
(d) The gendered and racialised basis of the 
care workforce, its hierarchies of skills 
and the relationship of these to workers’ 
remuneration 
(e) The histories of care policies and the 
relational practices of care/domestic 
work in the home 
(f) ‘Care cultures’: dominant national and 
local cultural discourses on what 
constitutes appropriate care and who 
should provide 
(g) Political negotiation and struggle at 
supranational, national and local policy-
making levels involving, for example, 
public sector trades unions, disability and 
carers’ movements.  
(h) Immigration policies: rules permitting 
country entrance and exit as well as 
special arrangements such as quotas for 
care/ domestic workers, bilateral 
arrangements, and rules in relation to 
skills, gender and family dependants.  
(i) Residency, settlement and 
naturalisation rules in combination with 
social, economic, political, legal and 
civil rights 
(j) National norms and practices 
governing relationships between 
majority and minority groups and anti-
discriminatory laws against 
discrimination or for multiculturalism  
(k) The extent of mobilisation of migrant 
worker activity through advocacy 
groups and trade unions as well as 
international organisation both 
governmental and non-governmental  
 
Source: Adapted from Williams (2012: 371-2) 
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1.3.3. Organisation 
 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Here Chapter 1 has introduced the main 
phenomenon with which the research is concerned and discussed the development of the 
focal theory and its current limitations, clarifying the originality of this case study on 
Korea. Chapter 2 systematically reviews the existing literature to find out in what way 
two seemingly separate domains of research i.e., care and migration have been 
articulated with each other, producing a new research agenda on the intersection of the 
two. The chapter focuses on the theoretical development but it also reviews case studies 
on some European countries and other East Asian countries to which the Korean case 
should be compared or contrasted. Chapter 3 briefly summarises the theoretical frames 
of the research developed in the two previous chapters and outlines the research design 
and the data methods adopted for this study. It also discusses philosophical, ethical and 
technical issues involved while conducting the research. Chapter 4 examines Korea’s 
transition to a migrant-receiving country by taking stock of the growth of migrants and 
analyses factors driving this transition. This chapter provides not only a statistical 
background for the following chapters but it also contextualises the migration growth in 
Korea in economic, social and cultural dimensions.  
Chapters from 5 to 7 are the main empirical chapters devoted to the study of the 
Korean case. Chapter 5 analyses the (im)migration regime in Korea. The chapter, in the 
first half, patterns out the various routes of migration, and in the second half it examines 
government policies with regard to migrants’ entry, residency and settlement by each 
route of migration. Chapter 6 first examines the development of the Korean welfare 
state and its regime characteristics. It progresses by assessing the ‘care crisis’ Korea has 
experienced and then analyses how Korea has attempted to address the crisis through a 
series of care reforms. Drawing on previous chapters, Chapter 7 examines how different 
groups of migrants are engaged in different modes of care work at the intersections of 
different regimes of care and migration. The focus is to reveal the roles of the 
government (policies) in this process. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 8), first I 
summarise the main findings and illuminate how these findings can contribute to the 
existing knowledge on the intersection between care and migration. Drawing on the 
findings and limitations, I conclude the chapter by highlighting the policy and research 
challenges that this work identifies. 
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1.3.4. Terminology and Scope 
 
‘Migrant /migration’ will be used interchangingly with ‘immigrant/immigration’, given 
that the current research is only concerned with in-migration to Korea. The first sets of 
words are preferred so that I may avoid negative connotations often associated with 
‘immigrant’ and ‘immigration’, problematisation and marginalisation for example. 
Immigrant and immigration is to be used only in the context in-migration should be 
clearly indicated to distinguish it from out-migration, or where Korean policy 
documentation adopts specific English expressions. It should also be noted here that the 
process of care transnationalisation may involve ‘internal migration’ as the global care 
chain concept illustrates; however, the current research focuses on international (or 
cross-border) migration only.  
Another set of words to be used interchangingly to a large extent is care and social 
care. Care (work) cannot be isolated from relational and social contexts, thus 
intrinsically rendering it ‘social’. The expression ‘social care’ is to be used to indicate 
more clearly a collective provision of care arranged by the government. In addition, 
social care is often used in distinction from ‘medical care’ especially when discussing 
eldercare as in the case of the UK, although the boundary between the two are not 
always clear (Twigg, 1999: 345).  
The research deals with the Korean experiences and draws much on Korean 
literature. So, language issues involved in the translation process are unavoidable. 
Certain words are so specific to the Korean context that either there are no English 
alternatives or they may lose the original meaning when translated. In this case, those 
words will be only phonetically anglicised and italicised. If particular Korean terms do 
find proper English translation, yet they should be understood in the Korea-specific 
context, these words appear enclosed in single quotation marks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CARE, MIGRATION AND THEIR INTERSECTIONS 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This research is situated at the interface of migration research and social policy research. 
Migration, international migration in particular, is a complex dynamic which can 
profoundly affect not only the lives of concerned people but also every dimension of 
societies involved. So, it is no wonder that migration becomes a topic of a wide range of 
academic disciplines, often as a theme of multi- or inter-disciplinary research (Castles 
and Miller, 2009). Due to its multi-faceted nature and transformative impacts, cross-
border migration finds an immediate relevance to many public policy areas as well on 
both the national and transnational/global levels; some such areas include citizenship, 
human rights, labour markets, development and security (Castles, 2010; Castles and 
Davidson, 2000; Cohen and Kennedy, 2000).  
Despite this wide relevance, migration (policy) is often considered “an orphan that 
does not comfortably fit anywhere in an integrated manner” either as a research topic or 
policy area (Hujo and Piper, 2007: 20). The ambivalent positioning of migration cannot 
be more true in the case of social policy or, more broadly, welfare state research. 
Sainsbury (2012), for example, argues that conventional social policy research, 
including comparative studies, tended to treat migration and migrants as rather marginal 
issues in the context of the post-War welfare states. The primary reason for this neglect 
originates from the focus on ‘class’ (and social relations around it) in understanding the 
welfare state and social citizenship; other social divides such as gender, ethnicity/race, 
disability or age were consequently overlooked in the welfare state research (Craig, 
2004; Lister, 1997; Wilkinson and Craig, 2012). In addition, privileging the nation state 
as an analytical unit does not allow much room for incorporating transnational or global 
dimensions into social policy research even in international ‘comparative’ studies 
(Mahon and Robinson, 2011). Some existing studies of the relationship between 
migration and welfare states hardly seem to be free from state-centric preoccupations: 
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for example, increasing migrants and ethnic diversity are often viewed as threats, at 
least challenges, to the welfare state by potentially weakening public support for the 
welfare state (van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007).  
Efforts have been made from various directions to challenge this orthodoxy. While 
some have attempted to empirically test how far the prevailing hypothesis that 
‘migration erodes welfare states’ can be confirmed (Banting et al., 2006), others, from 
an opposing direction, have tried to analyse how welfare states can affect migrants 
especially in terms of their social inclusion/exclusion (MacAuslan and Sabates-Wheeler, 
2011; Sainsbury, 2012). Still others, mainly feminist researchers, have been trying to 
recognise the interaction between welfare states and gendered/racialised migration 
(Anderson and Shutes, 2014; Kilkey and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010; Kofman, 2012; 
Lister et al., 2007; Lutz, 2008b; Williams, 2010; Yeates, 2012): they have highlighted 
that migrants, as active agents of globalisation, are also an integral element of the 
welfare state and its ongoing process of transformation. Specifically, they bring ‘care’ to 
the centre of illuminating the complex and multi-level relationships between 
migration/migrants and welfare states (and their policies).  
This literature review chapter, in essence, traces how the concept of ‘care’ has 
evolved into a critical analytical tool to analyse not only the welfare state itself, but also 
the relationship between migration and the welfare state. The chapter firstly (Section 2.2) 
interrogates how care has been conceptualised and broadened over time. The next 
section discusses how the concept has critically contributed to the analysis of the 
welfare state in explaining its variations and transformation. The chapter proceeds by 
examining some key characteristics of contemporary cross-border migration and 
mechanisms through which care becomes transnationalised. As the main focus of the 
current research project, Section 2.5 investigates a very specific area of migration-care 
research, the intersection between migration regimes and care regimes, and lastly the 
chapter provides an East Asian context in which the Korean case of migration-care 
nexus is situated in terms of migration patterns, migration regimes and care regimes. 
Then a short summary of the chapter follows as a conclusion.   
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2.2. Care: the Concept 
 
Care is a complex, often contested, concept. The complexity originates from the multi-
faceted nature of care as a human activity itself and from the different levels at which 
the concept is elaborated. One particularly influential approach is to see care as labour, 
women’s labour most frequently. Standing on the tradition of feminist scholarship, care 
has been conceptualised in a way which reveals women’ roles as mothers, wives and 
daughters (Daly, 2002; Daly and Lewis, 2000; Rummery and Fine, 2012). What they 
are doing can be articulated as both physical and emotional labour, which, like 
productive paid-work, must be arranged with costs and responsibility (Bowden, 1997; 
Daly and Lewis, 2000; Glucksmann, 2005; Hooyman and Gonyea, 1995; Ungerson, 
2000). However, what exactly consists of care labour is not something easily agreed 
upon. Care labour can take various forms in different spatial and temporal contexts. So, 
it is no surprise that successive researchers have “delimited” the concept rather than 
“confined” it (Rummery and Fine, 2012: 323). Tronto (1993: 103), for example, 
extended the concept of care to encompass “everything that we do to maintain, continue 
and repair our ‘world’, and the world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our 
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web”. 
In a similar vein, care is often defined as reproductive labour (Kofman, 2012; 
Yeates, 2012). Social reproduction refers to “the array of activities and relationships 
involved in maintaining people both on a daily basis and intergenerationally”, and those 
activities include not only essential household works such as shopping, cooking, 
cleaning or maintaining the house but also relational types of work such as socializing 
children, providing care and emotional support for adults, and maintaining kin and 
community ties (Glenn, 1992: 1). Here boundaries between care and other activities are 
not made totally clear; however, the social reproduction perspective does provide a 
delineation of what may contribute to social reproduction among different activities 
both in and outside of homes (Kofman, 2012). Although the ‘everything counts’ 
approach in the conceptualisation of care may be overstretched even to a point of losing 
its core meaning (Daly and Lewis, 2000)5, this broad approach has helped a variety of 
                                                         
5 For this reason, some researchers prefer narrower definitions of care. For example, care can be defined 
as help or services provided for those who have no or limited abilities to perform such activities 
themselves typically the young, aged, ill and disabled (Daly, 2002). This definition seems intuitive, but it 
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types of care clearly acknowledged as equally important labour as productive, typically 
paid, labour (refer back to Chapter 1).  
This conceptualisation of care as social reproduction emphasises physical 
reproduction as well as socialisation processes (Kofman, 2012). In relation to the former 
it includes the production and reproduction through the life-course of people as physical 
beings, incorporating on the one hand, family building through relationship formation 
and procreation, and on the other hand, the ongoing care required in the maintenance of 
people on a daily basis. It thus entails taking account of how families are formed, 
procreate and care over time (Kilkey, 2013). Moreover, these reproductive processes 
happen in the context of time (daily and generationally) and space (notably, family, 
institutions and states) (Peterson, 2003). Thus, social reproduction is inevitably 
configured by given social and cultural characteristics (Bjeren, 1997). The configuration 
of social reproduction is not limited to the private or local levels, but it can extend to the 
national, regional and even global level, in which, therefore, varied patterns of cross-
border migration become highly relevant (Kofman, 2012). It is also the case for the 
Korean experience to be examined here (see Chapter 7).  
Apparently, conceptualising care as labour can be seen as an attempt to value care 
itself, but, in a deeper sense, it is an endeavour to make fully appreciated women’s care 
activities, which have been largely unpaid, undervalued, and under-politicised (Daly 
and Lewis, 1998; Lutz, 2008a; Yeates, 2011). This may be one of the reasons why 
earlier research purposefully focused on informal and unpaid care and the conditions 
under which women perform such activities (Finch and Groves, 1983; Ungerson, 1987). 
By doing so, the concept has been utilised to draw attention both to the material and 
ideological elements configuring care work and to women’s (disadvantaged) positions 
and (often hidden or often exploited) experiences as main carers in the process of care 
provision (Daly, 2002).  
Over time, however, the earlier labouristic and individual/family approach to care 
has been challenged and complemented (Alsop et al., 2008; Williams, 2001). Williams 
(2001) identified a series of changes in the meaning and scope of care, or ‘paradigms of 
care’. In charting the changes, Williams (2001) pointed out that the early (1970s) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is rather restrictive to fully capture the multifaceted nature of care. Apparently, the definition cannot 
capture the dimension in which people outsource care labour for themselves or their families even they 
themselves are able to perform it. 
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paradigm framing care mainly as the unpaid labour performed by women within the 
domestic sphere shifted through the 1980s to an ‘ethical or moral paradigm’, which 
emphasises women’s different and superior capacity to care (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; 
Graham, 1983). At the same time, a more sociological approach, conceiving care in 
terms of social obligations which are shaped in turn by normative structures governing 
people’s caring activities (e.g., Finch, 1989), further challenged so-called ‘the 
exploitation paradigm’ of care.  
In addition, the conceptualisation of care has been complemented by the emphasis 
on the relational nature of care. Thomas (1993), for instance, emphasised that care is 
highly relational and contextual, so any analysis of care should consider not just the 
form/nature of the labour itself, but the nature of the relationship (such as inter-personal 
and economic) and physical care settings as well. Researchers began to pay growing 
attention to the wider social relations and contexts around which care (labour) is defined 
and organised (Lloyd, 2000; Rummery and Fine, 2012). They have been particularly 
keen on documenting how care roles (responsibilities) are socially divided along with 
the axes of class, gender and race in the combination of individual/family practices with 
institutional settings. Among early contributions, Graham showed that care can be 
delivered through a paid service outside of kin relationships, and the racial relation 
(hierarchy), as well as gender and class, can influence the process of giving and 
receiving care (Graham, 1991, 1993). It has long been observed that poor and working 
class women (largely to be replaced by migrant domestic workers later on) performed 
reproductive labour not only in their own home but also for middle and upper class 
families (Glenn, 1999).  
The social divisions of care are further complicated when bringing racial relations 
and historical institutional dimensions into perspective: for example, in the 1950s and 
1960s, the UK recruited health and care workers from its then colonies in order to meet 
a labour shortage in welfare facilities which otherwise native married women could 
have been expected to fill (Wilkinson and Craig, 2012; Williams, 1989, 2010). Complex 
social dynamics behind the division of care labour reject any naive assumptions that one 
type of social relation is dominant over others or that people belonging to the same 
gender/class/race automatically share the same interests. In addition, a continuing 
growth of care-related international migration and consequent changes in family care 
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practices have made race/ethnicity ever more relevant in the division of care labour, the 
discussion of which will be resumed later on. 
An increasing emphasis on social contexts as well as recognition of relational 
features of care has prompted an emergence of a body of literature which specifically 
looks at how care (and its costs) is socially constructed and shared, and what is the role 
of the ‘state’ in this process. The next section will discuss how the concept of care has 
evolved into a key conceptual tool to analyse the form and nature of contemporary 
welfare states: how they vary and how they change.   
 
 
2.3. Care and the Welfare State 
 
The concept of care has proven to be a useful tool to analyse the welfare state. Utilising 
the concept of care in welfare state analysis has been central in attempts to overcome 
the limitations of the original welfare state research, especially by constructing a more 
gender-sensitive analytical framework (Kilkey, 2000). As highlighted earlier, so-called 
mainstream welfare state research, represented by the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), 
explained the development of welfare states mainly in relation to class relations and 
(paid) workers’ political mobilisation, so it has been accused of not only being gender-
blind but also neglecting the significance of welfare (care) provision from private 
domains (notably, families), and the situation of care givers (Lewis, 1992, 1997; Lister 
et al., 2007; Orloff, 1993). Bringing ‘care’ to the centre of analysis of welfare states has 
contributed to remedying this neglect by highlighting the gendered nature of the welfare 
state and its social policies. Daly and Lewis (2000: 296), for example, argue that “it [the 
concept of care] provides an over-arching frame of reference” for an alternative welfare 
state analysis, and “it enables a more comprehensive and sociologically more complex 
understanding of why and how social policies are gendered.”  
However, the usefulness of the concept of care has not been limited to gendering 
the welfare state, but also in enhancing a general understanding of the welfare state 
(Daly and Lewis, 2000; Orloff, 2009). Care is an indispensable resource for human 
well-being, so it constitutes an important “good for social policy” of welfare states 
(Daly, 2002). But, at the same time, care is a very unique social policy good in that care 
is arranged across the domains of family, state and market, across the different types of 
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personal/social relations, and across the economic, political and cultural dimensions, 
which the conventional welfare state analysis (focusing on the state provision and 
monetary relations) may not be able to fully address (Daly, 2002). The concept of care, 
as reviewed above, is capable of analysing both private and public domains; both 
informal and formal forms and relations of care (Daly, 2012). Such a comprehensive 
approach to care allows a wide framework through which researchers can analyse how 
the provision of care is shaped in a certain way in a specific welfare state (Knijn and 
Kremer, 1997). One of such systematic approaches is the ‘care regime’ research.  
 
 
2.3.1. Care Regimes 
 
As an alternative to conventional welfare state regime research, the care regime 
approach is claimed to provide a useful analytical platform that helps researchers 
compare and contrast welfare states’ social policy arrangements vis-à-vis care-related 
rights and responsibilities (Anttonen and Sipilä, 1996; Lister et al., 2007). Care regime 
can be informed not only by the forms of institutional arrangements through which care 
responsibility is to be distributed among the state, the market and the family (Lister et 
al., 2007), but also by social/political discourses and norms regarding care provision, 
namely ‘care culture’ (Williams, 2012). Not surprisingly, care regime typologies due to 
different focuses and scopes are showing rather different pictures from what the 
mainstream welfare state regime studies portray. While three variations are 
conventionally identified for welfare state regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990), a 
fewer number of clusters have been claimed as ‘distinct’ in the care regime approach. 
 Anttonen and Sipilä (1996), for example, identified only two types of social (care) 
services regimes. Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) were classified as a 
‘Scandinavian model’ because of extensive pubic care services for both children and for 
older people and higher levels of women’s labour market participation. These countries 
are what Daly (2002) calls ‘caring states’ where care is an integral part of social 
citizenship and the state is the primary provider of not only monetary security but also 
the high-quality care for both children and adults (Ploug, 2012). The primary 
contribution of Anttonen and Sipilä (1996) is that they challenged the mainstream 
regime typologies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999) by distinguishing a ‘family care 
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model’ of southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy) from the rest 
of continental Europe on the ground that these countries have a ‘very limited’ supply of 
social care services. 
The findings of Anttonen and Sipilä (1996) have been largely supported by 
subsequent studies. In a more sophisticated cross-national comparative research, for 
example, Bettio and Plantenga (2004) suggest similar groupings of care regimes. Here 
again, Nordic countries form a distinctive cluster featuring widely available public care 
services. Southern European (or Mediterranean) countries are also identified as a 
distinct group in which care is privatised predominantly by the family. Regarding the 
rest of Europe, care regime models are inconclusive. However, it is indicated that 
different groupings can be possible according not just to the volume of social care 
services, but also to the differences in approaching eldercare and childcare (Anttonen 
and Sipilä, 1996; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). This is the point where conventional 
welfare state typologies are found incompatible with care regime typologies. For 
example, the UK and Ireland are both ‘liberal’ states but put a strong distinction 
between caring for children (largely privatised/marketised) and for older people (more 
collectivised). In Germany, care is not privatised to the family but voluntary (quasi-
statuary) sector through public funding plays a vital role in providing care for older 
people and children, whereas the same ‘conservative’ welfare state of France 
predominantly relies on unpaid family care and tends to collectivise only childcare 
while voluntary sector plays a minimal role. 
It is somewhat surprising to see that even one of the most elaborated care regime 
studies tends to deliver a very tentative conclusion regarding care regime typologies. 
Bettio and Plantenga (2004: 101) explain why they are reluctant to claim that their 
findings are “highly robust”: they admit that analytical rigidity was “severely hampered 
by differences in institutional and legal frameworks, conceptual difficulties, and lack of 
comparable data”. Despite the limited analytical rigidity resulting from especially data-
related difficulties, contributions of care regime research to analysing welfare states are 
clear. Firstly, it successfully reveals alternative patterning of care provision taking 
informal care input as well formal care provision, and social services as well as cash 
benefits into account. In essence, care regime studies have proven that care policies do 
not vary correspondingly to the models of conventional categorisation of the liberal, the 
conservative and the social-democratic welfare states (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Secondly, 
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it shows how different care strategies affect the social relations around work and care, 
and generate far-reaching consequences on family lives, gender equality, participation 
and even fertility (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Thirdly, it highlights the fact that 
different patterns of care provision reflect different ideologies and normative 
frameworks (Daly and Lewis, 2000). The care ideologies and norms are imbued in the 
formation of welfare institutions, which in turn set a specific path for future policy 
developments to follow (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). To illustrate, Sweden retains the 
strongest ideological commitment to state provision of care, which is compatible with a 
dual breadwinner model and it recognises claiming state care assistance as social ‘right’; 
on the other hand, in the UK, care ideology of ‘family care first’ is strong and a female 
part-time worker/carer model has been favoured, so consequently the state provision of 
care tends to be residual (Rummery and Fine, 2012).  
In a form of regime research, the concept of care has been utilised to examine the 
national differences cross-sectionally. However, care is an inherently dynamic concept, 
which makes it also useful to historically trace changes and transformation of welfare 
states (Daly and Lewis, 1998, 2000). The next subsection discusses how the recent 
transformation of welfare states can be analysed through the perspective of care. 
 
 
2.3.2. Care and Welfare State Transformations 
 
Care is one of the most significant and contentious policy elements in explaining how 
welfare states are transforming (Brennan et al., 2012; Rummery and Fine, 2012). Today, 
the environment around care (policies) in Europe and elsewhere is very fluid and 
dynamic: while the care policy area is under influence of the context of welfare state 
retrenchment, factors like women’s increasing rate of participation in the labour force, 
changing family forms, shifting values/norms of care and the demographic pressure 
from an aging population are together making care “one of few growth areas” (Daly, 
2012: 630). Given that these societal changes are widely shared across most 
industrialised countries, then can we find any convergence in the way different welfare 
states transform responding to these challenges? As discussed above, so far the care 
regime typology seems to build a bi-polarised spectrum: the Nordic ‘caring state’ (Daly, 
2002) regime at one end, and the Mediterranean family care model at the other end, and 
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the rest of countries in Europe exist in-between by the degree of care socialisation 
(formalisation). So, it is tempting to assume that welfare states may evolve from 
familial care regimes into, ultimately, more or less formalised and collectivised care 
regimes. 
Indeed, the tendency towards the socialisation of care, especially childcare, has 
been indicated: countries (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Spain) 
previously had limited public childcare have taken steps to increase supply (Bettio and 
Plantenga, 2004; Daly, 2012). However, as Pfau-Effinger (2005) argues, it is not a 
linear path of evolution from the informal to formal care: informal (family) care is itself 
modernising and still assuming a significant role especially as a means of achieving 
‘home-work reconciliation’. It is more important to recognise how the roles of different 
providers of care i.e., family, state, market and voluntary sector are shifting in the mixed 
economy of welfare (care) (Daly and Lewis, 2000). Thus, directions of change are 
various and often contradictory even within the same country. To illustrate, as 
mentioned above, childcare in many countries is becoming increasingly 
commodified/de-familialised through care services (both public and private), but 
eldercare is de-commodified/re-familialised by a shift from public (residential) care to 
informal family care almost simultaneously (Lyon and Glucksmann, 2008). 
Nevertheless, one compelling trend can be identified: the market is taking on more 
and more significant roles while the state is retreating from the role of a direct care 
provider, often as an element of purposeful neoliberal welfare reformations. The 
emergence of a care market and the introduction of direct payments and cash 
allowances for care are particularly important developments in this regard (Daly, 2012; 
Simonazzi, 2009). The growing influence of market provision might be termed as 
‘marketisation’, but the marketisation of care has been differently interpreted into 
policies in different countries. Brennan et al. (2012: 387) contend that “resting on 
different institutional bases, and influenced by local histories and practices, the 
argument for and processes of marketisation have developed different speeds, 
depending on the political contexts and the problems that marketisation was expected to 
solve. Marketisation is therefore path-dependent”: for example, in Sweden, 
marketisation was introduced to extend choice by overcoming a public monopoly, but in 
the UK, markets have been brought in to fill up the lack of public service. Moreover, 
marketisation is accommodated by different rationales for childcare and eldercare: while 
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the market is regarded an effective way to expand the supply of care (and education) to 
children as a social investment, cost-effectiveness and a wider consumer choice are key 
logics of eldercare (Brennan et al., 2012: 388). 
Essentially, analysis of welfare state transformations through the lens of care 
regime is about the changing degree to which responsibility of care provision is shared 
among the family (and within family members), the state, the market and the third 
sector. Care regime keeps transforming by changing the distribution of care resource. 
The recent development of care ‘markets’ and the introduction of some kind of cash-
for-care schemes across Europe have added a new dimension of care rebalancing. In 
some cases, they are highly regulated and used only for formal care providers (France 
and the Netherlands) and in other cases (Austria, Germany, Italy) they are used to 
purchase care from migrant workers or family members (Rummery and Fine, 2012: 
334). Related to the deficit of formal care provision and a grey economy of low-waged 
labour, ‘care outsourcing’ via migrant care workers is most prominent in southern 
Europe (Daly, 2012). Growing migrants’ involvement into care provision adds the 
transnational dimension to the social division of care, which I turn to examine in the 
next section. 
 
 
2.4. Migration and Transnationalisation of Care 
 
As discussed above, care analysis has contributed to the understanding of welfare states: 
how they are structured and how they evolve. Such inquiries have traditionally been 
characterised by ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002), 
which privileges the nation state as an analytical entity, and tends to focus on the 
national (domestic) dimension of politics and policies. Evidence shows, however, that 
globalisation complicates gender, class and ethnic relations in the welfare state and now 
care is frequently being structured and delivered beyond national borders (Deacon, 2007; 
Orozco, 2009; Yeates, 2005). It is therefore imperative to recognise the 
transnationalised nature of care (Williams, 2011; Yeates, 2011). One way in which care 
can be transnationalised is by the direct intervention of supra-national agencies such as 
international organisations, international NGOs and transnational corporations (Deacon, 
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1997; Mahon, 2011). Outsourcing care through the involvement of (international) 
migrants is also an important mechanism constituting a “global mix of care provision” 
(Gough and Wood, 2004: 30). The following sections seek to analyse the second 
mechanism of care transnationalisation more fully.  
 
 
2.4.1. Feminisation of Migration and Migrantisation of Care 
 
Global human mobility is a central dynamic in globalisation and it is rapidly growing in 
volume and diversifying in pattern, partly thanks to breakthrough in transport and 
communication technologies as well as recent political and cultural changes (Sassen, 
1988; Urry, 2007). More and more countries are critically affected by migratory 
movements, and the effects are not just limited to the economic dimension, but the 
social, cultural and political dimension as well. Consequently, once what was regarded 
as ‘national’ domain has rapidly become an ‘inter-national’ or ‘trans-national’; for 
example, the concept and experience of membership (both as ‘becoming a citizen’ and 
as ‘being a citizen’) are increasingly diversified (Castles and Davidson, 2000: Chapter 4 
& 5). 
Since the 1980s international migration has expanded sharply and involved all 
regions of the world. While conventional circuits of international migration may persist, 
new patterns and flows are continuously added in response to economic, political and 
cultural changes. As Castles and Miller (2009) argue, it is still possible to identify 
general tendencies of contemporary international migration: among those most relevant 
to this research is the feminisation of migration (Kofman, 1999; Morokvaśic, 1984). As 
a part of the gendered aspect of global migration, the feminisation of migration can be 
understood in terms both of an increase in female migrants and of their growing 
importance in the overall migration scales and patterns. 
Women now comprise nearly half (48 per cent as of 2013) of the total global 
migrant stock; however, considerable differences exist across regions: the proportion of 
female migrants is the highest in Europe (51.9%), followed by Latin America and the 
Caribbean (51.6%), Northern America (51.2%), Oceania (50.2%), Africa (45.9%), and 
Asia (41.6%) (OECD-UNDESA, 2013: 2). Female migrants, when calculated as a share 
of the total migrant population for each of the four migration pathways (South to South, 
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South to North, North to North, and North to South), were found to be in the majority in 
the North to North context, but the proportion of women migrating within the South is 
also increasing (IOM, 2013: 109). The number of female migrants has increased, but 
what has really changed over the last decades is the fact that women are increasingly 
migrating as autonomous agents rather than as dependants traveling with their husbands 
or joining them abroad (UN-INSTRAW, 2007). Most female labour migrants are 
concentrated in jobs regarded as “typically female”: domestic/care workers, staff in 
hospitality businesses and assembly-line workers in clothing and electronics (Castles 
and Miller, 2009: 133-4). Another important feminised migration route is marriage 
migration: it is typically a marriage between a foreign bride and a native bachelor in 
destination countries, which is particularly the case in the development of intra-Asian 
migration (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005). 
The feminization of migration is closely related to the phenomenon called 
“migrantisation of domestic/care work” (Kilkey et al., 2010: 380). During the last 
decade, many countries in the Global North have witnessed migrants’ growing 
involvement in both private and institutional care settings. It is argued that this is 
because of a growing care deficit caused by both the increasing demand for care due to 
notably population ageing and women’s increased labour market participation, and the 
shrinking supply of care resulting from a lack of care labour from familial sources, the 
domestic labour market and inadequate (or changing nature of) public care services 
resulting from welfare state restructuring (Williams and Gavanas, 2008). It is especially 
the case if a country encourages migrants to fill the care deficit through certain types of 
migration and care policies because it is more likely to lead to the normalisation of a 
care practice of drawing on migrant domestic/care workers (Williams and Gavanas, 
2008). Against this background, the nexus of migration and care has surfaced as a new 
field of social inquiry as well as a heated social policy agenda, adding complexity to an 
existing debate of commodification/re-familialisation of care (Lister et al., 2007; Yeates, 
2011). 
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2.4.2. Global Care Chains 
 
The combination of the feminisation of migration and the migrantisation of care work 
has been best captured by the concept of ‘Global Care Chains (GCC)’, which refers to a 
mechanism in which the provision and attainment of care are arranged in and across the 
nations. To illustrate, migrants from one, usually poorer, country cross the borders to 
take care jobs in another (richer) country, while leaving their own care gaps behind to 
be expected to be filled by someone else from the origin country (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild, 2003; Hochschild, 2000a; Parreñas, 2001; Yeates, 2004b). The main 
arguments of the GCC theory include: i) Care is a core reproductive labour, the demand 
for which is often not fully met by the internal care sources; ii) Care analysis must go 
beyond the state level in order to fully grasp the political economy of care in the context 
of globalisation; iii) Care is organised by a series of links which are mediated by 
national and international factors; iv) Global division of labour in care provision reveals 
a highly classed, gendered and racialised (also skill-based) social relation; v) The 
formation of GCCs reinforces the existing patterns of global inequality (Williams, 2010: 
391; Yeates, 2004b). 
The concept of GCC consists of three parts: ‘global’, ‘care’, and ‘chain’ and each 
part contains its own analytical element and implications. I already discussed the 
analytical value of care above. Let me further the discussion by specifying what is 
meant by ‘global’ in the GCC analysis. GCC incorporates transnational dimension into 
care analysis. Care is now organised by multiple actors based in multiple sites: there are 
involved at least two governments (in sending and receiving), migrants, consumers, 
recruitment agencies and global governing bodies. In GCC, ‘global’ means more than 
transcendence of national territories; it implies strong transnational inter-dependence or 
interaction in the demand and supply of care. However, it is important to note that while 
emphasising ‘beyond the state’ characteristics of care provision, the GCC proponents do 
acknowledge the certain degree of policy autonomies of individual states as well as 
agency of individual migrants. In this regard, Yeates (2011: 1112-3) cogently points out 
that GCC adopts specifically a ‘transnational perspective’, rather than ‘globalist’ or 
‘internationalist’ one. 
The term ‘chains’ is ontologically and methodologically informing. GCC utilises 
the concept of ‘chain’ to describe and analyse one or multiple links by which care 
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providers and recipients are globally linked. The idea was borrowed from ‘Global 
Commodity Chain Analysis (GCCA)’ because GCC takes a form of international 
outsourcing: extracting resource (care) in one place and deploying it somewhere else 
through the globally operating networks, just as multinational corporations run their 
businesses with geographically dispersed bases (Yeates, 2004b, 2012). The formation, 
dissolution and reformation of these chains (links) of care services are intermediated 
(either facilitated or discouraged) by an array of agencies and infrastructures, both 
governmental and non-governmental agents (both for-profit and non-for-profit) (Yeates, 
2004b).  
To sum up, two contributions of the GCC concept deserve emphasis. GCC has 
been serving as a powerful conceptual instrument to understand ‘the globalisation-
migration-care nexus’ by overcoming the state-centric methodological prejudice of 
earlier care analysis (Kilkey et al., 2010; Yeates, 2005). In doing so, furthermore, GCC 
successfully maintains analytical frames sensitive to classed, gendered and racialised 
social relations in investigating the relationship between globalisation, migration and 
welfare states (Yeates, 2005, 2012). However, the original concept of global care chains 
has been criticised for focusing too narrowly on the “refamilialization of care” (Mahon 
and Robinson, 2011: 12). Although gaps still exist, the frontier of the GCC research has 
been expanding from early focuses on unskilled (paid) care workers in domestic settings 
to comprise different skill types, gender and care settings (England and Henry, 2013; 
Kilkey, 2010b; Kilkey et al., 2013; Kofman and Raghuram, 2006; Yeates, 2004a, 2009).  
However globally GCC can be stretched, it is not operating in a vacuum. The state and 
its institutions (most importantly, regimes of care and migration) play significant 
influences over the process of care transnationalisation. It is why some researchers 
began to more intensely analyse how those regimes are intersecting.  
 
 
2.5. Intersections of Migration Regime and Care Regime 
 
Care transnationalisation research, exemplified by GCCs, has documented the growth of 
care migration and the dynamics underpinning it, successfully highlighting the 
international division of reproductive labour which is deeply classed, gendered and 
racialised. The research, however, has not fully examined how the growth in care 
 28 
 
migration relates to the existing migration and care regime within a welfare state or how 
it varies across nations. This is partly due to the lack of mutual academic engagement 
between migration/care literature and welfare state/care regime literature (Kilkey et al., 
2010: 379). Analysing how the care regime and the migration regime of a state are 
intersecting enhances the understanding of care transnationalisation by rightly 
positioning the phenomena in a broader policy context, and it crucially helps explain 
how the modality of care transnationalisation differs cross-nationally.  
The phenomenon of migration into care work can be observed and analysed on at 
least three levels: ‘the personal relations of migration and domestic/care work; state 
policies, regulations and discourses; and the transnational and global movement of 
labour’ (Williams, 2010: 385). The national level of research is specifically interested in 
examining how the migration regime intersects with the existing care regime (with 
wider references to gender regime, care culture, employment regime and the welfare 
state regime) of a country (Lister et al., 2007: 137; Lutz, 2008a: 2). Lister et al. (2007: 
138-9) give an illustration on how the regimes can actually interact: a transition of the 
welfare state regime from male breadwinner to ‘adult-worker model’ creates a pressure 
on care demand by increasing women’s paid economic activities. Preference for a 
specific care policy package such as ‘cash for care’ may accelerate the commodification 
of care by encouraging practices of care outsourcing. Launching certain migration 
policies, e.g. quotas for domestic workers and special entry permits for care migrants, 
may further facilitate care transnationalisation, which in turn can influence future 
migration flows (such as feminisation). The actual patterns of intersection are expected 
to vary state to state, reflecting the country’s own cultural and institutional legacies 
toward (de)commodification and migrantisation of care.  
 
 
2.5.1. European Experiences 
 
Data permitting, standardised cross-national comparative research can be most useful to 
construct a systematic understanding of the dynamics of intersectionality (Williams, 
2010). Although it may not be considered a highly rigid systematic comparative 
analysis, Williams and Gavanas (2008)’s research involving the cases of the UK, Spain, 
and Sweden demonstrates how the intersection study can be conducted and how it can 
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bridge the welfare (state) regime research and (care) migration research. Williams and 
Gavanas (2008) show both converging and diverging patterns across different welfare 
state regime types: in all those countries, more and more women take up paid work but 
face challenges maintaining a balance of work and care responsibilities due to some (or 
all) of such reasons as work practices, limited public care services and unequal gender 
relations; however, differences are also found in the degree to which each country 
resorts to migrants as a way of responding to these challenges depending on its own 
institutional settings, dominant care culture, and policy stance toward migrant care 
workers.   
Unlike Williams and Gavanas (2008) who dealt with countries having different 
welfare state regimes in the area of childcare, Spencer et al. (2009) conducted a 
comparative research with four countries having the same liberal welfare regime (the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada and the United States). They found that in the context 
of ageing, migrant caregivers already had played a substantial role in all four countries, 
and lack of public provision of care for older people along with the shift toward 
population ageing and declining domestic labour supply were the primary reasons for 
the increasing reliance on migrant care workers. Moreover, it was found that the lesser-
skilled and lower-paid care workers across all four nations were admitted often outside 
of labour migration channels such as family migration, adding significant challenges to 
managing inflows of foreign workers.  
Also through empirical case studies, researchers have attempted to account for the 
varying patterns of migrantisation of care work with explicit reference to the particular 
welfare, gender and migration regimes. Mediterranean countries often receive the 
highest attentions due to higher visibility of migrant care/domestic workers. In relation 
to Spain, León (2010) found that the combination of historical legacy of a familial care 
regime with a highly permeable migration system for the last two decades has 
increasingly encouraged the commodification of care work inside private homes and 
caused high dependence on migrant domestic/care labours. Sharing similarities in 
escalating care demand and feminised migration with other Southern European welfare 
states, Portugal is also experiencing the rapid integration of migrant women in the 
domestic sector but this is only the case for the upper-income households, so Wall and 
Nunes (2010) conclude that ‘migrant in the family’ type of care model seen in Spain has 
not emerged in Portugal (Wall and Nunes, 2010). Although less frequently, 
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conservative welfare (care) regime countries are also included in the intersection 
scholarship. Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2010), for example, observed that the 
German conservative-corporatist welfare state becomes increasingly dependent on 
migrant domestic/care workers, although the existence of migrant care workers is 
acknowledged only tacitly due to a highly managed migration system, which renders 
private care work clandestine in nature and a particular niche for undocumented 
migrants (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2010).  
What about social social-democratic (or ‘caring’) states? Nordic countries are 
conventionally believed to have relatively similar welfare state models. However, in 
terms of migration policies, paradoxically, is far from being one model: Sweden takes a 
rather liberal stance but Denmark is far more restrictive while Norway is somewhere in-
between (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2011). However, similar trends in the 
commodification of domestic/care work through migrant workers have also been 
witnessed in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, so “the Nordic region may be becoming 
less an outlier than is often assumed” (Williams, 2012: 369). Privatisation, 
marketisation, deregulation and the recent emphasis on consumer choice intersect with 
migration regimes, consequently expanding the care service market where (female) 
migrants are overrepresented (Gavanas, 2013; Lutz, 2011). The main growth areas of 
care migrantisation in Nordic countries are eldercare and au pairs (Bikova, 2010; 
Stenum, 2010).  
Intersection scholarship has been largely limited to the western (European) welfare 
states. However, both feminised migration and migrantised care work are not limited to 
the traditional migrant receiving countries. An increase in female migrants can 
contribute to a country’s transition from a country of emigration into one of 
immigration. Indeed, the feminisation of migration has also been witnessed in Asia’s 
new destination countries such as Japan, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and Korea especially 
since the 1990s because of the increasing demand for female domestic/care workers as 
well as foreign wives; this demand will serve as a major factor for the future migration 
growth in the region (Castles, 2014; Castles and Miller, 2009). Given that Asian 
countries are strongly implicated in the global mobility of care migrants, incorporating 
them into the research of care-migration nexus can benefit this specific field of research 
as a whole (Daly, 2012).  
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Nevertheless, extending the applicability to other types of (welfare) states in 
different regions may not be straightforward. Applying the analytical frame of care 
transnationalisation developed in the West to other countries (or regions) may face 
many challenges. One such challenge is the issue of “transposability” (Huang et al., 
2012: 130). Research drawing on highly fluid and contested concepts like ‘care’ may 
pose a ‘universalistic bias’ when transposed without criticism to different settings 
because care can be differently understood and experienced by different regional 
contexts as well as social, political and economic contexts, so sensitivity to contexts 
should be first guaranteed (Huang et al., 2012; Milligan and Wiles, 2010). The next 
subsection contextualises the East Asian countries in terms of migration patterns, 
migration regimes and care regimes.  
 
 
2.5.2. The East Asian Context 
 
Despite the historical importance of East Asia in understanding global migration 
patterns both as origins and destinations, policy research linking migration regimes with 
care regimes (and welfare state regimes) in this region is rare (Ochiai, 2009). The study 
of Michel and Peng (2012) is one of few comparative intersection studies dealing with 
East Asian countries, and they found that these countries increasingly turn to migrant 
care workers to deal with growing care demand. The way in which they resort to 
migrant care workers to deal with growing care demand is comparable to the 
experiences of the European (Mediterranean in particular) societies, but to a degree they 
differ from other countries and also among themselves because of their cultural and 
institutional contexts. Then what are those contexts specific to East Asian countries6? 
Asia is not only a major source of emigration, but also an important immigration 
destination. Asia has 60 per cents of the total world population due to two population 
giants - China and India. As presented in Table 2.1, as of 2013 Asia hosts about 71 
million migrants, making up 30.6 per cent of the global migration stock. As one of the 
                                                         
6 ‘East Asian countries’ in this study are more relevant to high income countries (or areas) in the region 
which have transformed to predominantly migrant-receiving countries such as Japan, South Korea, Hong-
Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), and Taiwan (a province of China, by the UN 
perspective). Taiwan is by the UN term a part (province) of China, but this study treats it as a separate 
‘nation’ for research purposes. 
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sub-regions of Asia, East Asia holds a rather (comparatively) small number of migrants: 
3.3 per cent (about 7.7 million) of the total world migrant stock, considering its 
population share of 22.3 per cent of the world. However, almost all countries in this 
sub-region have been experiencing a growth of their migrant stock (UN-DESA, 2013a).  
 
Table 2.1: International migrant stock by region (millions) 
  1990 2000 2010 2013 
2013 
% in the world 
migrant stock 
% in the world 
population 
World 154.2 174.5 220.7 231.5 100 100 
Africa 15.6 15.6 17.1 18.6 8.0  15.5 
Asia 49.9 50.4 67.8 70.8 30.6  60 
- East Asia 4.0  5.4  7.2  7.7  3.3  22.3  
Europe 49 56.2 69.2 72.4 31.3  10.4 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
7.1 6.5 8.1 8.5 3.7  8.6 
Northern America 27.8 40.4 51.2 53.1 22.9  5 
Oceania 4.7 5.4 7.3 7.9 3.4  0.5 
Note: This is a subregion category by the UN classification which includes China, Japan, Hong-Kong, 
Macao, Mongolia, North Korea and South Korea. 
Source: Compiled by the author from UN-DESA (2013a) 
 
As Figure 2.1 shows, Hong-Kong has the largest stock of international migrants in 
East Asia, with about 2.8 million migrants, followed by Japan (around 2.4 million); 
(South) Korea is ranked the third in East Asia as a country of destination holding around 
1.2 million migrants7, but it showed the fastest growth rate in this sub-region (UN-
DESA, 2013a). It should be noted that the migration of Korean Chinese (co-ethnic 
migrants) is the most important migration path to Korea both as labour migration and 
family migration (refer to Chapter 4). When calculated as a proportion of the total 
population from the same dataset above, it is shown that despite the recent rapid 
migration growth, Japan and (South) Korea still maintain a far more homogeneous 
racial/ethnic makeup in East Asia, 1.9 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively, not to 
mention a mere 0.1 per cent of migrants in the mainland China.  
In addition, it is worth noting that East Asia hosts the highest proportion of female 
                                                         
7 It should be noted that the figure here is lower than that presented in Chapter 4 because the Korean 
government’s statistics includes migrants staying between 3 months to a year whom the UN defines as 
‘short-term immigrants’ (see UN, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/migration/migrmethods.htm) 
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international migrants in the world (54 per cent) (refer to Table 2.2). Outstanding 
economic success of some East Asian countries since as early as the 1970s has triggered 
labour migration within the Asian region (for low-skilled jobs in particular) for both 
men and women. However, the recent feminised migration flow in East Asia is closely 
related to a significant increase in (female) marriage migration, and this is especially the 
case in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Growth in migrant stocks in East Asian countries 
Source: Compiled by the author from UN-DESA (2013a) 
 
Table 2.2: Percentage of female migrants in the international migrant stock by region (%) 
 
1990 2000 2010 2013 
World 48.8 49.1 48.1 48.0 
Africa 46.6 47.2 46.1 45.9 
Asia 45.6 45.4 42.0 41.6 
- Eastern Asia* 49.3 52.7 54.2 53.9 
Europe 51.4 51.8 51.6 51.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 49.8 50.1 51.5 51.6 
Northern America 51.1 50.5 51.2 51.2 
Oceania 49.1 50.0 50.2 50.2 
Note: This is a sub-region category by the UN classification which includes China, Japan, Hong-Kong, 
Macao, Mongolia, North Korea and South Korea. 
Source: Compiled by the author from UN-DESA (2013a) 
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A marked increase in international migrants in some destination countries in East 
Asia such as Japan, Hong-Kong and Taiwan has posed great social and economic 
challenges. Given that all these countries are experiencing a rapid decline of the fertility 
rate and an acceleration of ageing, policy makers in these countries, on the one hand, try 
to offset the negative impact of this demographic transition and continue to (re)vitalise 
economies by drawing on migrants and, on the other hand, they have to address or 
prevent social problems potentially caused by the increasing migrant population (IOM, 
2010). International marriages and the formation of families having different 
racial/ethnic backgrounds have emerged as growing policy issues (such as 
multiculturalism and integration) particularly for the countries having long maintained 
cultural and racial/ethnic homogeneity (HR Kim and Oh, 2011; Parreñas and Kim, 
2011).  
Despite the shared experiences of the recent migration transition and perceived 
cultural similarities among the East Asian destination countries, the policy approach to 
migrants varies. The way each country incorporates migrant (unskilled) workers in the 
labour market is very much determined by the government’s position on importing this 
type of worker: while Hong-Kong and Taiwan tend to adopt a less strict policy, Japan 
and Korea’s approach are much more cautious (Chan et al., 2011). Regarding marriage 
migrants, however, these countries seem to have adopted rather similar policies: various 
support programmes have been introduced to ensure their full integration, or ultimately, 
assimilation. A dominant policy rationale backing up these support programmes is to 
frame marriage migrants “primarily as wives, daughters-in-law and mothers” rather than 
potential active citizens for their own sake (IOM, 2010: 63).  
Social (care) policies are closely related to migrant policies in East Asia, as in the 
case of Europe and elsewhere. East Asian destination countries are now more or less 
facing unprecedented demand for care in the context of the rapid ageing of populations 
together with changing values in relation to family life and familial obligations (Chan et 
al., 2011; Daly, 2012). However, the emergence of welfare states is a more recent 
phenomenon to most East Asian countries than in the West, and possibility of sharing 
care role with the state and the market began to be seen a viable option for families only 
very recently even in the welfare leaders in East Asia (Peng, 2010). The East Asian 
welfare state regime, known as ‘productivist welfare states’ (Holliday, 2000) or 
‘developmental welfare states’ (H-j Kwon, 2007b), prioritise economic growth and 
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securing the supply of productive labour, so social policies are designed to best protect 
(male) paid workers through contributory social insurance schemes (refer to Chapter 5). 
On the other hand, reproductive labour, i.e., care, has been provided typically through 
(women in) the family in the East Asian countries (Ochiai, 2009). The Confucian ideal 
of ‘filial piety’ along with the patriarchal gender relations have formed a care culture 
which strongly normalises and prioritises familial and feminised provision of care (J-W 
Kim and Choi, 2013; Sung, 2003). When a family care capacity is diminishing and the 
traditional gender roles are challenged, the state, the market and the third sector begin to 
assume bigger roles, transforming the mix of care provision. The division of care 
responsibility has been further complicated by the involvement of migrants in two ways: 
recruiting paid care workers for both home and institutional care and incorporating 
unpaid care givers within the family.  
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a review on three bodies of literature in which this research 
project is situated: care, migration and the intersection of the two. In essence, it is all 
about ‘care’. Firstly, accumulated studies so far, as examined here, proves that the 
concept of care has evolved to capture multiple facets of care work on the individual 
level, and to provide an alternative tool to analyse the nature and varieties of the welfare 
states on the national level. Furthermore, on the global level, when placed in the context 
of migration, the concept of care helps overcome the methodological nationalism in the 
study of welfare states. Now the nature of care itself and welfare states’ role in the 
provision of care can be properly studied only by applying a transnational perspective 
on social entities such as class, gender and race/ethnicity. However, my review of 
migration-care intersection research, both comparative and case studies, has shown that 
the actual modality of the intersection between migration regime and care regime vary 
across the different welfare (care) regimes and also within the same regime. That is why 
the intersection research needs to continue to include more cases beyond the well-
known three worlds of welfare states. Lastly, before unfolding the case study on Korea 
in the chapters to come, here I located the case in the East Asian contexts of migration 
and care, implied how the Korean case potentially makes interesting but valuable 
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contributions to migration-care relationship literature, the intersection research 
specifically, essentially by bringing in co-ethnic migration and marriage migration as 
well as a new welfare state regime type - a productivist welfare state - into this 
scholarship.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this research project is to add new knowledge about the way in which 
migrants are incorporated into various types of care work through certain policy 
combinations in destination countries. As indicated in Chapter 1, this research employs 
two strategies to achieve this aim: by utilising a broadened understanding of ‘care’ as an 
analytical core and by focusing on the analysis of ‘regimes’ of migration and care. This 
chapter explicates how those two strategies have been rationalised and substantialised 
into specific research tactics in order to carry out the project. The chapter consists of 
two sub-sections: the first section discusses the general orientations of the current 
research including the design and epistemological and ontological stances of the 
research; the second section examines the specific methods adopted for this research to 
collect and analyse the data, and reviews technical and ethical issues arising over the 
research process.  
 
 
3.2. Research Orientations 
 
This research is a study on the intersections of care regime and migration regime. As 
reviewed in Chapter 1 and 2, intersection research is theoretically informed, on the one 
hand, by the feminist theorisation of care as (social) reproductive labour and its 
transnationalisation in the context of gendered migration, and by regime studies 
analysing the formal and informal institutions as new (historical and sociological) 
institutionalism emphasises, on the other hand. Staying consistent with these theoretical 
stances, this research has applied two organising principles: one is that it adopts ‘a 
single case study’ for the research design; the other is that it forms ‘a policy study’ on 
the state level rather than a study on individual experiences. These orientations not only 
 38 
 
provide a framework and rationale of the project, but they also direct the data strategies 
and delineate the boundary of the research.   
 
 
3.2.1. A Single Case Study 
 
It is reasonable for this research to constitute a single case study since the primary goal 
of the study is to generate detailed and holistic knowledge on a specific case (Korea), so 
that it can contribute to the current body of literature on the chosen subject. This 
research setup determines the nature of the relationship between theory and the research. 
As reviewed in the preceding chapter, the subject of this research, the relationship 
between migration and care, has developed its own set of concepts and theories 
validated by accumulated empirical evidence. That established knowledge directly 
informs this Korean case study, and, the findings from the study, in return, feed back to 
the knowledge in several ways, for example, providing an additional endorsement 
and/or calling for substantial modification of it. In this respect, this research project at 
the designing stage was clearly intended to emulate the Popperian ‘hypothetico-
deductive model’ of reasoning (Popper, 1972).  
I was convinced at first that this ‘testing out’ type of research could give a very 
neat formula which makes any social research (look) scientific: the researcher first 
located the limitations of previously proposed generalisations (concepts or theories), 
from which researcher’s original contributions can be claimed by specifying, modifying 
or clarifying those, significant yet premature, generalisations. However, it turned out 
eventually far more difficult than first expected to make this research project neatly fit 
into the ‘hypothetico-deductive model’. The difficulties arose from the nature of the 
research subject itself as well as from the features of the research design adopted for this 
project. In essence, this research borrows a key analytical tool (care transnationalisation) 
developed in the West and applies it to totally different geographical, cultural and 
institutional contexts. Expectedly, wearing borrowed spectacles has caused a great deal 
of epistemological issues from the beginning of the research.  
The research was motivated by the desire to find links between welfare states and 
(international) migration/migrants. At first, I was interested in researching how the 
welfare state provides social protection to migrants, in other words, examining migrants 
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through a lens of passive welfare (care) recipients. This initial focus may partially 
reflect the migration research tendency among social policy researchers in Korea. I 
quickly realised, however, that the opposite direction, how migrants provide care for the 
citizen in the welfare state as active agents, is an equally important but neglected 
dimension to the welfare state-migration research field. In an attempt to address this 
lacuna, the existing literature on the relationship between migration and care has 
influenced not only how I see (analyse) the reality, but also what I see (Bryman, 2012). 
It is without doubt that there has existed an observable reality that some migrants were 
somehow involved in care work in various forms in Korea despite its short history of 
immigration. However, the reality has hardly been framed as a phenomenon of ‘care 
outsourcing’ or ‘transnationalisation of care’, nor has been highlighted the role of 
government policies over this process. So, examining migrants’ involvement in care 
work in Korea through the concept of care transnationalisation required dual processes: 
the application of theory to a given reality and, simultaneously, the construction of the 
reality per se. 
Indeed, the concepts and theories developed in the western context gave me fresh 
eyes to recognise the complexity behind the recent migration growth in Korea. 
Government policy documents and media outputs on migration-related issues began to 
read different ways to me with new nuances and implications. However convinced I was, 
it was quite a challenge to convince other Koreans of the validity of my research agenda. 
During my preliminary research visit to Korea, I had chances to present my research 
proposal on the relationship between migration and care to a handful of social policy 
academics and government officials. I received rather contrasting feedback. They all did 
acknowledge the growing importance of the subject itself; however, some were very 
sceptical whether there was enough substance, or whether I could find proper methods 
to investigate the topic. Some pointed out that the migration-care relationship had never 
been staged as a serious policy agenda or a political discourse on the (social) policy 
community in Korea. It was rather surprising to see that some social policy researchers 
abroad, scholars based on North America in particular (from a personal communication 
with Ito Peng and other colleagues in her recent project8), seemed to be more convinced 
                                                         
8 The project 'Gender, Migration and the Work of Care' (http://www.cgsp.ca/research). I myself am a 
postgraduate participant to this project.  
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of the existence of the substance, i.e. the interconnectedness of migration and care in 
Korea.  
This disparity in awareness of the nexus of migration and care originates from the 
difference in the preformed social reality (for example, different immigration history 
and the characteristics of institutions). But, more importantly, the disparity also comes 
from different understanding or interpretations of social phenomena, most 
representatively ‘care’, and intellectual traditions within academia such as the strength 
of feminist/gender analysis. This interpretative or constructivist understanding of social 
ontology is particularly prominent when applying the definition of care to the Korean 
context. To illustrate, domestic work such as cleaning and washing has rarely been 
discussed as ‘reproductive work’, let alone ‘care work’ in Korea. When challenging this 
established position, the researcher’s theoretical stance and values play a significant role. 
This is why this research has demanded a high level of reflexivity and sensitivity when 
interpreting the phenomena and related policies throughout the research process.  
 
 
3.2.2. A Policy Study 
 
The second orientation of this research project is that it focuses on studying public 
policies related to migration and (social) care. According to Blakemore (1998: 2), 
studying (social) policy can be done in three directions: 1) what the policies are; 2) how 
the policies are developed; 3) why the policies exist (or do not exist). These questions 
are explored in this research through the analysis of ‘regimes’. Adopting the concept of 
regime determines the scope (mainly, formal institutions) and the level (middle range 
i.e., the national level) of this study. Investigating formal institutions of care and 
migration in Korea meets the purpose of this research to expand the understanding of 
the intersection of migration and care regimes. Regime(s) by its definition can be ideally 
studied for and through the comparative research, but it can also be useful for a single 
case study. Detailed data produced is itself contributing to the current intersection 
research, and it can potentially provide background data for future comparative studies 
as well. For this purpose, I have employed transferrable (applicable to other cases) 
‘indicators’ (refer to Chapter 1).  
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The intersection research basically is an attempt to recognise the national and 
regional differences (and/or similarities). In doing so, researchers have tried to highlight 
characteristics of institutions of each case (country or regional bloc). Whether 
comparative studies or single case studies, they share the same emphasis on institutions. 
Institutions do matter in a sense that social phenomena “cannot be simply reduced to the 
aggregate consequences of individual behaviours”; instead, it is to be shaped to a 
significant extent by the institutions within which individuals interact (March and Olsen, 
1983: 747). Recognising the importance of institutions is relevant not only to the 
European welfare states which have a long tradition of welfare ‘state’ analysis, but also 
to an emerging welfare state, Korea, in that the state has played a critical role for its 
social and economic development.  
However, what exactly constitutes ‘institution’ varies among researchers 
(Burnham et al., 2008). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, regimes can be 
analysed by various indicators, some of which, such as ‘culture’ or ‘norms’, are difficult 
to operationalise into specific policy terms. The current research is in the main guided 
by a relatively narrow definition of institutions i.e., in terms of formal structures and 
laws (rules); however, wherever relevant it also tries to capture wider (or informal) 
aspects of institutions such as norms, expectations and traditions (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: 9). This holistic approach to institution is especially useful when attempting to 
construct in-depth historical interpretative accounts on the development of the regimes 
of a specific country. For the Korean case here, for example, historical legacies (as a 
path dependance) are found particularly useful in explaining its regime characteristics, 
as historical institutionalism hypothesises (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Such a broader 
definition of institutions also sits well within ‘regime analysis’.  
 
 
3.2.3. Limitations of the Research Design 
 
At least three limitations relating to the research orientations should be elucidated. First 
of all, most obviously, the findings from this single case study are limited in its potential 
for generalisation; instead, they should be considered as a new piece of knowledge and 
insight added to the existing body of literature.  
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Secondly, as discussed earlier, this research is explicitly in line with the feminist 
tradition of migration and care research. I have no intention to limit the scope of this 
research to one gender type, but undoubtedly this research tends to prioritise the 
perspective from/for female migrants over their male counterparts, although overall 
discussions around the migration regime and the care regime are relevant, albeit 
disproportionately, to both genders. This is because, on the one hand, I myself strongly 
support the ‘gender-sensitive analysis’ as feminist care/migration researchers have been 
promoting, and, on the other hand, (im)migration growth and related social discourse as 
well as government policies in Korea are indeed constructed by gender along with class, 
race/ethnicity and/or skill. 
Thirdly, this study prioritises institutions over individuals, which can inevitably 
downplay the ‘agency’ of individual migrants. Migration can happen only through the 
existence of pre-established institutions e.g., immigration programmes and visa rules. 
Even undocumented migrants by definition can be seen as the consequences of the 
institutions. In this regard, this research seems to endorse a rather one-directional 
understanding of social ontology: individual actors are passively controlled by fixed 
realities (institutions) which are ‘already out there’. However, this is simply not true: 
individual migrants in Korea do exercise their agency in order to maximise utility as the 
rational choice theory anticipates. Nevertheless, this research understands that 
individuals’ utility maximising behaviours are ultimately conditioned, sometimes more 
effectively, through institutions (Peters, 2005). The evolution of the Korean version of 
guest worker programme provides a good example of how individual migrants can 
interact with institutions under the given conditions (refer to Chapter 5).  
So far I have discussed how the research aim and the focal theory provide 
rationales and frameworks within which the Korean experience of care 
transnationalisation can be researched. I have also highlighted priorities of this research 
and their weaknesses. Those priorities and limitations of the research determine what 
kind of data is needed and how they should be collected and analysed, which the next 
section turns to.  
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
3.3. Data Methods 
 
The way in which researchers choose and employ specific data methods for any project 
is “dictated both by its [the project's] objectives and by its boundaries” (Burnham et al., 
2008: 5). My research objective has been to investigate the Korean case of care 
transnationalisation, and it required a historical interpretation of the migration-care 
relationship and the role of state policies therein. To do so, the research has demanded 
three categories of core data, both quantitative (statistics) and qualitative (words): 
(im)migration growth, societal changes including demographic transition and changes 
in families, and state policies on social care and (im)migration.  
To collect, analyse and interpret these data, the research adopted a combined 
approach: documentary analysis and expert interviews. Various types of documentary 
materials have constituted the primary source of evidence to construct the thesis, and the 
data from expert interviews were less in volume and only selectively used to make 
specific arguments. The synthesis of these two data methods was an attempt to increase 
the credibility of the research by diversifying data sources, which is often called 
“triangulation” strategy (Bryman, 2012: 392). This is a single case study and its 
orientation is largely qualitative, so measures could be eclectic and less reliable, so 
crosschecking the argument by different sources of data is crucial to guarantee the 
validity of the research.  
The boundaries dictating the selection of data methods refer to not only the 
research focus and scope, but also ‘physical conditions’ under which the research is 
carried out. First of all, the researcher (in the UK) and the research subject (in Korea) 
are geographically distanced. The geographical separation has influenced the way I 
conducted the research both positively and negatively. In a positive way, I have been 
able to maintain fresh eyes on the subject and keep a rather objective attitude. However, 
in a negative way, the limited physical access to the subject has also limited my access 
to data, forcing me to draw on the data only accessible from abroad via online facilities. 
All real world research projects are carried out within certain constraints, but this PhD 
project has been even more stringent: lack of funding and fixed time frame (3 years) 
certainly limited the options I could choose for data methods as well as research design. 
However, it is the researcher's ability and duty to carry out the project negotiating 
through all those constraints and to produce the best possible outcomes. The following 
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sections will explicate how the two data methods have been justifiably employed for the 
research and discuss technical and ethical issues involved.  
 
 
3.3.1. Documentary Analysis 
 
This research project has been primarily built upon a comprehensive survey of 
‘documents’ from both governmental and private sources. Burnham et al. (2008: 212) 
argue that “careful use of a wide range of documentary material is one of the most 
reliable methods open to political researchers and provides an opportunity for the 
production of authoritative studies”. This can also be the case for the social (policy) 
researchers. A large quantity of documentary materials in all varieties is readily 
available and becoming increasingly accessible ‘globally’ via new information 
technologies. In addition, it is easier to apply various analytical tools to documentary 
data. Particularly when digitalised, these types of data can save the researcher a great 
deal of time and cost, and thus make the research process more efficient.  
 
Types of materials 
The documentary data for this research comprise official statistics, policy documents, 
academic papers and media outputs. Combined in different proportions in each chapter 
of this thesis, these four categories of documentary data were used to construct detailed 
historical narratives and interpretations of Korea’s migration transition (Chapter 4), the 
evolution of migration and care regimes (Chapter 5 and 6), and the intersections 
between the two regimes (Chapter 7).  
As noted earlier, this research is a study of public policies. So, the most essential 
‘primary data’ for this research has been official statistical information. Official 
statistics were extensively incorporated throughout the thesis in both a descriptive and 
an analytical way. The main gateway for acquiring the official statistical data was the 
Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) of the Statics Korea (a bureau of 
statistics in Korea), which contains virtually all statistical data created by the 
government agencies and affiliated organisations such as government-funded think 
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tanks. The KOSIS runs a very accessible website9 where raw datasets including 
metadata10 can be downloaded. The data on population (including foreign nationals), 
households, labour markets and social welfare were retrieved from the KOSIS. Another 
important source of the statistics on migrants is the Korea Migration Service website11, 
maintained by the Ministry of Justice, which provides detailed statistical reports on 
immigrants and emigrants on a monthly and a yearly basis.  
This research also heavily drew on the policy documents directly provided by the 
Korean government (refer to Appendix 3.1). Laws have been the most authentic 
references to this policy study. The Ministry of Government Legislation provides an 
online database of the entire body of laws in Korea often with English translations 
(translation issues to be discussed below).12 This facility was found particularly useful 
in tracing policy changes through successive amendments. Another type of crucial 
policy documents was policy reports directly published (on- and offline) by the central 
government. Migration and care are major policy agendas in Korea, and the relevant 
ministries periodically create joint policy reports as a form of ‘master plan’. Apparently, 
some of the ‘plans’ in those reports more often appear mere political rhetoric rather than 
substantialised policies, but these plans do reveal the government’s own policy 
evaluation, emphases and future directions. Access to the information on government 
policies is guaranteed by a law in Korea, and all governmental organisations are 
disseminating up-to-date policy information through media release and official websites. 
Policy reports and surveys produced by think tanks and experts constituted also an 
important data source for this research. It is a common practice in Korea that the central 
government commissions research on certain topics, typically large-scale survey, to 
governmental/private research institutions or simply a group of experts before the 
introduction or reformation of certain policies. Those materials are not necessarily 
academically rigorous, but they are very useful to gain the background knowledge of 
certain social phenomenon and to preview the government attitude toward the 
phenomenon and proposed policies.  
                                                         
9 See http://kosis.kr 
10 Matadata is a statistical term to refer to information about data and about processes of producing and 
using data (OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1647) 
11 See http://www.immigration.go.kr 
12 See http://www.law.go.kr 
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Needless to say, genuine academic publications written in Korean as well as 
English have been indispensable as secondary data. Together with governmental or 
quasi-governmental policy documents, scholarly literature was utilised in setting up 
theoretical background and analytical frames for the current study. Korean literature, 
through my own translation, was of a particular value in showing how migration and 
care have been framed and researched in Korea. Considering the importance of 
interpretative effort on a single case study, as highlighted earlier, incorporating 
academic discussions happening in Korea to this research is vital.  
The documentary data sources above were complemented by media outputs. As 
migrants have surfaced as a major social issue and a policy agenda since the mid-1990s, 
various types of migrant/migration-related information have been spreading online. The 
information exists in various forms including news articles, personal blogs and postings 
in social network services. This research, however, only incorporated news articles, 
interviews and speeches released online by the government, news agencies or 
organisations to guarantee the credibility of data.  
 
Analysis of documentary data 
Documentary data were identified, collected and processed by the following steps. To 
begin with, I identified the four main themes of research informed by the focal theories, 
care and care transnationalisation (refer to Chapter 2): migration transition, migration 
regime, care regime and the intersections of migration and care regimes. These themes 
have been developed into four empirical chapters. I started with searching the most 
frequently referenced academic papers/books via Google Scholar, through which I 
managed to build up background knowledge and key contributors and concepts/issues 
for each chapter. 
Then, I visited official websites of the related Korean government departments and 
retrieved main policy documents (mainly ‘master plans’) from their archive. From those 
main policy documents, I traced back other policy documents and statistical data set via 
the KOSIS system the original documents refer to. In parallel, I searched policy reports 
on specific policy area published by think tanks and academics, and compared their 
findings and policy recommendations with the official policy documents and the 
academic papers. To be informed of most recent policy updates, media interviews, open 
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discussions and public responses, I conducted unrestricted (non-academic) online 
searching using the key words using search engines like Google or Naver.  
Next, all the collected documentary data were categorised thematically and 
chronologically for analysis. In analysing numerical data, I used MS Excel and IBM 
SPSS programmes. For textual materials, I simply used a ‘search and find’ function of 
MS Word and Adobe Acrobat.13 In doing so, I attempted to highlight how the key 
concepts/issues initially identified from focal theories were translated into actual policy 
terms and presented in the Korean policy documents. In addition, my analysis paid 
particular attention to how declared policy goals and rationales were established into 
actual policies, and how statistical data show the outcomes of the policies. This stage 
helpled me draft and refine critical interview questions for the expert interviews. 
In order to verify and update my observations, the whole process of data 
gathering/analysing has been repeated three times (roughly once a year) between 
September 2012 and May 2015. In writing up the findings, I returned to the academic 
publications to see how my findings can meaningfully contribute to the existing 
academic understanding of the chosen topics. This overall research strategy was 
similarly applied to the interview method (see below).  
 
Technical issues in the documentary analysis 
The government tends to afford to carry out large scale research projects and produces a 
large quantity of, and potentially more reliable, data for academic social research 
(Bryman, 2012). However, it is important to realise that even official documents 
deriving from the state are “socially constructed” (May, 2001: 84). In other words, those 
data may not be totally neutral but can be biased by the producers of the documents, 
which demands an extra caution from researchers dealing with them. Statistical data on 
migrants are not an exception since they are heavily influenced by government political 
intentions and its policy approaches. To illustrate, the Korean government started to 
collect and provide more detailed statistical information on marriage migrants and their 
naturalisation only when marriage migrants received policy spotlights. On the other 
hand, the government has not so far provided a separate dataset of migrant care workers 
                                                         
13 I did not feel an absolute necessity to utilise any other qualitative research software such as NVivo 
since the data were rather small in volume and already well organised and indexed from the collection 
stage using key words consistently. Moreover, after several attempts, I found that the Korean language 
was not fully compatible with NVivo yet. 
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by types (such as domestic workers or nannies); instead, they are grouped together 
under the entry of ‘household employment’. This is the result of the lack of a legal 
framework for domestic care workers. The addition (or removal) of certain visa 
categories and changes in migration policy frames directly affect the way statistical data 
are collected and presented. The official statistical data that I needed in some cases were 
categorised differently, making it impossible to construct a consistent time-series data, 
and in other cases, the data simply did not exist. In those cases, I could not but to turn to 
the second best, the secondary data which other scholars’ and institutions’ produced.  
Textual materials from the government also call for cautions. Bryman (2012: 551) 
alerts us to note that “people who write documents are likely to have a particular point 
of view that they want to get across.” The ‘master plans’ published by the Korean 
government are the most apparent examples, where the government promotes specific 
values and attitude toward immigrants and immigration policies. So, what the 
documents reflect may not the actual reality but a separate level of reality in their own 
right (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011; Bryman, 2012). Therefore, “all users of documents 
face problems of interpretation”, which demands that the researchers be aware of the 
document creators’ intentions, the conditions under which the text was produced, and, 
most importantly, the limitations of the documents (Burnham et al., 2008: 211-2). One 
way to address these issues is to buttress the research with additional data method(s). 
That is what I intend to do for my research with expert interviews.  
Language translation from Korean to English has been a recurring challenge over 
the entire process of the study. Some Korean words in translated in English may lose 
the original meaning and nuances. In addition, so-called official English translations 
provided by the Korean government often turned out simply inappropriate or 
inconsistent across documents and departments. On the first hand, I adopted academic 
researchers’ Korean-English translations and compared them to choose better 
expressions with the official translations if available. In other cases, I tried to comply 
with international usage of terms. As the Korean government has increasingly engaged 
with global knowledge gathering efforts through international organisations, many 
policy and statistics data on Korea became available in English from the organisational 
archives of the UN, ILO, OECD and IMO, from which I took references for translations.  
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3.3.2. Expert Interviews 
 
Interviews with experts were employed as a means to supplement the findings from the 
documentary analysis. Immigration is a very recent but rapidly developing phenomenon 
in Korea. Migration has become such an important political and policy issue in Korea 
due to its enormous social, economic and cultural implications. Migration policy itself 
has become a new challenge to the Korean government and a contested area where 
multiple policy actors with different interests are competing in the policy making. It is 
possible to figure out through official policy documents how the government 
approaches (im)migration and defines its relationship to other public policy areas, 
notably social care policies. However, it is often the case that the government’s genuine 
policy intentions and political considerations are not explicitly expressed in the official 
documents. This is why the current research has sought additional data through 
qualitative interviews with experts.  
 
Sampling 
Then who are the experts? This research touches two distinct policy areas, migration 
and care, which make all different types of experts, such as lawmakers (congress 
members), government officials as well as academics, potential interviewees. However, 
the interviews here, as one component of the data which the research draws on, were 
used in a limited manner which aims to triangulate the evidence from the documentary 
analysis rather than to produce own arguments. Since I was interested in finding out the 
government’s intentions and rationales behind introducing and reforming specific 
policies, I decided to interview middle-rank government officials who were actually in 
charge of devising and operating policies. The sampling of the interviewees was 
therefore guided accordingly. 
On the ministerial level, three ministries are found relevant to migrants’ work and 
life: Ministry of Justice (MOJ), Ministry of Employment and Labour (MOEL), and 
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF). MOJ is the main control tower 
which is in charge of providing legal frameworks for migration policies and 
administering overall immigration control (entry, residence and settlement). MOEL 
operates ‘labour migration’ programmes while MOGEF deals with ‘family migration’. 
The selection of the interviewees was based on their job duties. Contact information 
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was obtained from each ministry’s official website which provides detailed information 
on the staff and their duties. In case I called the department main number, they put me 
through the person(s) in charge of the policies I was interested in. Thereby, three 
interviewees working for each ministry were finally selected. In addition, I managed to 
recruit one official from the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) 
through a personal route. SMBA is a sub-ministerial body specialising in assisting small 
and medium-sized enterprises, so it is highly relevant to migrant workers. I tried to 
recruit an interviewee from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) but it was 
eventually not included because MOHW apparently had neither such policies nor 
officials specifically dealing with migrants.  
During the sampling stage, lawmakers were ruled out first due to the difficulty of 
accessibility. Academics were also excluded on the ground that their professional 
opinions can be obtained through their publications; however, a more fundamental 
reason is that, noted earlier, such academics are rare who have accumulated a specialty 
on the intersection of migration and care. I did have some chances to talk about the 
issue of migration-care connection with both Korean and foreign scholars but not as 
formal interviews. However, at the later stage of the study, I was lucky enough to recruit 
an academic whose specialty lies on gender and welfare/care politics of Korea. The 
person was willing to participate in a formal interview (face-to-face). I thought it could 
be a good way to compensate the lack in care policy-related interview data.  
The rather limited number of interviewees of five can be justified by following 
reasons. Geographical separation and financial and time constraints were, in part, the 
reasons for not having been able to increase the sample size. Constrained resources have 
dictated me to ‘select and focus’; more fundamentally however, locating suitable 
interview candidates (officials) having good understanding of this issue (migrants for 
care work) was far more difficult than initially expected, exactly as I had been warned 
off earlier by a Korean academic. Even those who were working at the relevant ministry 
and department had very limited awareness on this very recent and specific issue. This 
lack of awareness substantially limited the size of the potential interviewee pool.  
There was an episode that when I tried to find who and which ministry/department 
were in charge of the employment policies for (female) marriage migrants, officials 
from MOEL and MOGEF referred me to each other repeatedly, saying “they have a 
speciality on that policy, not us.” It may have resulted from the fact that the Korean 
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migration regime takes a sort of joint governance system, so that individual officials 
inevitably have limited knowledge by their ranks (refer to Chapter 5). In this regard, the 
information from the interviews alone should not be used to construct arguments due to 
the limited sample size. And it is also the reason why the analysis of documentary 
sources, such as joint policy reports, is so crucial for this research in order to grasp the 
big picture. Nevertheless, however small it may seem, my sampling successfully 
covered the core government institutions related to migration policies (MOJ, MOEL 
and MOGEF). The interviews have provided valuable chances to glimpse how the 
people inside the government evaluated and rationalised their migration-related policies.   
 
Conduct of interviews 
I chose the telephone interviewing method due to following benefits. First of all, it was 
a pragmatic consideration. Given that the researcher could not afford to carry out long-
term on-site fieldwork but potential interviewees were geographically dispersed, 
telephone interviewing seemed a reasonable choice. Secondly, telephone interviewing 
allowed greater flexibility in arranging and conducting interviews at interviewee’s most 
convenience. Considering government officials are extremely busy and frequently work 
overtime in Korea, telephone interviewing causes less distress to them. Indeed, in my 
preliminary discussions, two government officials suggested that government officials 
would prefer telephone or email communications over face-to-face interviews not only 
because their calendars are already loaded with schedules, but they feel more 
comfortable with ‘just talking over the phone’ rather than revealing their faces. Lastly, 
each call may be relatively short but telephone interviewing does allow multiple 
chances of interviews over a certain period of time.  
After my research proposal approved in October 2013, I visited Korea for a month 
to share my research idea with others and to recruit potential interviewees. I managed to 
recruit the interviewees and earned consents to have telephone interviews when I came 
back to the UK. Actual interviews with the government officials were conducted via 
telephone between December 2013 and August 2014. The interviews were not rigidly 
structured but guided by a set of questions prepared by the researcher. All the 
conversations were recorded and subsequently transcribed for analysis. Disappointingly, 
interviews happened only once with each interviewee but in one case, there was a 
follow-up email communication with a valuable ‘internal document’. As indicated 
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above, I had a chance to conduct a face-to-face interview with one participant at the 
later stage of research (May 2015). It taught me a valuable lesson on the difference in 
the two interview methods.  
The telephone interview should not necessarily be seen as an inferior method to 
face-to-face interview because it can be the best option under certain circumstances 
(Harvey, 2011). There is some evidence that there are few differences in the kinds of 
response that researchers can get when interviewing by telephone instead of in person 
(Bryman, 2012). However, during the telephone interviews, I experienced some obvious 
drawbacks. As Bryman (2012) pointed out, it was difficult to secure a certain length of 
interview time, and respondents seemed to be less engaged. Even though I managed to 
reach him or her later again, it was difficult to maintain the natural flow of dialogue, so 
the interviews became something similar to ‘question and answer’ time. In addition, 
telephone interviewing prevented the researcher from appreciating respondents’ non-
verbal signals such as gestures. In contrast, the face-to-face interview was much more 
spontaneous, personal and engaged. However, under the given situations, the 
advantages of telephone interviewing in general far outweighed the disadvantages for 
the current research project.  
 
Analysis of interview data 
All the audio-recordings were firstly literally transcribed in Korean, and then they were 
translated into English by the author. In this stage, translation became an issue once 
again. Admittedly, the translator’s understanding and preference of certain terms and 
expressions were inevitably reflected. The English version of interview transcripts were 
repeatedly read, and any wordings revealing policy intentions and rationales were 
highlighted. Then they were juxtaposed with the findings from the documentary 
analysis to see whether they support or contract each other. Comparing my interview 
findings with media interviews with lawmakers and a presidential speech turned out to 
be a very effective way of triangulation. 
 
Ethical considerations in the expert interviews 
This research involves a direct contact with people, so it cannot be free from the ethical 
consideration. The primary ethical issue involved in this research is with regard to how 
to guarantee anonymity of interviewees. The interviewees were not asked to reveal 
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personal stances against any highly controversial issues; rather, all the questions were 
about the official positions of the government. However, they were middle-rank 
government officials who were actually making and delivering policies and programmes. 
Some of their opinions could be understood politically incorrect or maliciously distorted 
if their identity is revealed. So, all the possible measures have been sought to guard their 
privacy. Gathering of interviewees’ personal information was minimised: names, job 
roles or any identifiable personal information are not to be exposed in the thesis. Only 
official contact information appeared on the official websites was collected and used for 
the arrangement. What they said during the interviewed were translated into English and 
cited only with the title of the ministry they were working for. The transcription has 
been completely anonymised and the voice recordings have been destroyed right after 
the transcription completed. All transcriptions have been securely protected in the 
author’s password-protected laptop only, and they will also be destroyed when the 
research ends. All of these precaution measures were reviewed and approved by the 
Ethics Coordinator of the Department of Sociological Studies, the University of 
Sheffield. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the general orientations of the current research project: a single 
case study and a policy study, and discussed how these orientations are related to 
epistemological and ontological frameworks adopted for this research. I highlighted 
‘reflexivity’ when conducting this case study and interpreting the data. In addition, the 
chapter also justified the data methods which this research employed with detailed 
discussion on their strengths and weaknesses. Documentary analysis and qualitative 
interviews were conducted for different purposes and the data from them were used in 
different ways accordingly. For both methods, online research facilities have been found 
indispensable. Every effort has been made to maintain a scientific rigor over the entire 
process of the research; however, I only found that a real world research would not be 
the one conducted through a neat linear process but the one in which the researcher 
should be ready to deal with full of unexpectedness and messiness, yet find the best 
possible research methods under the given situation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MIGRATION TRANSITION IN KOREA 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
One of the contemporary global migration phenomena is “the proliferation of migration 
transition” (Castles and Miller, 2009: 12). Migration transition happens when a 
traditional migrant-sending country becomes a receiving country. The dichotomy of 
emigrant and immigrant countries may be no longer sustainable because many countries 
are in reality simultaneously migrant sending and receiving countries in the fast 
globalising world (Held et al., 1999). Nevertheless, either form of migration may be 
identified dominant in a country. Countries in migration transition are often likely to 
become predominantly migration destinations in the long run, which can have critical 
impacts on countries, such as Korea, which have hitherto maintained ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity.  
Korea’s transformation into a migrant-receiving country over the last three decades 
constitutes an important background to the current research. The aim of this chapter is 
to set the scene for forthcoming chapters, essentially by giving statistical data to show 
how (im)migration has become such a significant social (and policy) issue in Korea. 
The chapter consists of two parts: the first section briefly examines the recent regional 
history regarding the migration transition of some new destination countries in Asia 
including Korea, and it takes stock of the migration growth in Korea in terms of its scale 
and patterns. The next section analyses various factors which have been contributing to 
the growth of different types of migration in Korea. This is followed by a short 
conclusion.  
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4.2. Migration Growth in Korea 
 
4.2.1. Recent Regional History 
 
Korea’s migration transition is an integral part of the growing intra-regional migratory 
activities in Asia (Debrah, 2002; Hujo and Piper, 2007). Migration in and out of Asia 
has a long history but the migration growth within the region from the 1990s is a new 
dimension. The intra-regional flows had been limited in scale until the late 1980s. By 
the early 1990s, intra-regional migration had reached a significant level, transforming 
East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and South Korea) and a part of South-East Asia 
(Singapore) into “the newest migration pole” (Athukorala, 2006; Findlay et al., 1998; H 
Jones and Findlay, 1998). Political liberalisation and continuous integration into the 
global market have accelerated the migration mobility in this region (Castles and Miller, 
2009). Asian countries currently hold a much smaller proportion of migrants in the total 
population (2 per cent), compared to other regions (10 per cent in Europe and 15 per 
cent in Northern America, for example); however, some destination countries show far 
greater concentration and faster growth of migrants (UN-DESA, 2013a).  
Disparity in the economic development within Asia is often attributed to the 
growth of intra-regional migration. In fact, economically successful countries in East 
and South-East Asia such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are all experiencing 
migration transition in a varying stage (Athukorala, 2006; Castles and Miller, 2009; 
Piper, 2004). Researchers have attempted to find some common denominators of those 
countries in the migration transition, mainly in terms of labour migration. Abella (2014: 
3), for example, asserts that “the East Asian economies have undergone two kinds of 
transformation since the post war period: the first transformation was the emergence of 
the industrial sector replacing agriculture as the major generator of income and 
employment, and the second was the growth of services replacing manufacturing as the 
provider of high productivity jobs.” These economic transformations, the first one in 
particular, were initiated by their governments through targeted investment in the 
export-oriented large-scale production industries such as electrical, machinery, motors 
and high-tech goods later on.  
Those industrialisation strategies were highly successful, so that they created 
labour demand often beyond the capacity of the domestic reservoir, which consequently 
 57 
 
triggered the early growth of labour migrants in heavy industries (Debrah, 2002; Fields, 
1994). In addition, some historical events, notably the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Gulf War in 1990, contributed to the growth of intra-regional migrant flows. The former 
event added another international migration supply and the latter changed the direction 
of migration to Asia (Seol, 2000). When one of the largest migrant receiving spots, the 
Gulf, had been shut down due to the war, newly industrialised countries such as Korea 
emerged as an attractive alternative. However, as the economic transformation of those 
countries reached the next stage, namely ‘post-industrial economies’, new demands for 
migrants began to arise, for example employment in service jobs of varying skill-levels, 
diversifying patterns of migration.  
 
 
4.2.2. Taking Stock of the Migration Growth in Korea 
 
Speed and Scale of Migration Growth  
Korea’s migration transition is a very recent phenomenon. Post-war Korea was 
characterised by high rates of emigration, with its population providing labour, typically 
as farmers, nurses and construction workers, to states such as Japan, Russia, the USA 
and Germany (Castles and Miller, 2009; Held et al., 1999). With the exception of a 
small number of professionals, including foreign government officials and military 
personnel, Korea had remained virtually shut to international migrants, including 
irregular migrants, until the 1970s, rendering it virtually a zero-migrant country. 
Confident, however, that economic development was on track from the late 1970s, the 
Korean government became interested in attracting human resources from abroad. 
Starting with investors, traders and engineers, there was a trickle of technical trainees 
and students from nearby Asian countries into the country from the 1980s. However, 
Korea had to wait another decade to see a more constant inflow of migrants. When the 
Korean government systematised the foreign trainee system and subsequently 
introduced non-skilled labour migration schemes (refer to Chapter 5) from the 1990s, 
the number of migrants finally began to rapidly grow. 
The scale of migration may look small by the global standard but the speed of 
growth has been dramatic. As shown in Figure 4.1, there were merely about 50,000 
migrants in 1990 but the number grew more than 10 times over the next decade. The 
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growth remained robust even during the economic crisis in 1997 to 1999. As of 2014, 
the number of migrants is 1,797,618 accounting for 3.6 per cent of the total population 
of Korea. If we consider irregular migrants, the exact number of migrants in Korea 
would be larger than suggested by the official statistics. 14  The government has 
estimated that the migrant population will reach 3.2 million, representing 6.12 per cent 
of the total population, by 2030 (IPC, 2012a: 20). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Growth of migrant stock in Korea (person, %) 
Source: KIS, Migration Yearbook (various years) 
 
Patterns of Migration Growth 
The migration growth has been patterned by route. As Table 4.1 shows, migrants for 
short-term visit and (industrial) training led the growth in the early stage of the 
transition. This is closely related to the increase in undocumented migrants until 2002 
because short-term visitors and industrial trainees often overstayed for work. Since 
2002, labour migration and family migration have emerged as more dominant forms of 
                                                         
14 Interpretation of migration statistics deserves double scrutiny. There is an allegation that government is 
underestimating the real number of the undocumented migrants on purpose. For example, Martin (2009) 
suspected the data from Korean government by pointing out that as many as 200,000 undocumented 
workers were not included in the Korean government’s report to UN. 
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migration. Combined, those two routes account for 70.6 per cent of all migrants as of 
2014.  
Labour migration refers to a migration route for employment, while family 
migration comprises wider types of migrants whose primary purpose of entry is not 
working but staying as dependants, spouses or relatives. Family migration constitutes 
the single largest migration route into Korea: at 36.3 per cent of the migrant stock, it is 
just slightly ahead of labour migration (34.3 per cent). It should be noted that certain 
groups of migrants, notably those having F-4 visa, classified here as family migrants, 
are simultaneously economic migrants for employment or business since they are given 
both residence and labour rights. Therefore, there is a chance that the proportion of 
labour migration is underestimated here by the author’s classification.  
 
Table 4.1: Migration growth by route in Korea (stock, person) 
Migration 
routes 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 (%) 
Total 49,507 269,641 491,324 747,467 1,261,415 1,797,618 (100) 
Family 39,524 53,530 73,903 150,327 326,677 653,395 (36.3) 
Labour 2,833 8,540 18,563 252,562 557,114 617,145 (34.3) 
Short-term 
Visit 
3,274 145,941 242,710 168,338 196,371 337,944 (18.8) 
Education & 
Training 
2,106 56,950 146,305 90,838 112,759 91,764 (5.1) 
Business 1,765 4,630 8,931 10,742 13,564 16,475 (0.9) 
Other 5 50 912 74,660 54,930 80,895 (4.5) 
Note: Visa classification for each route as of 2014: Family (F-1 to F-6), Labour (C-4, E-1 to E-9 and H-1 
to H-2), Short-term Visit (B-1, B-2, C-2, C-3, D-5 and D-6), Education and Training (D-2 to D-4), 
Business (D-7 to D-9) and Other (G-1 and others).  
Source: KIS, Migration Yearbook (various years) 
 
Labour Migration Growth 
The labour migration growth in Korea has been largely driven by the increase in 
unskilled migrant workers, while skilled migrant workers have remained constant in 
number (refer to Figure 4.2). The growth in the former was a direct consequence of the 
introduction and expansion of unskilled labour migration programmes from 2002. These 
programmes resulted in a large number of undocumented migrants in the country before 
2002 being rapidly absorbed into the labour migration system. The size of labour 
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migration has remained almost constant since 2008 due to the new labour migration 
system established in 2007 which turns out to have been very effective in regulating 
unskilled labour migrants by either expatriating or absorbing them in the system. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Growth in labour migration by skill-level in Korea (stock, person) 
Note: The number of undocumented migrants here represents both labour and non-labour migration. 
Source: KIS, Migration Yearbook (various years) 
 
Family Migration Growth 
Compared to labour migration, the growth of family migration has been more persistent 
(refer to Figure 4.3). One of the major factors is a strong growth of marriage migration 
since 2000, occupying the largest proportion in the family migration stock until 2011. 
Although the growth rate of marriage migration began to decline since then due to 
tightened regulations on international marriage arrangement and marriage migration 
status, the stock itself is on a steady growth path.  
In addition, the category of ‘Overseas Compatriots’ has become increasingly 
significant in the composition of family migration from 2000. The government enacted 
a law, called ‘Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans’, to 
promote return migration through favourable treatment on ethnic Koreans overseas in 
1999. Based on the Act, a new visa category (F-4) was created for overseas Koreans 
apart from the special unskilled labour migration programme for ethnic Korean 
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migrants. Obtaining an ‘Overseas Compatriots’ visa is exclusively available to ethnic 
Koreans, with which they can stay and work on a long-term basis. Some of F-4 visa 
holders stay in Korea indeed for family matters but it is reasonable to believe that a 
large proportion of them are in effect labour migrants although they cannot take most of 
the unskilled jobs which are reserved for both unskilled Korean workers and migrant 
workers.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Growth in family migration by visa category in Korea (stock, person) 
Note: The number excludes those already naturalised. 
Source: KIS, Migration Yearbook (various years) 
 
Significance of Co-ethnic Migrants in both Labour Migration and Family Migration  
It cannot be emphasised too much the importance of co-ethnic migrants in 
understanding Korea’s migration growth. Co-ethnic migrants refer to the migrants who 
have the Korean ethnic background. Most of them are the descendants of the Korean 
diaspora living in China, CIS countries15. However, about a quarter of co-ethnic 
migrants are also from ‘advanced’ countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia, 
which reflects the long history of Korean out-migration to those countries: the second 
                                                         
15 CIS countries refer to ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ which consists of ten former Soviet 
Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. (World Atlas, http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/cis.htm) 
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and third generations of the early Korean emigrants are often immigrating back to 
Korea for various reasons such as business, work and study.  
As you see in Figure 4.4, the number of co-ethnic migrants has been continuously 
increasing. The number slightly waned in 2012 as the first cycle of 5-year long co-
ethnic labour migration programme ended but it bounced back right away. It is crucial 
to note that co-ethnic migration contributes not only to family migration but also to 
labour migration. As of 2014, almost 40 per cent of co-ethnic migrants are employed as 
unskilled workers (H-2) and some of those with the F-4 visa, as mentioned above, are 
likely to be engaged in the labour market.  
 
Figure 4.4: Growth in co-ethnic migrants in Korea (stock, person) 
Note: The relevant visa types for co-ethnic migrants include F-1 to F-4, H-2 and H-5.  
Source: KIS, Migration Yearbook (various years) 
 
It is often the case that family migration leads to naturalisation. This is particularly 
true for marriage migrants in Korea. As Table 4.2 shows, marriage migration has been a 
major path to obtain citizenship, consisting of 68.7 per cent of the total naturalisation 
cases as of 2014. Therefore, although smaller than labour migrants, the significance of 
family migrants, including those already naturalised, should not be underestimated, 
considering their long-term impact on the receiving society.  
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Table 4.2: Naturalisation from marriage migration in Korea (accumulative, person)  
 
2007 2009 2011 2013 2014 
Total 54,051 73,725 111,110 133,704 147,904 
From marriage 
migration 
38,991 41,417 69,804 83,929 101,507 
Percentage 72.1 56.2 62.8 62.8 68.7 
Source: Compiled by the author from MOGAHA (2014) and KIS (2015) 
 
 
4.3. Factors Contributing to the Growth 
 
The migration routes to Korea are complex, so are the contributing factors to the 
migration growth. The current chapter analyses those factors drawing on Martin’s (2009) 
framework as presented in Table 4.3. He divided migrants into two types: economic and 
non-economic migrants and listed factors in three categories: ‘Demand-Pull’, ‘Supply-
Push’ and ‘Network’, arguing that migration is caused by the combination of these 
factors. The framework is in line with so-called ‘push-pull’ scenario which has been 
typically utilised in explaining labour migration growth (Abella, 2014; Martin, 2009). 
The push-pull theory, however, has been criticised as “individualistic and ahistorical” 
due to its preoccupation with individuals’ rational choice and a resultant neglect of 
collective decision making at the level of households and institutions (Castles and 
Miller, 2009: 22). While I agree that this neo-classical account of migration potentially 
oversimplifies the reality (Debrah, 2002), I do, however, find Martin’s framework 
useful for analysing the Korean case. To begin with, the framework takes both 
economic and non-economic migrants into consideration: this is crucial because family 
migration is also significant in Korea’s migration growth although economically 
motivated individual unit of migration has been most prevalent. In addition, the 
framework does take note of the role of public policies and networks which are 
influencing migration flows beyond the individual level. Lastly, this framework 
considers both ends of the migration flow, which allows us to better capture the intra-
regional economic dynamic propelling migration, although the current research is more 
concerned with the demand side.  
Nonetheless, I had to substantially modify the framework to make it more 
applicable to the Korean case. The original framework includes family reunification and 
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refugees/asylum seekers but they are excluded here because the migration route for 
family reunion is largely discouraged and the number of refugees/asylum seekers is 
nominal. Instead, I have added both social and cultural factors in order to explain the 
flow of a unique form of non-labour migration (marriage migration) and ethnicity-based 
migration. Martin (2009) acknowledges that the factors listed here are not exhaustive, 
and are subject to change in importance over the course of migration development. On 
top of that, it is important to recognise that the division of economic and non-economic 
migration is not clear-cut, neither is that of demand-pull and supply-push. The 
nature/purpose of migration may change as the stay prolongs. In addition, some factors, 
notably demographic transition, can be applied to both categories of factors. Therefore, 
the framework and the factors here should be understood as only a snapshot of a 
dynamic process of migration.  
 
Table 4.3: Analytical frame to examine factors contributing migration growth in Korea 
Type Demand-pull factors Supply-push factors Network factors 
Economic 
migrants 
▪ Labour shortage due to 
structural changes in 
economy and 
demographic transition 
▪ Introduction of labour 
migration programmes 
▪ Disparity in economic 
conditions (low income 
and high unemployment) 
▪ Emigration as 
Government’s 
development strategy 
▪ Migrant 
communities and 
information sharing 
▪ Geographical and 
cultural proximity 
Non-
economic 
migrants 
▪ ‘Bachelor surplus’ and 
changes in norms around 
marriage, family and 
gender roles 
▪ Support from the 
government and the civil 
society 
▪ Emigration as family’s 
livelihood strategy 
▪ Desire for better life 
chances (education or 
new life experiences) 
Source: Adapted from Martin (2009: 4) 
 
 
4.3.1. Demand-Pull Factors  
 
Labour Shortage due to Structural Changes in Economy and Demographic 
Transition 
The economic migration growth in Korea is primarily attributed to labour shortage 
triggered by Korea’s rapid economic expansion since the 1970s. The Korean labour 
 65 
 
market had almost full employment, maintaining an unemployment rate of around 2.5 
per cent until the mid-1980s; however, from then onwards certain industries began to 
suffer from a severe labour shortage (Seol, 2000). Ever expanding industries required an 
abundant supply of workers. At first, this labour demand was met by internal migrants. 
A large number of workers, both men and women, migrated from rural areas to 
industrialised areas to work in factories. However, the internal labour reservoir was 
soon drained. Factories in industrialised areas became severely understaffed. Remaining 
farming and fishing industries had been drastically shrunk as young workers left but no 
replacement labour sources were found. Despite the heavy investment on developing 
human resources by the government, the economic growth was so rapid that inter-
sectoral transfer of labour alone would never fully address the labour shortage (Abella, 
2014). These situations served as a background against the increase in undocumented 
migrant workers before the official foreign labour importing system began to fully 
function from the early 2000s.  
Labour shortage in small and medium sized enterprises (hereafter SMEs) in 
manufacturing sectors continued to worsen as the Korean economy began to be 
restructured. As Korea continued to be industrialised, native-born workers were fast 
moving to jobs in the service sector for better work conditions and higher income. This 
labour market restructuring and the consequent deficit in production workers has been 
often referred to as ‘3D syndrome’ (attitude of avoiding dirty, dangerous and 
demanding jobs) in Korea (AE Kim, 2009b: 71). Already understaffed SMEs in 
manufacturing, farming and fishing industries, could not but demand more intense and 
longer work to survive, which made it even more difficult for them to recruit enough 
native-born labour. To compound the matter, the government’s large conglomerates 
(chaebol16)-centred development strategy widened the gap between major companies 
and SMEs with regard to income level and work conditions. Given that there were 
plenty of white collar jobs even in major companies, the labour shortage in SMEs 
became structural and chronic. This is why employers in SMEs had been so keen in the 
early 1990s on lobbying the government to introduce a labour migration scheme.  
As the labour shortage now became more structural and prevalent, it became 
apparent that the domestic workforce alone would never meet the demand, especially in 
                                                         
16 Collins English Dictionary defines ‘chaebol’ as a large, usually family-owned, business group in  
South Korea 
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the low skilled areas. This explanation is in line with dual labour market theory (Debrah, 
2002). Historical evidence gives credit to this argument. During the East Asian 
economic crisis from 1997 to 2000, Korea recorded minus economic growth and the 
unemployment rate doubled. Even major companies stopped new recruiting and went 
through painful restructuring, inevitably involving massive lay-offs. To mitigate social 
unrest caused by soaring unemployment, the government tried to take jobs occupied by 
migrant workers and give them to unemployed native workers, believing that even a bad 
job would be better than no job during the crisis. The government promised to subsidise 
the companies replacing migrant workers with Korean workers. However, this 
‘replacement project’ did not work as expected. The fact that SMEs failed to hire 
native-born workers even in the midst of the unprecedented unemployment may suggest 
that they do not compete for the same jobs but rather there exist certain job niches 
which are meant to be filled only with migrant workers.  
Evidence confirms, as illustrated in Figure 4.5, that the lack of native-born 
applicants and high turnover rate are the primary reasons why manufacturing and 
agriculture/dairy industries turn to migrant workers. It is consistent with previous 
survey results (Y-b Park, 2000; Yoo and Lee, 2002). Construction companies are in the 
similar situation but saving labour cost by hiring migrant workers is proved to be a 
bigger advantage for them. The data for service economies, restaurant businesses here 
for an example, are more telling. Recently, the hospitality, catering and care sectors 
have increasingly become more and more dependent on a migrant labour force because 
native-born workers simply do not want those jobs any more. Although not presented 
here, we can assume that private homes would be in the same situation when attempting 
to hire home-making and personal care workers.  
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Figure 4.5: Primary reason to hire migrant workers by industry (selected), 2009 (%) 
Source: Adapted from G-y Lee et al. (2011: 44) 
 
Labour shortages can be addressed in different ways other than hiring migrants. 
One of the options is to utilise the part of the female labour force inactive due to career 
interruptions (typically those in between 30s and 50s). The Korean government has 
attempted to encourage women’s labour market participation since the enactment of 
‘Equal Employment Act’ in 1987 and its amendment in 1989. However, these 
legislative measures including affirmative actions, had a limited success in boosting 
women’s employment. This was primarily because while labour shortage was most 
severe in small to medium scaled manufacturing industries, the measures introduced 
were only compulsory for large firms and the public sector. Besides, the gender-biased 
culture (regarding recruiting, employment, jobs, positions, and promotions) at male-
dominant workplaces undermined the effectiveness of those policies (Patterson et al., 
2013; Patterson and Walcutt, 2014). Consequently, activating the female labour force 
has been an ineffective solution for the labour shortage especially in so-called ‘heavy’ 
industries. 
Another option can be offshoring factories to more labour abundant but less costly 
countries such as China. Relocation, however, is not a viable option for all businesses 
because many SMEs lack enough resources to operate overseas production facilities. It 
was found that many SMEs considered that hiring more migrant workers, along with 
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automation, was a more effective long term solution to labour shortage particularly if 
they had already employed migrant workers (Yoo and Lee, 2002). Saving labour costs 
by replacing native workers with migrant workers is a key consideration for SMEs. One 
official in an interview with the author for the current research said:  
 
Labour shortage of SMEs is ever becoming chronic. At the same time, cutting 
down the labour cost is almost the only way for SMEs to become profitable, given 
that SMEs are operating mainly through contract-out from major companies in 
which SMEs tend to be left with little room to create profits except saving labour 
costs. These are the reasons why migrant workers are desperately needed and I 
expect that this situation will continue. (Interviewee A, 2 December 2013) 
 
Low(er) wages, long hours and hazardous work environments have been identified 
as the primary reasons why SMEs have difficulty recruiting native-born workers 
(Chung et al., 2013b). However, a recent large scale survey of employers (n=567) of 
migrant workers reveals that even though work conditions improve, the possibility of 
filling the vacancies with native young or female workers is limited, and the chances are 
even lower in agriculture/dairy industries and in smaller companies than in 
manufacturing industries and in larger companies (Chung et al., 2013b). So, the 
government’s attempts so far to reduce the demand for migrant labour force by 
encouraging (or forcing) companies to make efforts to hire native-born workers first 
have been largely unsuccessful due to the structural changes in the labour market.  
Coupled with the transformation in the economic/labour market structure, the 
labour deficit has been further exacerbated by the change in the population structure in 
Korea. It is expected that the number of economically productive people (aged between 
15 and 64) will sharply drop to 28.87 million by 2040, approximately 80 per cent of the 
level of 2010 (Statistics Korea, 2014a). As witnessed in the West, change in 
demography and the labour market would not reduce labour demand but rather create a 
new type of labour demand, such as workers in care facilities. Therefore, we might 
expect that labour shortage will continue to be a leading factor in the migration growth 
into the future.  
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Introduction of Labour Migration Programmes 
Labour shortage itself, however, does not automatically lead to migration growth since, 
as pointed out above, there is more than one option to deal with labour shortages. Actual 
migration inflow can only be realised by the willingness of a state to support migration 
(Hollifield, 2004). Although it was employers who initiated the process by making 
requests for the admission of migration workers, recruiting migrant labour was a 
strategic policy decision made by the Korean government (Abella, 2014). In order to 
mitigate the severe shortage in unskilled workers, the Korean government has 
developed two labour migration programmes, called the Employment Permit System 
(EPS) and the Working Visit Programme. A detailed examination of the development 
and content of these migration policies is reserved for the next chapter. An important 
point to note here is that the growth in economic migrants in Korea has been accelerated 
by the introduction of a type of ‘guest worker programme’, as happened in some 
countries in the West a generation ago (see Castles and Miller, 2009: Chapter 5).  
The Korean government, however, wanted to avoid repeating the problems 
experienced in the West with guest worker programmes. For instance, in Germany in 
the 1970s many ‘temporary’ guest workers did not return but stayed for the long term 
and brought in their families, betraying policy makers’ intentions (Castles, 2004). The 
Korean government would provide migrant workers as the market requires; however, 
the government made it clear that the admittance of an (unskilled) migrant labour force 
under the above programmes should be only temporary and it would not lead to 
subsequent family migrations. So, the government has placed all possible measures to 
tightly manage the flow and the stock of migrants, including yearly sectoral quotas and 
a prohibition on migrant workers from changing workplaces. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
number of economic migrants is rising unexpectedly solely based on the market demand. 
Instead, political considerations and policy decisions will continue to play a critical role 
in determining the future growth. Interestingly, however, the initial principle of 
‘temporary’ labour migration has been gradually loosened by the government: the 
Korean government has repeatedly lengthened the maximum period of employment 
(from 1 year initially to 4 years and 6 months later on), and has added various 
exceptional rules allowing opportunities for long-term work and stay. Consequently, the 
labour migration stock has been persistently on the rise.  
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It remains to be seen whether the Korean case in the long run, as were cases in 
Europe (Castles, 2004), will become another example in which historical lessons on 
guest worker programmes were once again over-ridden by the government’s naive 
confidence in its ability to control migration flows as it wishes through modern 
administrative systems. However, the main reason why labour migration keeps growing 
in Korea is that the Korean economy has become ever more structurally dependent on a 
migrant labour force. Therefore, it is important to note that the migration growth has 
been a part of the economic restructuring process in Korea. The Korean government 
approaches admitting more migrants as one of the solutions to remedy population 
ageing and a consequent slowdown of economic development (IPC, 2012a). Thus, it is 
highly probable that the Korean government would continue to maintain extensive 
labour migration programmes to accommodate varying demands for migrant workers 
not only from traditionally labour absorbing industries, but also from service sectors, as 
well as private homes. An official mentioned this point in an interview with the author 
for this research: 
 
The EPS system has been limited to as an unskilled labour importing system, so it 
needs to develop into a more comprehensive system comprising different skill 
levels. The sustainability of the EPS, I believe, depends on Korea’s industrial 
development and characteristics of the economy. But I don’t think the current 
industrial structure heavily drawing on a sizeable supply of unskilled labour would 
soon change in Korea. (Interviewee D, 5 August 2014) 
 
‘Bachelor Surplus’ and Changes in Norms around Marriage, Family and Gender 
Roles  
Now let us turn to the factors contributing to non-economic migration growth. As 
identified earlier in the chapter, an increase in marriage migration marks an important 
feature of the (family) migration growth in Korea. The number of marriage migrants in 
Korea has been on a steady rise and accounts for 6.7 per cent of the total migrant stock 
as of 2014 although the growth rate itself has been slowing down. The growth of 
marriage migrants in Korea has resulted from increasing international marriage. Before 
the new millennium, international marriage was rare in Korea. Marrying a foreigner had 
been something to be avoided if possible in Korea because it often comes with a strong 
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social stigma. Furthermore, there were no official infrastructures to support international 
marriages or mixed families.  
As shown in Table 4.4, international marriages, however, have grown fast since 
2000. International marriages occupied only 3.5 per cent of all marriages in 2000, but 
by 2005 they reached a peak of 13.5 per cent. Since then international marriage cases 
began to decrease due to tightened regulations on commercially arranged international 
marriages and marriage migration, as pointed out earlier. It is interesting to see that 
international marriages with Korean nationals are strongly gendered: over 70 per cent of 
all international marriage cases since 2002 are between Korean males and foreign 
females, while the remaining 30 per cent are between foreign males and Korean females. 
It should be noted that not all international marriages lead to marriage migration into 
Korea. The data (Table 4.4) includes international marriages that happen while Korean 
nationals are staying abroad (the number is not available but presumably small), so the 
foreign partners may not migrate to Korea. In addition, some foreign nationals who get 
married to Korean nationals in Korea may have different visa status such as labour 
migration or permanent residence rather than marriage migration visa. However, among 
those migrants entering Korea specifically with a marriage migration visa (F-6 or 
equivalents before 2012), the feminised nature of this route is stronger: over 85 of them 
are female foreigners marrying Korean males.  
This highly feminised flow of marriage migration is a direct consequence of the so 
called ‘bachelor surplus’ in Korea. Skewed sex ratio caused by successive family 
planning policies from the 1950s to the 1980s is often mentioned as a primary factor for 
the severe mismatch in the marriage market from the late 1990s when the post-Korean 
War generations reached marrying age (Seol, 2006). The family planning policies 
turned out to be very successful and Korean families stated to have fewer children, 
increasingly normalising nuclear forms of family. It was a part of the process in which 
the Korean society had been modernised along with the process of industrialisation. 
However, combined with a strong preference for sons, the family planning often led to 
sex selection (in other words, sex selective abortion) in the midst of a strong 
discouragement against having multiple children. Sex off-balance continued to 
deteriorate, reaching its highest ratio of 117:100 in 1990. After three decades of tight 
family planning and selective birth, some males at their marriage age found themselves 
having not enough potential native-born brides.  
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Table 4.4: Trend in international marriages in Korea 
Year All marriages 
International 
marriages 
% 
Marriages with a 
foreign wife 
% 
2000 332,090 11,605 3.5 6,945 59.8 
2001 318,407 14,523 4.6 9,684 66.7 
2002 304,877 15,202 5.0 10,698 70.4 
2003 302,503 24,776 8.2 18,751 75.7 
2004 308,598 34,640 11.2 25,105 72.5 
2005 314,304 42,356 13.5 30,719 72.5 
2006 330,634 38,759 11.7 29,665 76.5 
2007 343,559 37,560 10.9 28,580 76.1 
2008 327,715 36,204 11.0 28,163 77.8 
2009 309,759 33,300 10.8 25,142 75.5 
2010 326,104 34,235 10.5 26,274 76.7 
2011 329,387 29,762 9.0 22,265 74.8 
2012 327,073 28,325 8.7 20,637 72.9 
2013 322,807 25,963 8.0 18,307 70.5 
Note: The number of international marriages here includes those who get married abroad and report back 
to Korea for family registration. 
Source: Statistics Korea (2014b) 
 
The enhanced social and economic status of Korean women also contributed to the 
mismatch (S Park, 2011). With the decline in the birth rate, parents were willing to get 
their son or daughter as much education as possible. Advancing to a college or a 
university became a norm for boys and girls alike. Higher and extended education of 
women means their increased career aspirations and delayed or given up marriages. 
Most of the female college graduates tend to find employment in cities. Even those 
women considering marriage expect their male partners to have better educational 
backgrounds and occupational potential. Where females have wider choice than males, 
there is no reason for them to marry down the social and economic ladder. The marriage 
market in disadvantageous areas was further squeezed, leaving some bridegrooms 
virtually no options but to turn to foreign wives (H Lee, 2012). Males employed in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries suffered the most from this discrepancy due to their 
disadvantageous social and economic status. 
Marriages in a society are not determined solely by the ratio between sexes, but 
they are also approached and negotiated in wider social and cultural contexts, which are 
bound to change over time. Over the last decade or so, the Korean people on average 
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have become ever more liberal regarding marriage. According to periodical national 
surveys by the Statistics Bureau, 69.1 per cent of the respondents agreed that ‘one must 
marry’ in 2002, but the figure decreased to 56.8 per cent in 2014; however, people in 
rural areas and males seem to remain more supportive in formalising marital 
relationship than their urban and female counterparts (Table 4.5a). In the meantime, 
marrying a foreigner has become increasingly socially acceptable in Korea even over a 
short five-year period: 56 per cent of those surveyed were agreeable in 2008 but it rose 
to 62.9 per cent in 2014. As shown in Table 4.5b, not much difference is found between 
rural and urban areas or males and females; yet, positive change in attitude toward 
international marriage among people in rural areas has been growing faster (8.8 per cent) 
than in urban areas (7 per cent) since 2008. Residents in rural areas, especially from 
older generations, seem slightly less agreeable to the idea of international marriage (see 
Table 4.5b), but they have been no less active on seeking foreign wives as alternative 
marriage partners when marriage with native-born brides apparently becomes more 
difficult.  
This somewhat ironical situation can be a result of negotiation between personal 
relational needs and socially constructed norms and expectations regarding martial 
relationship and marriage partners (Le et al., 2014). In other words, (male) people in 
rural areas might be under higher social pressure to find marriage partners and their 
(female) partners, in turn, are expected to assume traditional gender roles within the 
family as wives, mothers and daughters-in-law so that families continue to be 
biologically and socially reproduced (Jang et al., 2009; Lan, 2008). However, as in the 
case of labour migration, ‘demand’ for foreign wives itself cannot automatically explain 
the actual increase in marriage migrants, but it can only be realised into actual marriages 
and subsequent migrations through the relevant government policies as well as societal 
supports.  
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Table 4.5a: Change in attitudes on marriage: 2002 and 2014 compared (%) 
One must marry. 
2002 2014 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Sub-Total 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Sub-Total 
Nat’l average 25.6 43.5 69.1 14.9 41.9 56.8 
Urban areas 23.2 44.2 67.4 13.4 41.9 55.3 
Rural areas 36.0 40.4 76.4 22.2 41.9 64.1 
Males 29.5 47.8 77.3 16.3 45.2 61.5 
Females 21.9 39.4 61.3 13.5 38.8 52.3 
 
Table 4.5b: Change in attitudes on international marriage: 2008 and 2014 compared (%) 
It is acceptable 
to marry a 
foreigner. 
2008 2014 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Sub-Total 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Sub-Total 
Nat’l average 10.3 45.7 56.0 17.0 45.9 62.9 
Urban areas 10.7 45.9 56.6 17.8 45.8 63.6 
Rural areas 8.5 45.2 53.7 15.8 46.7 62.5 
Males 10.1 46.7 56.8 16.7 46.8 63.5 
Females 10.5 44.8 55.3 17.9 45.1 63.0 
Note: Respondents are those aged 15 or above. 
Source: Compiled by the author from Statistics Korea, 2002, 2008, 2014c, 2014d 
 
Support from the Government and Civil Society 
Marriage in essence can be seen as a very private matter, but combined with migration it 
becomes a highly complicated legal process which requires a series of policy 
arrangement in both the sending and receiving country. Especially, family (marriage) 
migration policies in a receiving country are critically important in order that marriage 
migration can be actually realised. So far, active support from the government has been 
vital in the growth of marriage migrants. The details of those marriage migrant-related 
policies and their policy rationales are to be more fully investigated in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 7. One point, however, can be highlighted here that continuous positive framing 
of marriage migrants by the government itself has sent off encouraging signals for both 
inviting men and prospective wives. Female marriage migrants have been regarded as 
deserving migrants by the government in that they not only relieve the social tension 
caused by ‘bachelor surplus’ but also help form a family, a crucial unit in which the 
members are biologically and socially being reproduced. Unlike other types of migrants, 
marriage migrants are encouraged to settle permanently and they can enjoy a wide range 
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of supportive programmes and full rights. It is a rather surprising move for Korea where 
anti-settlement policy orientation prevails (Seol and Skrentny, 2009b).  
In addition, civil society organisations and activists in Korea have influenced to a 
substantial degree the process of both labour and family migration in Korea. They may 
not be the direct drivers of the migration growth but they have contributed to it by 
helping provide and reform migration policies and assisting existing migrants with their 
settlement and integration. Thanks to their pressure, unskilled labour migrants, for 
example, can enjoy enhanced labour/human rights even amongst harsh crack-downs 
during the early stage of migration transition. On the other hand, marriage migrants 
most benefit from the support of the civil society groups which have contributed to 
enhancing public acceptance of marriage migrants and establishing very supportive 
policies targeting marriage migrants as well (Jeon, 2012; I-J Yoon, 2008). Many related 
NGOs, often forming a liaison with local governments, provide various types of 
settlement and integration support programmes such as Korean language classes and 
legal advice services. Information regarding such support may well spread and 
encourage further migration. In both labour and family migration, positive signals from 
the civil society as well as the market partly constitute what Castles (2004: 209) calls 
“opportunity structure”, through which migrants can negotiate to increase their chance 
of entry and later survival, often regardless of government’s policy intention.  
 
 
4.3.2. Supply-Push Factors 
 
Disparity in Economic Conditions 
While labour shortage exerts the strongest pulling power from the demand side, it has 
been argued that Korea’s higher income and employment chances among Asian 
countries are the strongest push factor from the sending countries’ perspective (Lim, 
2002; Seol, 2000). Uneven industrialisation in the region has widened the disparity in 
economic performances, which generated “a regional division of labour” through 
migration (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005: 1). In this regard, it can be hypothesised that the 
greater the differentials of GDP and unemployment rate are between Korea and a 
certain country, the more labour migrants would come to Korea. Table 4.6 shows the 
largest 18 labour migrant sending countries and their per capita GDPs (ppp) and 
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unemployment rates. When statistically tested, however, no significant correlation is 
established between the macroeconomic indicators (represented by GDPs and 
unemployment rates) and the size of labour migration regardless of their skill levels 
(refer to Table 4.7). The result confirms that the differential in income and employment 
opportunities itself cannot lead to the actual migration. The primary reason is that the 
scale of the unskilled labour migration, which is the largest proportion of the labour 
migration, is not an entirely free movement but is predetermined by intra-governmental 
agreements and related policies. To illustrate, even though someone may want to come 
to Korea for a job in a factory, they may not be admitted unless there is a labour 
migration agreement with their government or they belong to certain ethnic group in 
another case.   
 
Table 4.6: Labour migrant sending countries to Korea and their economic indicators, 2014 
Sending Country 
Total labour 
Migrants 
Unskilled labour 
migrants 
GDP(PPP) per 
Capita, USD 
Unemployment 
rate 
China 251,214  234,666  9,844  4.6  
Vietnam 53,538  48,966  4,012  1.9  
Indonesia 32,617  29,352  5,214  6.0  
Uzbekistan 27,075  26,924  3,762  10.8  
Cambodia 25,542  25,525  2,576  0.3  
Philippines 25,116  20,567  4,682  7.3  
Thailand 22,719  22,291  9,875  0.8  
Sri-Lanka 21,448  21,390  6,531  4.2  
Nepal 18,846  18,462  1,508  2.7  
United States 13,158  0  53,101  7.5  
Myanmar 11,461  10,885  1,740  3.5  
Bangladesh 9,469  9,287  2,080  4.3  
Mongolia 8,854  8,578  5,885  4.9  
Pakistan 4,188  4,014  3,149  5.2  
Canada 3,784  0  43,472  7.1  
Japan 1,706  0  36,899  4.1  
Russia 1,112  544  17,884  5.8  
Australia 603  0  43,073  5.6  
Note: No. of migrants is as of 2014; GDP and Unemployment Rate as of 2013. With the same time point, 
the per capita GDP(PPP) and the unemployment rate for Korea are 33,189 USD and 3.2 
respectively. 
Source: Compiled by the author from KIS (2014c), IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (April 
2014)17, ILO. Global Employment Trends (2014)18 
                                                         
17 IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed on 31 June 2014) 
18 ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/ 
WCMS_233936/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 31 June 2014) 
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Table 4.7: Correlation between the scale of labour migration into Korea and economic 
performances of the sending countries 
 GDP(PPP),per Capita Unemployment rate 
Total labour 
migrants 
Pearson Correlation -.177 -.072 
Sig. (2-tailed) .482 .776 
N 18 18 
Unskilled labour 
Migrants 
Pearson Correlation -.218 -.094 
Sig. (2-tailed) .385 .711 
N 18 18 
Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of the strength of a linear relationship 
between paired data. The closer the value is to 1 or –1, the stronger (either positive or negative) the 
linear correlation.  
Source: Author’s calculations (SPSS ver.19 used) based on data presented in Table 4.6  
 
It is, however, not to deny the critical importance of economic disparity in the 
migration flow. Rather, it is to emphasise that various motivations are factored in 
migration decisions and they are often based on very personal experience and 
expectation rather than the aggregate level of economic performances. A survey 
commissioned by the Korean government asked 795 unskilled migrant workers of their 
reasons to choose Korea for a destination. The result reveals that higher income is 
indeed a leading driver for migration (refer to Figure 4.6). Interestingly, the second 
most important factor is not job availability but chances to learn new skills in Korea. 
The reason is related to how the migration system works. Easiness to find a job can be 
an irrelevant question to some migrant workers because a work contract is arranged for 
them even before they depart. However, newly earned skills may guarantee them a 
better position in the labour market even back in the country of origin. In the same 
survey, 41.4 per cent of migrant workers were reported to earn 2 to 3 times higher salary 
than they used to in the country of origin; 23.7 per cent of them earn even 4 to 5 times 
higher (G-y Lee et al., 2011: 67). This experienced income difference is not only a 
strong incentive to potential migrant workers, but also helps retain existing workers and 
their return to Korea.  
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Figure 4.6: Reasons for migrant workers to choose Korea, 2009 (cases) 
Note: Multiple choices are allowed, Total n=795,  
Source: Adapted from G-y Lee et al. (2011: 66) 
 
Emigration as a Development Strategy for Governments 
As noted earlier, unskilled labour migration to Korea is arranged by the bilateral 
agreement between the Korean government and the sending country. Therefore, sending 
countries’ policy considerations are decisive in exporting migrants. The potential of 
economic development by labour emigration has been the centre of debate (Lucas, 
2005). In this migration-development nexus, migrants become “agents of development” 
through financial and social remittance which benefit receiving households and the 
government by reducing unemployment and increasing income, consumption and social 
protection (Hujo and Piper, 2007: 4). It can also make a strong case for East and South-
East Asia. Athukorala (2006: 19) argues that “the governments of labour sending 
countries in the region generally believe that the national gains from emigration 
outweigh the potential costs. In particular, they consider labour migration as a safety 
valve for unemployment and underemployment and as an important source of foreign 
exchange. Reflecting this favourable perception, the facilitation and promotion of labour 
export has become an important aspect of their labour and employment policies”.  
128
427
20
121
62 67
155
81
27
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
 79 
 
Once their economies become structurally dependent on emigration, governments 
encourage emigration through official policies, as in the Philippines under Marcos, and 
it has long-term effects on their economy and society (Abella, 1993 Castles, 2000a). 
One such effect is the creation of “a culture of emigration”, in which working/living 
abroad can be accepted as “a normal rite of passage for young people” as seen in the 
Philippines and other countries (Castles, 2004: 210). While the genuine contribution of 
emigration to the development is often doubted (Geiger and Pecoud, 2013; Sanderson, 
2013), these countries keep making a continuous outflow of migration throughout the 
world not only for work but also for marriage and living. As of 2014, migrants from the 
Philippines constitute the fifth largest group in Korea's labour migration stock and the 
third in its marriage migration stock (KIS, 2015). One official in an interview with the 
author for the current research highlighted how the development agenda become part of 
Korea’s unskilled labour migration system (EPS):  
 
We [the Korean government] hope that migrant workers not only earn money for 
them while working here in Korea but also build capacity to contribute to their 
countries when they go back. That’s the reason why we provide to migrant 
workers various industrial training on the government subsidy such as heavy 
machinery operation, vehicle maintenance, computer skills, etc. When they 
willingly return to their countries, we organise information/consultation sessions 
for their successful resettlement. (Interviewee D, 5 August 2014) 
 
Emigration as Family Livelihood Strategy 
As shown above, migration cannot be adequately explained just by income differences 
on an aggregate level between the destination and the origin country. This is in part 
because migration is often a collective decision made in the context of a much wider 
range of factors (Castles and Miller, 2009). Unlike the neoliberal understanding of 
human behaviour, social groups, notably families, rather than utility-maximising 
individuals, may make a decision to send one or more members to another region or 
country which they find most optimal to manage risks and maximise survival chances 
(Castles, 2004; Taylor, 1999).  
This ‘new economics approach’ can explain marriage migration as well as labour 
migration flows. Research on Vietnamese marriage migrants reveals that marriage 
migration decisions are family-level strategies to secure family livelihoods (Le et al., 
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2014). Typically, marriage migrants are given a large sum of money (as a ‘gift’) from 
the inviting husbands at the point of the marriage which may be large enough to rescue 
the sending families out of economic trouble right away, and continuous remittances 
from their daughters after migration can also be a significant financial source. It was 
found that “the economic consideration of a married life abroad is the major drive in 
their [Vietnamese women marriage] decision. Beliefs in the prospect of a better 
economic situation, the possibility of supporting the family left behind, and of securing 
a better future for their possible children are all associated with such marriages” (Le et 
al., 2014: 96). Marriage migrants from Vietnam currently account for 26 per cent of all 
marriage migrants in Korea, making them the second largest ethnic group in this 
migration category (KIS, 2015). 
 
Desires for better Life Chances 
Although many marriage migrants may never become free from the pressure to support 
their original families left behind, marriage migration like other non-economic 
migration such as study can also be prompted by more subjective and diverse motives. 
Others may see marrying overseas as an opportunity to start a new life in a better 
environment (Le et al., 2014). Migrants may decide to leave to escape not just poverty 
but also traditional gender roles, domestic violence or lack of life chances such as 
education, or they leave simply because they yearn for new experiences. Desires for 
better (or new) life chances can be as strong as the economic motivations. However, 
those motives cannot be entirely isolated from economic ones. For student migrants, for 
instance, newly earned academic qualifications as well as industrial skills significantly 
increase economic potentials. As noted above, marriage migrants can be even more 
eager to find employment in the destination. Some exploit the marriage migration 
channel ultimately to access the labour market with long-term residence rights as 
fraudulent marriage migration cases show.  
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4.3.3. Network Factors 
 
Migration Communities and Information Sharing 
In general, while demand-pull and supply push-factors are decisive at the beginnings of 
a migration flow, the network factors become more influential as the flow matures 
(Martin, 2009). This is because migration takes place drawing on various forms of 
networks and they tend to become “self-sustaining once started” (Castles, 1998: 180). 
Existing connections between the origin and the destination country can have a strong 
influence over potential migrants’ choice of routes and destination for both economic 
and non-economic migration cases. Here the information sharing is critical in migration 
decision-making. Information about income, job condition, overall market situation, and 
migrant-related policies and procedures may encourage or discourage the decision to 
migrate. Once moved, migrants can receive various types of support over the process 
from arrival to settlement from the established migrant communities (Castles, 2004).  
Networks are important also in that they can trigger ‘chain migration’ by which an 
initial migration is followed by others often from the same family or community. Even 
before the Korean government officially admitted labour migration, some migrants 
managed to settle in Korea and started to form ethnic communities and networks, which 
encouraged further migration inflow because the existence of settled migrants can 
reassure the survivability of new comers. A government-commissioned survey on the 
process of labour migration to Korea confirms that ‘recommendations from friends who 
used to work in Korea’ is the second most influential factor (11.7 per cent) in the 
migration decision making other than higher income (50.6 per cent) (Chung et al., 
2013b). It was also found that in the case of co-ethnic migration to Korea, advice and 
assistance from relatives and friends were far more influential than other sources of help 
(Chung et al., 2010). Many (female) marriage migrants find their partners through 
agencies, but ‘introduction by families, relatives or friends’ becomes an increasingly 
frequent channel (J Kim et al., 2014; Le et al., 2014).  
 
Geographical and Cultural Proximity 
Geographical and cultural closeness itself may not explain migration growth but 
proximity does influence migration mobility and its patterning especially in the context 
of intra-regional migration growth is which Korea is situated. First of all, geographical 
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proximity to Korea is another appeal since migrants’ travel cost is directly related to 
their economic motivation (Hujo and Piper, 2007). In an effort to reduce overstay and 
consequent illegalisation, the Korean government allows a chance of rehiring, another 
three years maximum, to those migrants who showed a good work record and departed 
voluntarily at the end of the first stint. In this case, migrants may well consider multiple 
travels in and out of Korea. In this case travel distance matters a lot.  
Similar appearance, cultures (custom) and language, as well as geographical 
closeness, can give migration candidates additional incentives. Indeed, many Korean 
employers show absolute preferences for ethnic Koreans who can speak Korean over 
any other Asian migrant because they are thought to fit in better and thus cause less 
tension with natives in and out of the workplace (Chung et al., 2013b; Gwak, 2012). 
Even when having become undocumented, some ethnic Koreans manage to find 
employment more easily compared to other migrant workers from different ethnic 
backgrounds (Chung et al., 2013b).19 
China’s contribution via all types of migration routes to Korea’s migration 
transition supports the proximity argument. As of 2014, migrants from other Asian 
countries occupy 86.6 per cent of total migrant stock in Korea, and 55.7 per cent of 
those Asian migrants originate from China (KIS, 2015). China is apparently not the 
poorest countries in the region but geographically and culturally one of the closest 
countries to Korea. China, as shown in Table 4.8, is the single largest migration source 
country for both labour migration and marriage migration. It is important to note here 
that 65.7 per cent of those Chinese have Korean origin.  
 
Table 4.8: Chinese migrants by route in Korea (stock), 2014  
 
All migration Labour migration Marriage migration 
Total migrants 1,797,618 617,145 150,994 
Chinese migrants 898,654 292,839 60,663 
% in total migrants 50.0 47.5 40.2 
Korean origin 590,856 271,250 24,604 
% in Chinese migrants 65.7 92.6 40.6 
Source: Compiled by the author from KIS (2015) 
 
                                                         
19 This is the very reason why the Korean government introduced a separate labour migration system for 
co-ethnics in order to deter them from overstaying in an attempt to find or keep a job (also refer to 
Chapter 5). 
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Most of Chinese Koreans are from a Korean Autonomous Prefecture in south-
eastern China, called ‘Yanbian’, which is currently bordered with North Korea. North 
Korea, of course, used to be the same nation with South Korea before politically being 
divided in 1948. The formation of a Korean settlement in Yanbian can be traced back to 
the 19th century. Many were driven by economic hardship on the Korean Peninsula. 
After the Japanese colonised Korea in 1910, a significant number of migrants migrated 
also for political reasons. Ethnic Koreans once reached around 60 per cent of the 
population in the Prefecture. Although their share had fallen to 32 per cent by 2000, 
their economic connection with Korea remains strong. It is estimated that the ethnic 
Koreans, also known as ‘joseonjok’, contribute 33 per cent of the local GDP each year 
through remittances earned in. One retired joseonjok from Yanbian in a media interview 
said:  
 
My wife used to work in Korea for some ten years. Thanks to her, we managed to 
buy two apartments and successfully educated my daughter to be a medical doctor. 
It would’ve been impossible without Korea, and one in two joseonjok families here 
went to Korea to work with same expectations. (Yonhap News, 2014b)  
 
The significance of joseonjok in the Korean migration growth shows the 
importance of both “material and cultural linkages” previously established between 
Korea and origin countries (Seol, 2000: 10).  
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned with identifying and analysing the patterns of 
migration growth in Korea and the contributing factors. Starting from the ignorable 
existence of Filipina maids in better-off families in Seoul and a handful of industrial 
trainees brought into Korea, migrants have dramatically increased in number, exerting 
profound impacts on a hitherto ethnically homogenous labour market and families. We 
have observed that the migration growth in Korea is closely related to its changing 
economic status in the East and South-East Asian region. It was also found that labour 
migration, un-skilled in particular, is the largest contributor to the growth and family 
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migration including marriage migration has been increasingly important. On top of that, 
ethnic Korean migrants are significant in labour migration and family migration alike. 
The earlier migrant rush, including that of undocumented migrants, seems to be 
stabilised. However, the growth is expected to continue not only because the economy 
is now structurally dependent on a foreign labour force, but also because migration 
origins and patterns are becoming more diversified, responding to the newly growing 
demand for migrants such as in care services. In addition, the possibility of permission 
of family reunion of unskilled migrant workers may cause a second wave of migration 
growth in Korea. In this regard, Korea’s ongoing transition to a migrant-destination 
country seems hardly reversible. 
The factor analysis shows that labour market conditions, in terms of higher income 
and wider job opportunity, in the destination are the strongest driver; however, no 
statistically meaningful correlation can be found between the aggregate economic 
indicators and the actual number of migrants. It shows that migration decisions, either 
economic migration or non-economic migration, are influenced by a complex interplay 
of factors on the state, family and individual level. The conditions under which these 
factors are interacting are not static but in a process of constant change, linked to both 
global factors and the local historical and cultural legacies (Castles and Miller, 2009). 
Examining the cases of the Philippines and Vietnam confirms that emigration can be 
sought out both as a state strategy for economic development and a family or individual 
strategy for livelihood and life chances.  
Over the process of migration growth, it is important to recognise that the 
migration process is heavily intervened by both sending and receiving governments. In 
other words, migration can happen only when related legal bases and policies are 
present. Although Korea has been receiving more migrants than before, it does not 
necessarily mean an ‘open door’ policy. Migration into Korea has been highly 
controlled (at least meant to be) mobility operating upon carefully calculated bilateral 
arrangements between states. Migration type, size and flow are predefined and regulated 
by the governments with specific rationales and procedures. As Cohen and Kennedy 
(2000: 206) pointed out, “migration shopping” can be found anywhere to a varying 
degree. Korea is not an exception and its instrumental approach has been even more 
conspicuous. The Korean government has reformed its migration regime in order to 
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facilitate (or discourage) certain types of migration, which will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MIGRATION REGIME OF KOREA 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
While the preceding chapter mainly dealt with migration ‘growth’ in Korea and the 
driving forces behind it, this chapter is concerned with the ‘the (im)migration system’ 
developed in Korea over the ongoing process of its migration transition. International 
migration is far from a free movement; rather it is a mobility highly controlled by states’ 
policies (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000; Findlay and Wahba, 2013). Like transnational 
economic activities such as trade and foreign investment, “migration cannot and does 
not take place in a legal or institutional void” (Hollifield, 2004: 901). Even irregular 
migration does not result from the absence of states’ control; instead, it should be 
interpreted as one of the consequences resulting from states’ legal and institutional 
efforts in managing migration through constant negotiations and adjustments (Castles 
and Miller, 2009). As an emerging migrant-receiving country, Korea has also developed 
a range of migration-related policies and institutions. They have been introduced not 
only to ‘manage’ a rising demand for various types of migrants but also to respond to 
the rapidly increasing migrant population and growing ethnic diversity. This chapter 
examines those institutional arrangements, highlighting how the government approaches 
different types of migrants with different policy measures and rationales to achieve 
certain policy goals.  
Since migration is an integrated element of the global economics and politics, 
states often develop similar tendencies in formation of migration policies, labour 
migration policies in particular. For example, many highly industrialised countries in 
Western Europe adopted ‘guest worker systems’ at some point between 1945 and 1973 
to supply labour for their rapidly expanding economies (see Castles and Miller, 2009: 
Chapter 5). Following the post-war migration boom, however, in the midst of economic 
slowdown since the oil crisis of 1973, the unexpected settlement of guest workers in 
Europe and increase in undocumented migrants in North America made ‘controlling 
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migration’ a central feature of both national and international migration policies 
(Castles and Miller, 2009; Martin, 2013). Although global mobility of capital and labour 
is increasingly difficult to be separated, “most governments effectively restrict 
migration flows or at best adopt a managed migration approach” (Hujo and Piper, 2007: 
5). However, when taking a full spectrum of migration including family migration into 
analysis, patterns of migration policies vary cross-nationally, even within the same 
regional bloc due to different historical legacies, institutional constraints, economic 
conditions and dominant social norms and cultures (Boucher and Gest, 2015; Castles, 
2000b; Martin, 2013).  
Variations in the form of migration governance across nations enable researchers 
to apply the notion of ‘regimes’ in analysing migration policies and to construct 
typologies (refer back to Chapter 2). According to Boucher and Gest (2015), a variety of 
migration regime typologies have been developed with two different policy focuses: 
admission and settlement/integration. Following are some examples. Focusing on 
admission-related policies, Freeman (1995) makes a distinction between English-
speaking ‘settler societies’ (the United States, Canada and Australia), ‘European states’ 
with post-colonial links and guest worker systems (the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) and ‘new countries of 
immigration’ (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece); in a similar vein, Cornelius and Tsuda 
(2004) distinguish between ‘classic countries of immigration’ (the United States, 
Canada and Australia)’, ‘reluctant countries of immigration’ (France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and ‘recent countries of immigration’ (Italy, 
Spain, Japan and South Korea). With a focus on settlement (citizenship) and integration 
policies, Brubaker (1992) differentiates between ‘French republicanism’ and ‘German 
ethno-nationalism’.  
Castles and Miller (2009: 44-5) add further complexity to typologies of citizenship 
by identifying five categories: ‘imperial model’, ‘folk or ethnic model’, ‘the republican 
model’ and ‘multicultural model’ with an addition of ‘transnational model’. Some 
scholars have attempted to distinguish countries by measuring the restrictiveness of 
nationality acquisition and cultural rights attribution (Koopmans et al., 2012) or the 
character and strength of multiculturalism policies (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). 
Others employ the existing typology of welfare states, notably that of Esping-Andersen 
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(1990), in analysing (im)migrants’ differing welfare entitlements according to visa 
status (Sainsbury, 2012). 
As Boucher and Gest (2015) criticise, the existing (im)migration regime research 
almost exclusively deals with western states and tends to examine admission and 
settlement regimes in a separate manner, ignoring the possible admission-integration 
policy nexus. As a consequence, how Asia’s new migrant destination countries manage 
migration through admission and settlement policies (and their nexus) has rarely been 
systematically researched. It is not the intention of the current chapter to directly engage 
with developing migration regime typologies. Instead, the chapter aims to help address 
the limitations noted above by supplying an in-depth examination of the migration 
regime of one of the key migration countries in Asia, Korea.  
Following suit of the existing migration regime studies reviewed above, the 
chapter analyses the migration regime of Korea by examining two roughly divided 
policy areas: ‘admission and residency’ and ‘settlement and integration’. Each area is 
empirically informed by analysis of indicators listed in Table 5.1. In the admission and 
residency area is immigration control - a main body of policy. Visa specifications, entry 
and residency regulations of each visa type and special arrangements of screening 
migrants are examined under this area. The (stratified) degree of economic (labour), 
civic and social rights which migrants and their dependants are entitled to exercise are 
especially crucial elements to be examined (see Morris, 2001, 2003). The policy area of 
‘settlement and integration’ is concerned with long-term aspects of migrant lives. 
Although ‘settlement’ and ‘integration’ are ultimately linked, each has a different 
emphasis: while ‘settlement’ is more related to the legal status of migrants associated 
with gaining permanent residency or citizenship, the term ‘integration’ is adopted here 
to describe a policy goal/tendency and a series of social programmes assisting migrants 
with their smooth life transition and functioning in the new country, including supports 
for their children. National norms and practices governing relationships between 
majority and minority groups and laws for anti-discrimination (or for multiculturalism) 
are related to the integration policy area.  
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Table 5.1: Analytical frame in the examination of the Korean migration regime 
Policy Area Admission and Residency Settlement and Integration 
Description 
Policies on the conditions and rights 
under which a migrant enters and 
remains in the state 
Policies on the conditions and rights 
under which a migrant gains 
citizenship 
Analytical 
Indicators 
▪ Rules on entry, exit and residency 
▪ Screening measures: quota (total or 
sector-based) and/or selection based 
on skills or finical capacity 
▪ Regulations on dependants 
▪ Provisions on economic (labour), 
civic and social rights 
▪ Rules on naturalisation of 
migrants and their dependants 
▪ Privilege systems applied to 
certain migrant/ethnic groups 
▪ Integration (support) programmes 
for migrants and their families 
▪ Norms or measures for anti-
discrimination (or for 
multiculturalism) 
Source: Adapted from Williams (2012: 371-2) 
 
The chapter is further divided into five sections. The next section (Section 5.2) 
overviews the institutional settings of the Korean migration regime: it first discusses the 
Korean government’s migration governance structure and its policy goals and 
orientations, and then it examines the Korean migration system with a focus on the visa 
system, and identifies major migrant routes and key migrant categories in each route. 
Against these backgrounds, the chapter closely examines three sets of migration policies 
in detail. These policies govern the largest categories of long-term migrant flows/stocks 
in Korea, namely, unskilled labour migrants, (unskilled) co-ethnic migrants, and 
marriage migrants. Firstly it analyses two different unskilled labour migration policies: 
the (general) unskilled labour migration policy (Section 5.3) and co-ethnic (labour) 
migration policy (Section 5.4). Then the chapter examines the policy on marriage 
migrants (Section 5.5), the most significant type of the family migration to Korea. The 
last section (Section 5.6) summarises the findings, highlights the main features of the 
Korean migration regime and provides some concluding comments. 
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5.2. Institutional Backgrounds 
 
5.2.1. Migration Governance Structure in Korea 
 
The history of migration policy in Korea is short but has experienced many changes. 
The migration policy before the 1990s was narrowly defined as ‘a border (immigration) 
control’. It was mainly because the international migrant movement into Korea was 
limited in scale and pattern (refer to Chapter 4). From the mid-1990s, the nature of the 
Korean migration system was rapidly transformed to ‘a foreign labour policy’, 
coinciding with the introduction (and subsequent reforms) of unskilled labour migration 
policies. Then the year 2007 marked a major watershed in the Korean migration policy 
history. The migrant population finally passed the historic one million mark in 2006. 
Then the government expressed a need to develop a long-term and comprehensive 
migration policy frame in order to manage not just the increasing inflow of various 
types of migrants but also the issues arising from their prolonged or permanent stay, 
such as integration (IPC, 2008). Against this background, the ‘Act on the Treatment of 
the Foreigners in Korea’ was legislated in 2007, which stipulates the state’s roles and 
responsibility regarding the treatment of foreigners (and migrants) and their social 
adjustment. Since then, Korean migration policies began to be framed as a 
comprehensive ‘immigration policy’ rather than simply border control or migrant labour 
policy.  
With respect to migration governance, there is no separate government bureau on 
the ministerial level to formulate and implement migration policies in Korea; 
alternatively, the Korean government has developed a collaborative governance system. 
By the law aforementioned, the ‘Immigration Policy Committee’ (hereafter, the 
Committee), the central immigration policy planning body, was created in 2007. It is led 
by the prime minister, and heads of 14 relevant ministries join it. The key role of the 
Committee as a policy designer and coordinator is to set up a master plan with specific 
policy goals and tasks every five years, called ‘The Basic Plan for Immigration Policy’ 
(hereafter, the Basic Plan). Then the Committee allocates policy tasks to relevant 
governmental agencies. To carry out the tasks, related government bodies, both central 
and local, are required to develop and implement yearly action plans (see Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: The governing system of Korean migration policies 
Source: IPC (2012a: 8) 
 
The Basic Plan for Immigration Policy 
The first Basic Plan became effective from 2008 until 2012 with four policy goals and 
13 related programmes (refer to Table 5.3 below). The policy goals cover four policy 
areas: proactive immigration (admission-related policies), social integration, 
immigration administration and human rights. In order to realise these goals, the central 
government agencies had carried out 149 tasks and local governments had completed 
804 tasks by 2012 according to the action plans (IPC, 2012a: 12-3). Accordingly, 
numerous migration/migrant-related programmes were newly introduced. For such an 
extensive scale of the project, a total budget of 1,336,398 million KRW (equivalent to 
786 million GBP) was allocated between 2009 and 2012 (Table 5.2). The financial input 
was concentrated on both ‘proactive immigration’ policy (44.7 per cent) and ‘social 
integration’ policy (50.4 per cent): the former is mainly related to operating labour 
migration programmes and the latter to supporting marriage migrants and their families. 
The finance was shared by both the central administrative agencies (640,564 million 
KRW) and local governments (695,834 million). The budget for the central government 
had increased on average by 28 per cent year by year, and eight per cent for the local 
governments during the period. 
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Table 5.2: Budget allocations for the First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (million 
KRW) 
Policy Goals 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total 
(4 years) 
% 
Total 342,549  249,878  355,635  388,336  1,336,398  100  
Proactive 
immigration 
244,027  112,313  113,488  127,325  597,153  44.7  
Social 
integration 
90,604  125,989  216,762  240,201  673,556  50.4  
Immigration 
administration 
2,059  2,966  14,770  6,554  26,349  2.0  
Human rights 
protection 
5,859  8,610  10,615  14,256  39,340  2.9  
Note: Budgets of the central government and municipal governments are combined. 
Source: Compiled by the author from IPC (2012b: 18-27) 
 
Examining the contents of the First Basic Plan reveals several policy orientations. 
The Korean government became more positive or even proactive toward receiving 
migrants. The government asserted that “Korea has maintained control-oriented 
immigration policy, prioritising security concern, but Korea needs to change migration 
policy orientation to ‘strategic openness’ in order to utilise foreign human capital in the 
globalising world” (IPC, 2008: 8). This policy orientation justified the adoption of a 
very differential approach to different types of migrants. Labour migrants are 
approached as a development resource to help ‘enhance national competitiveness’, but 
priority was clearly put on attracting skilled migrants (or brains). In addition, receiving 
more co-ethnic migrants was explicitly encouraged. To promote ‘greater social 
integration’, adaptation and integration support programmes targeted marriage migrants 
and their children. It is interesting to see that promoting human rights of foreigners was 
listed as one of the policy goals. Judging from the budget allocation above, this policy 
area is only nominal, not to mention that, in reality, unskilled migrant workers continue 
to be denied family reunion and undocumented migrants are subject to ever more 
tightened crackdowns and forced repatriation. 
The second Basic Plan was launched with the new administration in 2013, and it is 
currently underway. The second Basic Plan more or less stays in line with the previous 
one in terms of policy goals (refer to Table 5.3). Migration policies are framed as a 
process of securing human resource for economic development. Migrants’ social 
integration continues to be emphasised. The earlier notion of human rights protection is 
now more clearly articulated as measures for anti-discrimination and mutual cultural 
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respect. Some new policy goals emphasising safety and migrants’ responsibility are also 
found. The action plans corresponding to these new goals show that the government 
started to consider social conflicts between nationals and migrants more seriously, 
particularly with regard to migrants’ (including both regular and irregular migrants) 
criminal activities against nationals. So, the second Basic Plan expresses a strong 
intention to strengthen entry/status control and calls for an active participation of 
sending countries’ governments in controlling migration.  
The subtle change can be illuminated in the way that two Basic Plans define 
‘immigration policy’: the first one defines immigration policy as “the policy 
comprehensively covering matters related to granting official temporary and permanent 
status to foreigners and their children planning to immigrate to Korea and to creating 
the proper environment for them to live in Korea” (IPC, 2008: 2), whereas the second 
one terms it as “policies encompassing matters on border control, immigration, 
nationality, and social integration for immigrant” (IPC, 2012a: 7), which delivers more 
regulatory and coercive nuances.  The government argues that the second Basic Plan 
puts a priority on addressing various social issues associated with a rapid increase in 
migrants such as violation of immigration rules (typically, overstay), other migrant-
involved crimes and (uncontrolled) residential concentration, whereas the first one was 
primarily about establishing a migration governance policy system for the first time in 
Korea (IPC, 2012a: 21). The added emphasis on safety and responsibility shows the 
government’s growing concern over aforementioned social problems and its intention to 
prevent migrant-related social unrests recently witnessed in the West. To back up the 
point, the government cited Merkel’s saying “Germany’s attempt to create a 
multicultural society has utterly failed” (IPC, 2012a: 17).20 The notion of ‘failed 
multiculturalism’ in the West is brought up by the Korean government to justify more 
tightened regulations and migrants’ fuller integration to the society.  
The second Basic Plan has not been fully substantiated as policies or programmes 
yet but the direction of the migration regime is moving toward a tougher migration 
control and a fuller integration of migrants. However, the plausibility of the Basic Plan 
is in question since tensions seems inevitable due to the lack in congruency found in 
                                                         
20 See Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/uk-germany-merkel-immigration-
idUKTRE69F19T20101016 
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policy goals and action plans, for example, between ‘attracting foreign labour’ and 
‘tight control’; ‘respecting cultural diversity’ and ‘full integration’. 
 
Table 5.3: The Basic Plan for Immigration Policy: 1st and 2nd round compared 
 The 1st Basic Plan (2008-2012) The 2nd Basic Plan (2013-2017) 
Vision Make Korea a leader in embracing foreigners Vibrant Korea growing with immigrants 
Policy Goals 
1. Adopt proactive immigration policies to 
enhance national competitiveness 
2. Pursue greater social integration 
3. Establish an orderly administrative process 
on immigration 
4. Advocate the human rights of foreigners 
 
1. Attract human resources from overseas to 
supply economic stimulus 
2. Promote social integration that respects 
shared Korean values 
3. Prevent discrimination and respect cultural 
diversity 
4. Ensure a safe society for Koreans and Non-
Koreans alike 
5. Promote co-prosperity with the international 
community 
Action Plans 
1-1. Secure growth engines by attracting 
talented foreigners 
1-2. Attract foreign workers for the balanced 
national development 
1-3. Create a suitable living environment for 
foreigners 
2-1. Raise public awareness of the multi-
cultural society 
2-2. Help foreign spouses adjust to Korean 
society 
2-3. Help immigrant children grow up in a 
healthy environment 
2-4. Encourage ethnic Koreans to fulfil their 
economic potential  
3-1. Enforce immigration laws 
3-2. Control borders and personal information 
on foreigners for the greater national 
security 
3-3. Conduct nationality programs for 
accepting qualified immigrants 
4-1. Prevent discrimination against foreigners 
and promote human rights 
4-2. Protect the human rights of foreigners in 
protective custody 
4-3. Establish an advanced registration and 
support system for refugees 
1-1. Invite more foreign visitors who 
contribute to the economy 
1-2. Attract in-demand human resources from 
overseas 
1-3. Draw foreign students to secure future 
growth engine 
1-4. Attract foreign investment for balanced 
regional development 
2-1. Refine the Nationality and Immigration 
System in the interest of self-reliance and 
social integration 
2-2. Operate a well-organized Korea 
Immigration and Integration Program for 
immigrants 
2-3. Prevent fake marriages and support the 
settlement of immigrant spouses 
2-4. Provide a friendly environment for 
children with a foreign background 
2-5. Increase the infrastructure and finances 
for social integration 
3-1. Institutionalize immigrants’ human rights 
protection and discrimination prevention 
3-2. Improve society’s tolerance of cultural 
diversity 
3-3. Build an international environment where 
Koreans and foreigners can interact 
4-1. Control borders safely and surely 
4-2. Control immigration offenders effectively 
4-3. Expand procedures for tracking irregular 
immigrants  
4-4. Enhance the management of 
comprehensive information on foreigners 
5-1. Enhance international cooperation with 
sending countries, international 
organizations 
5-2. Promote refugee policies befitting Korea’s 
national status 
5-3. Expand exchanges and cooperation with 
overseas Korean communities 
Source: Compiled by the author from Immigration Policy Committee (2008, 2012a) 
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The government acknowledges that it needs to keep the door open to migrants 
because they contribute to the Korean economy by complementing the labour deficit, 
replenishing the population, and sharing knowledge/skills, but at the same time it 
realises that receiving more migrants can increase the social and financial burden of 
‘managing’ migration with regard to administrative costs, welfare provision to migrants, 
and public safety (IPC, 2008, 2012a). These competing benefits and costs have put the 
Korean government in a difficult situation in which it has to find a best balancing point. 
Korea does not seem too free from the dilemma that an open democratic economy faces 
between openness and closure (or at least, less openness) to migrants which Hollifield 
termed as “liberal paradox” (Hollifield, 2004: 886). The government proposes a rather 
straightforward solution to this dilemma: while minimising the migration stock, it 
attracts more ‘desirable migrants’ such as skilled workers or other types of migrants 
who are expected to be integrated better to the society, ethnic return migrants and 
marriage migrants. The next part of the section investigates how the differential 
inclusion/exclusion policy strategy is embodied in the current migration system in 
Korea.  
 
 
5.2.2. Immigration System in Korea 
 
Visa Classification 
One useful starting point to comprehend the feature of (im)migration system of a 
country is to investigate its visa system which specifies by type requirements, 
restrictions and rights over migrants’ entry to their settlement. The Korean migration 
system is characterised by a highly segmented system of visa categories. As of February 
2013, there are 36 visa types to enter and remain in Korea. The official immigration 
information website groups all visa types into six categories according to the purpose of 
visit: tourism/transit, temporary visiting, business, work, visit and stay with family 
including overseas Koreans, education and others.21 Based on this classification, I have 
constructed six ‘migration routes’ by reorganising most frequently granted 28 visa types 
(Table 5.4). However, it should be noted that the notion of ‘route’ does not sharply 
emerge in the Korean migration system because regulations often differ substantially for 
                                                         
21 Hi Korea, http://www.hikorea.go.kr/pt/InfoDetailR_en.pt?categoryId=2 
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different entry types even in the same migration route. Instead, migration policies tend 
to be organised for specific ‘migrant categories’ indicated by visa type. In fact, the 
aforementioned visa classification by the government is more an informational guide 
than the official policy structure. So my formulation of migration routes here is only for 
an analytical guide.  
As Table 5.4 presents, among six migration routes, the labour migration and the 
family migration combined dominate the migration pattern in Korea by occupying 70.6 
per cent in the total migrant stock. Both routes are almost equally divided in half 
(family migration is only slightly larger by two per cent). Migrant workers under two 
unskilled labour migration visas (E-9 and H-2) are the most important entry schemes 
consisting of the labour migration route to Korea. Migrants holding either an ‘overseas 
compatriot’ visa (F-4) or a marriage migration visa (F-6) are main contributors to the 
family migration route except those already having a permanent residence visa (F-5). 
The ‘overseas compatriot’ visa is exclusive to ethnic Koreans. Migrants holding this 
visa are either people who had Korean nationality in the past but have since acquired 
nationality of another country, or those who have at least one parent or grandparent who 
is Korean or had a Korean nationality in the past. Although the government classifies 
them as not an employment-purpose migration but a form of family migration (‘F’ visa 
series)22, many of them actually come to Korea for business and employment purposes. 
In this regard, ‘overseas compatriot’ visa (F-4) is strongly relevant to the labour 
migration route. Thus, I argue that, policy-wise, H-2 visa and F-4 visa combined form a 
distinguishable route of (labour) migration to Korea, namely, ‘co-ethnic migration route, 
although not all co-ethnic migrants are admitted with either of those visas (see also 
Table 5.9 in this chapter).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
22 This research follows the government classification (see KIS, 2015: 20) 
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Table 5.4: Migration routes and scales by visa type in Korea, 2014 
Route Visa typea 
No. of persons entering 
with the visa 
% in the total 
migrant stock 
Labour 
Temporary employment (C-4) 593 0.03  
Professor (E-1) 2,664 0.15  
Language instructor (E-2) 17,949 1.00  
Research (E-3) 3,195 0.18  
Technical guidance (E-4) 186 0.01  
Special profession (E-5) 645 0.04  
Culture/art (E-6) 5,162 0.29  
Specially designated activities (E-7) 19,109 1.06  
Non-professional work (E-9) 270,569 15.05  
Seaman employment (E-10) 14,403 0.80  
‘Working visit’ (H-2) 282,670 15.72  
Sub-total 617,145 34.33  
Family 
Visiting/Staying with relatives (F-1) 71,203 3.96  
Residency (F-2)c 37,504 2.06  
Family dependency (F-3)d 21,809 1.21  
‘Overseas compatriot’ (F-4)b 289,427 16.10  
Permanent residence (F-5) 112,742 6.27  
Marriage migration (F-6) 120,710 6.71  
Sub-total 653,395 36.31  
Short-term 
visit 
Visa exemption (B-1) 93,619 5.21  
Travel/Transit (B-2) 96,113 5.35  
Temporary visit (C-3) 146,357 8.14  
Religious work (D-6) 1,855 0.10  
Sub-total 337,944 18.80  
Education  
& Training 
Overseas study (D-2) 61,257 3.41  
Technical training (D-3) 3,507 0.20  
General training (D-4) 27,000 1.50  
Sub-total 91,764 5.11  
Business 
Intra-company transfer (D-7) 1,593 0.09  
Corporate investment (D-8) 6,026 0.34  
Trade management (D-9) 8,856 0.49  
Sub-total 16,475 0.92  
Other Other  80,895 4.50  
  Total 1,797,618 100 
Note: a English translations of visa types presented here are taken from the official website of the Ministry 
of Justice for foreigners. See Hi Korea, http://www.hikorea.go.kr/pt/InfoDetailR_en.pt? 
categoryId=2. 
b ‘Overseas Koreans’ in other translations 
c F-2 is granted to dependants of either Korean nationals or permanent residence visa holders, and 
those who want to stay longer by changing their visa type (typically semi- or skilled workers or 
business persons/investors).  
d F-3 is granted to other types of family dependants than F-2. 
Source: KIS (2015) 
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Regulations on Entry, Residency, Settlement and Labour/Social Rights 
All the different migration routes are subject to different stipulations on entry, residency, 
and labour/social and settlement rights, although not all types of migrants become 
relevant to all those stages. This mixed arrangement of controls and rights is a policy 
device to manage migration, called ‘civic stratification’, and it is operating by means of 
differentiated access to rights often based on skill level, class, nationality or ethnicity 
(Morris, 2001, 2003). With all 36 types of visa, the Korean government provides two 
over 600 page-long volumes of detailed immigration manuals. Considering the scale 
and complexity, it is impossible to cover all migration routes and visa types here. Some 
general rules on entry, residency, labour/social rights and settlement are briefly 
discussed here. In the later sections, regulations on three key migrant categories are 
examined in finer detail. 
Foreigners entering Korea, except those coming through the ‘short-term visit’ 
route and ‘temporary employment’, are granted a period of stay between as short as 6 
months and less than 5 years (Table 5.5). In general, the paths leading to permanent 
settlement are usually open exclusively to professionals or long-term residents. In either 
case, the length of stay is decisive for a chance of settlement (either permanent 
residency or nationalisation). There are some special arrangements to grant migrants a 
settlement right without attaching the residency requirement in Korea. Typically, 
however, only foreign nationals who have legally stayed consecutively at least for 5 
years in the Korean territory are entitled to apply for a permanent resident visa, which 
then makes them eligible for a citizenship application (test). Linking the length of 
residence to a settlement right is a very effective (stratifying) migration control. If the 
government limits the length of stay or the renewal of visa, affected migrants are 
automatically denied the chance for settlement (as you will see in the case of general 
unskilled workers under the E-9 visa).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Table 5.5: Residency regulations on labour and family migrants in Korea as of 2015 
Route Purpose of Visit Visa Types Length of Stay 
Labour 
Temporary employment  C-4 No more than 90 days 
Skilled workers or special professions E-1 to E-7 2 to 5 years (R) 
Unskilled workers  E-9 3 years (+1 years 10 
months) 
Seaman employment E-10 1 year 
Working holiday H-1  6 months to 1.5 years 
‘Working visit’ (exclusive to co-ethnic 
migrants) 
H-2 3 years (+1 years 10 
months) 
Family 
Visiting/staying with relatives  F-1 2 years (R) 
Residency F-2,  3 years (R) 
Family dependency F-3 Vary (R) 
‘Overseas compatriot’ (exclusive to co-
ethnic migrants) 
F-4 3 years (R) 
Permanent residence F-5 Permanent 
Marriage migration F-6 3 years (R) 
Source: Compiled by the author from MOJ (2015) 
Note: (R) means a possibility that the visa can be renewed ‘without’ requiring re-entry.  
 
To those on the labour migration route, the right to access the labour market is 
predetermined by their skill level-based entry visas. Change of the visa type after 
admission and mobility between the different skill levels are tightly controlled: lower 
skilled migrants may have some chances to move up by acquiring higher qualifications 
but higher skilled migrants’ entering low-skilled jobs is prohibited in order to prevent 
competition over the same job areas with migrants admitted through the official 
unskilled labour migrant programmes. In contrast, family migrants’ access to the labour 
market is not straightforward. While some dependant visa holders (F-1 and F-2) have 
limitations in their choice of job, F-3 holders are given full access to the labour market 
except certain unskilled job areas. Permanent residence visa holders (F-5) and marriage 
migrants (F-6) have no limitations in their activities. Family migrants’ change to a 
labour migrant status is also very conditional. Besides the skill level, ethnicity also 
matters in the Korean migration regime: in both the labour migration and family 
migration routes, having a Korean ethnicity gives migrants a wider freedom and 
privilege in social and economic activities.  
With regard to social rights, most migrants are in general not entitled to tax-funded 
(non-contributory) social benefits except marriage migrants and some permanent 
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residents. However, contributory programmes are more accessible. All documented 
labour migrants become immediately entitled to work-place related social insurances 
(the Employment Insurance and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance) and 
the National Health Insurance. Any other type of migrants staying over 3 months can 
also benefit from the National Health Insurance after 3 months when they start paying 
insurance premium (including premiums for first 3 months). For both labour and non-
labour migrants, entitlement to the National Pension is optional, determined by the 
mutual recognition of each other’s pension scheme between Korea and the origin 
country. The next section closely examines how these general rules/regulations are 
operating in a different way with the major migrant groups.  
 
 
5.3. Unskilled Labour Migration Policy 
 
The Korean government divides labour migration into two categories based on skill 
levels: skilled and unskilled. Skilled (or professional) migrant workers are sub-divided 
into eight categories according to their speciality or job area (Table 5.6). The rest of 
labour migrants having no specific qualifications are collectively referred to as unskilled 
labour migrants. As you see in Table 5.5, unskilled migrant workers occupy an absolute 
majority (92 per cent), while skilled migrants make up only eight per cent. Then 
unskilled labour migration is further segmented into two types on the ethnicity ground: 
general unskilled migrant workers and co-ethnic migrant workers.23 Before discussing 
the current policy for each type, I will briefly present an overview of the development of 
unskilled labour migration policy in Korea, which provides background knowledge for 
both types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
23 The seaman migration programme is excluded from the analysis because of its separate regulations and 
distinctive work nature (working on a boat).  
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Table 5.6: Composition of labour migrants in Korea, 2014 
Skill Level Visa Type 
No. of persons 
entering with the visa 
% in the total labour 
migrant stock 
Skilled 
Temporary employment (C-4) 593  0.1  
Professor (E-1) 2,644  0.4  
Language instructor (E-2) 17,949  2.9  
Research (E-3) 3,195  0.5  
Technical guidance (E-4) 186  0.0  
Special profession (E-5) 645  0.1  
Culture/art (E-6) 5,162  0.8  
Specially designated activities (E-7) 19,109  3.1  
Sub-total 49,503  8.0  
Unskilled 
Non-professional work (E-9) 270,569  43.8  
Seaman employment (E-10) 14,403  2.3  
‘Working visit’ (H-2) 282,670  45.8  
Sub-total 567,642 92.0 
Total 617,145   100  
Source: KIS (2015) 
 
 
5.3.1. Development of Unskilled Labour Migration Policy 
 
The early history of the migration system in Korea was marked by the establishment of 
unskilled labour migration systems. In the midst of a soaring demand for unskilled 
labour force in Korea, a growing number of migrants already start to meet the demand 
from the early 1990s. However, it was well over a decade later for the Korean 
government to provide a fully operating labour migration system. Table 5.7 shows how 
Korea has become equipped with comprehensive unskilled labour migration schemes. A 
series of reforms up to now can be summarised as the transition from ‘Industrial Trainee 
System’ into ‘Employment Permit System’, which includes a special labour migration 
scheme for co-ethnic migrants called ‘Working Visit Programme’. The overall policy 
reform process reveals the government’s changing attitudes and rationales toward 
unskilled labour migration and competing pressures from other related stakeholders 
such as business, civil society and migrants themselves.  
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Table 5.7: Development of unskilled labour migration policies in Korea 
Period Trend Policy Basis 
before 1991 
▪ Only a small number of migrants 
▪ No public attention 
▪ Only skilled labour migration 
allowed 
1991 - 1997 
▪ Increasing demand for migrant trainees (workers) 
▪ The Government expanded trainee quotas 
▪ Tacit allowance of hiring migrant trainees as 
workers 
▪ Repeated amnesties and round-ups 
▪ Increasing cases of human rights violation 
▪ Industrial & Technical Trainee 
Programme 
▪ Industrial Trainee System 
(ITS) 
 
1998 - 2003 
▪ Economic crisis and large scale layoff of migrants 
▪ Increase of undocumented migrant workers 
▪ Mixed approaches: legalisation and deportation 
▪ Migrant trainees get ‘worker status’ for 1 year 
after the 2 year training (changed to 1 year training 
and 2 year work later)a 
▪ Work After-Training System 
(WATS, a revised version of 
ITS) 
▪ Employment Management 
System for ethnic Koreans 
2004 - 2007 
▪ The economy recovered and migrant workers 
returned 
▪ New unskilled foreign worker system in operation 
▪ Sharp increase in ethnic Korean migrants 
▪ Employment Permit System 
(EPS), temporary cooperation 
with WATS until 2006 
▪ Working Visit Programme for 
ethnic Koreans (WVP) 
after 2007 
▪ Unskilled migrants are highly regulated migration  
▪ Number of undocumented migrant workers was 
subdued 
▪ Preference to skilled labour migrants and co-ethnic 
labour migrants 
▪ Unified to EPS including 
WVP 
Note: a In legal perspective, Korea first had non-professional migrant ‘workers’ under the WATS in 2000. 
 
Until early 1990s, only a small number of foreigners with skilled professions were 
invited in specific areas where there were no Korean substitutes available. In 1991 the 
Korean government first allowed the overseas branches of Korean companies to bring 
local workers to Korea as ‘industrial and technical trainees’ a short-term basis, allegedly 
emulating the Japanese ‘Foreign Trainee Programme’ (S Kim, 2010). Those trainees 
from less developed countries were admitted for the purpose of job training and skill 
transfer. However, many trainees did not depart after the training period had expired 
and became undocumented workers because they could find employment elsewhere in 
Korea often with better conditions than in the trainee scheme. While the government did 
not take any official measures against it, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
started hiring migrant workers without any legal basis. In the meantime, it was often the 
case that private agencies illegally recruited migrant workers and exploited them by 
charging high arrangement fees. Human rights violation and exploitative practices by 
employers became also prevalent and consequently the number of runaways and 
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undocumented workers soared and the Korean civil society started to express deep 
concerns for them (Martin, 2013; Seol, 2005). 
The Korean government decided to formalise the Korean version of industrial 
trainee programme named the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) in 1993, hoping that the 
ITS would meet the growing demand for cheap workforce and deal with the soaring 
numbers of undocumented migrants at the same time. The ITS expanded an official 
channel for the companies suffering labour shortage to recruit foreign trainees for two 
years. Unfortunately the new system did not operate as intended, failing to mend the 
existing problems with the previous system. In essence, The ITS shared the same 
embedded limitations with the previous ‘Foreign Industrial Trainees’ programme. The 
migrants hired through ITS were still called ‘trainees’ not ‘workers’. Businesses 
requested the government to maintain ITS because they preferred ‘trainees’ to workers 
since they could hire trainees at lower cost without extra spending on social protection 
and benefits for them.  
The government was reluctant to admit the fundamental limitations of the ITS. So 
the government tried to fix the problems by modifying the existing ITS system rather 
than redesigning it. The government devised a very interesting hybrid labour migration 
system, called the Work after Training System (WATS), which grants foreign trainees a 
worker status after their completion of the training period: two years as a trainee and 
then one year as a worker from 2000 and one year as a trainee and two years as a 
worker from 2002. This measure was introduced in order to provide a legal basis on 
which companies can continue to maintain migrant labour force after the training. 
Despite the gained worker status, exploitative practices against migrant workers were 
not effectively addressed, so many migrant workers kept running away from the 
designated workplace. As a result, a large number of migrant workers ended up 
becoming undocumented eventually, putting themselves in even more precarious 
situations. The government periodically carried out roundup operations against 
undocumented migrant workers in order to suppress the soaring number of 
undocumented workers. Escaping harsh crackdowns, some migrants had tragic 
accidents and other committed suicide, which ignited great public outcry. The civil 
society groups again took the initiative to protest against the government, asking for the 
complete reform of labour migration policy (Seol, 2005). This situation served as a 
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background for Korea to introduce a new labour migration system for unskilled migrant 
workers later on. 
The need for an alternative labour migration system to replace the industrial 
trainee system had gained a wide social consensus and preparation for the reform 
already was underway even from the mid-1990s. Some progressive politicians, social 
activist groups and academics as well as migrant workers themselves came to form an 
extended coalition for migrant worker policy reform (I-J Yoon, 2008). They gained 
support from the general public and were backed up by the newly elected government 
led by the former president Kim Dae-jung (officed from 1998 to 2003). Even the 
opposition party also supported the reform. SMEs, however, did not welcome the 
reform in fear of the burdens if migrant workers come to have enhanced labour rights. 
After much struggle and negations, the reform bill was finally submitted to the 
Congress in 1997. After some delay due to the Asian economic crisis of 1997, the 
Employment Permit System (EPS) was eventually legislated on 31 July 2003. After 
about two years of co-operation with the WATS from 2004, the EPS came to be fully 
effective as of 1 January 2007. 
The EPS has become the only official channel of hiring unskilled migration 
workers since 2007. The new system was intended not only to streamline the process of 
hiring and managing labour migration but also to address the limitations of the previous 
systems such as human rights violations by guaranteeing migrant workers a right to find 
an employment while equally protecting them under the labour laws. It is important to 
note that the EPS is a dual system: general unskilled migrant workers, i.e. migrant 
workers through the E-9 visa and co-ethnic migrant workers through H-2 visa. In this 
section, I focus on examining how the EPS operates for general migrant workers first. 
The H-2 programme will be discussed in the following section. The H-2 programme 
operates with different rules and procedures from the E-9 programme and it should be 
analysed as an integral part of a bigger policy frame of ‘co-ethnic migration’, rather 
than simply a labour migration programme.   
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5.3.2. Employment Permit System (EPS) 
 
Admission and Residency 
The admission of unskilled migration workers through the EPS (E-9) is a highly 
regulated process which involves both sending and receiving governments. The Korean 
government first selects origin countries. As of 2014, Korea has arranged memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) for the EPS with a total of 15 countries, including Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Nepal, Uzbekistan, China, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Pakistan and others (ordered by majority).  
The EPS, on the one hand, assists businesses to import foreign labour more 
efficiently, but, one the other hand, it tries to discourage their dependency on migrant 
workers. So, the EPS places various measures to protect the internal labour market so 
that migrant labour force should be sought only as the last resort. To begin with, the 
EPS specifies applicable industries and yearly admission quota, reflecting labour 
demands and economic situations. As Table 5.8 shows, admission increased sharply 
over the early years of the EPS implementation (2007 to 2008). The number declined 
during the global economic recession from 2008 to 2009, but since then the yearly entry 
scale has not fluctuated much. Expectedly, admission has been concentrated on the 
industries which suffer from the labour deficit. The largest portion of the EPS workers 
has been allocated to the manufacturing sector (79.7 per cent for the 2014 entry) and the 
second largest to the farming and dairy sector (11.3 per cent). It should be highlighted 
that most businesses in the service sector are not allowed to hire unskilled migrant 
workers (E-9) through the EPS.  
There are also regulations on the dependency ratio (the proportion of migrant 
workers in the total number of employees) according to the size of business. There are 
ceilings: for example, manufacturing businesses whose total employees are 300 or less 
can hire up to 30 migrant workers, and no more than 40 migrant workers for larger 
businesses. Furthermore, any businesses want to hire migrant workers via the EPS must 
prove that they have tried to hire native-born workers for at least 14 days. One official 
interviewed for the current research explained the rationales behind these measures: 
 
The reason for regulating company size and industry in importing foreign workers 
is to harmonise the need for foreign labour and the need for the protection of the 
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domestic labour market, especially jobs for vulnerable workers. The purpose of the 
EPS is to supply foreign labour to companies suffering from the labour deficit due 
to the difficulty of finding native-born workers, but some companies may 
intentionally choose to hire foreign workers instead of Korean workers in order to 
cut the labour cost. In this case, foreign workers can substitute the domestic labour 
force. Labour cost and conditions are decided at the tense equilibrium between the 
demand and supply of labour. If the government supplies foreign workers, 
considering only the demand side, overall work conditions/income level can be 
negatively affected, and, we are afraid that, in the long run, native-born workers 
may forever lose the chance to enter those industries. (Interviewee D, 5 August 
2014) 
 
Table 5.8: Yearly admission quota for the EPS by industry in Korea (person) 
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2014 
(%) 
Total 49,600 72,000 17,000 34,000 48,000 57,000 62,000 
53,000 
 (100) 
Manufacturing 42,100 60,800 13,000 28,100 40,000 49,000 52,000 
42,250 
(79.7) 
Farming and 
Dairy 
1,900 4,000 1,000 3,100 4,500 4,500 6,000 
6,000 
(11.3) 
Construction 4,400 6,000 2,000 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 
2,350 
(4.4) 
Fishing 1,000 800 900 1,100 1,750 1,750 2,300 
2,300 
(4.3) 
Storage and 
Recycling 
200 400 100 100 150 150 100 
100 
(0.2) 
Note: These quotas are exclusively applicable to the migrants through E-9 visa.   
Source: EPS website, https://www.eps.go.kr 
 
Regarding the exit control, the government is now emphasising ‘voluntary return’. 
The government rewards migrants who voluntarily leave at the point the EPS contract 
expires by giving them a chance for a contract extension or rehiring. It is a more 
positive approach than crackdown to prevent overstays. Employers also can save costs 
by bringing back previous workers who are already well trained. The government also 
started to call for increased responsibilities of sending countries regarding migrant 
workers’ return and settlement back in origin. It may refuse to renew the EPS agreement 
with certain sending countries according to the number of migrant workers failing to 
return. As a matter of fact, the Korean government suspended the EPS agreement with 
Vietnam in 2012 (restored 16 months later), one of major sending countries, on account 
of the increasing number of Vietnamese undocumented migrant workers.  
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Over the process from recruiting to placement and management, the Korean 
government directly intervenes in every stage. The direct intervention by the 
government in the labour migration allows a better position in dealing with issues raised 
with previous systems. One official in an interview with the author for the current 
research emphasised:  
 
The EPS is a fairly well made system. The overall process of recruiting foreigners 
- making a labour pool, making a contract, deploying them to companies, etc. - is 
honest and transparent. Human rights of migrant workers are also well protected 
under the EPS. That is, the EPS is to eliminate the possibility of private brokers’ 
interruption and officials’ corruption, and it also minimises the arrangement fee for 
migrant workers. In addition, we educate them with pre-employment training, 
useful information for living, laws, procedures to appeal when their rights are 
violated, and so forth. (Interviewee D, 5 August 2014) 
     
However, it is important to note that the EPS is based on the idea of ‘employment 
permit’ which, in essence, priorities the position of the recruiting parties rather than job 
seekers or employees. In practice, migrant workers are given little room to negotiate: 
the employment contract is signed with only a specific company even before the 
departure and they can neither change the workplace nor their visa type afterwards.  
Two consecutive Basic Plans (IPC, 2008, 2012a) repeatedly confirm that the 
number of unskilled migrant workers should be limited to the necessary minimum. In 
reality, however, annual quotas for unskilled migrant workers have gradually expanded 
since 2009 in response to the growing demand from industries. Contrary to its policy 
goals, the government apparently is failing to increase the proportion of skilled labour 
migrants. Recently, the Korean government is trying to experiment a different strategy 
to minimise the unskilled labour force. According to the second Basic Plan, the 
government now emphasises ‘up-skilling’ of current unskilled migrant workers (IPC, 
2012a: 32): the government is encouraging some qualified unskilled migrant workers to 
upgrade their E-9 visa to E-7 (applicable to skilled- or semi-skilled occupations), which 
allows them more freedom in job-seeking with an increased chance of long-term stay. 
The prospect of this measure does not seem to be very promising because employment 
opportunity (i.e., demand for foreign labour) is still wider in unskilled jobs.  
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Settlement and Integration 
In essence, the EPS is a short-term (up to 3 years in principle) and circulatory labour 
migration scheme. Unskilled migrant workers are not supposed to take up a long term 
residence. Therefore, policies on settlement/integration are largely irrelevant to them. 
That is the reason why family invitation was not considered at the first place. Exclusion 
from the settlement/integration programmes makes them isolated and vulnerable to 
discrimination and exploitation. The only way for general unskilled migrant workers to 
stay for a long time is to become undocumented by overstaying. The Korean 
government had repeated crackdowns and unexpected legalisation measures to control 
the total scale of undocumented migrant population. This lack of consistency in 
migration control, especially before the establishment of the EPS, made migrant 
workers distrust the government policies, so some simply did not return to hope for 
another chance of legalisation (S Kim, 2010; Seol, 2000).  
However, opportunities to legally stay for longer-term have been widened. For one 
thing, the government has continuously extended the employment permit period itself: 
only one year of employment at first in 2000, two years in 2002, then three years from 
2007 and now almost five years, by renewing the contract. The government recently 
opened an additional way for a long-term stay. It introduced a re-hiring scheme, called a 
‘Special Return Employment Programme for Diligent Workers’. If a migrant worker 
has consecutively worked for the original company for 4 years and 10 months and the 
employer want to keep hiring him/her, the worker can continue to work there for 
another full term after the 3 month waiting in the origin country. The requirement to 
return for a period before achieving 5 year continuous residence is to deny them the 
right to permanent residence and settlement. The system is to encourage migrant 
workers to keep working for small manufacturing and farming/fishing industries which 
suffer from the chronic labour shortage most. Furthermore, the Korean government 
arranges the Korean language test more frequently in sending countries in order to 
speed up the rehiring process by minimising waiting time for the mandatory language 
test. So technically speaking, migrant workers can now work and stay in Korea almost 
for ten years through an extension and a rehiring; however, the increased chance for 
longer residence will not necessarily lead to the legal settlement of unskilled migrant 
workers due to the length of residence (5 years in most cases) requirement.  
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5.4. Co-ethnic Migration Policy 
 
5.4.1. Development of Co-ethnic Migration Policy 
 
About 40 per cent of all migrants in Korea as of 2014 have a Korean ethnic background. 
It is a consequence of the implementation of special migration policies encouraging the 
immigration of overseas ethnic Koreans since 1999. Those policies include various 
favourable treatments for overseas ethnic Koreans in entry, settlement and social and 
economic activities.  
As European experiences testify, it is not uncommon for states to adopt such 
selective migration policies based on ethnicity (Joppke, 2005a; Skrentny et al., 2007). 
Germany, for example, has developed a migration policy favourably treating ethnic 
German returnees from Russia or Eastern Europe, through special arrangement for their 
resettlement and quick integration (Joppke, 2005b). An interesting point is that not all 
ethnic migrants are equally treated. They are often subject to differing treatments by 
their origin nationality and the skill level in terms of social/labour and membership 
rights. In other words, certain types of co-ethnic migrants are more (less) welcomed 
than others. It is also the case in Korea which has developed the hierarchical policy 
approach in a very explicit way to co-ethnic migrants who are believed to share the 
same blood (Seol and Skrentny, 2009a). 
As shown in Table 5.9, there are two dominant co-ethnic migration types in Korea: 
‘overseas compatriot’ (F-4) and working visit (H-2). Each occupies 47.3 per cent and 
46.2 per cent respectively in the total co-ethnic migrant stock as of 2014. The ‘overseas 
compatriot’ visa scheme was introduced according to ‘Act on the Immigration and 
Legal Status of Overseas Koreans’ of 1998, which stipulates the provision of special 
benefits to ethnic Koreans (with both Korean and foreign nationality) living abroad to 
encourage them to come to Korea to work in skilled or professional jobs. By this law, 
the special migration scheme, ‘overseas compatriot (F-4)’, was established. This scheme 
grants social and economic rights almost equal to Korean citizens with the exception of 
the rights of voting and public office, albeit not conferring citizenship automatically, (J-
S Park and Chang, 2005; Seol and Skrentny, 2009a). However, ‘overseas compatriot (F-
4)’ targeted ethnic Koreans from rich countries who were not likely to seek unskilled 
employment. The eligibility included (still does) higher degrees, skill qualifications or 
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financial capacity. Despite the largest co-ethnic population (Chinese Koreans, 
‘Joseonjok’), China initially was excluded from this scheme, fearing that a large inflow 
of ‘Chinese’ Koreans via this entry scheme may disturb the Korean labour market 
(Gwak, 2012; Seol and Skrentny, 2009a).  
 
 
Table 5.9: Co-ethnic migrants by visa type in Korea, 2014  
Visa Purpose of Visit 
No. of persons 
entering with the visa 
% 
Total 
 
704,536 100 
F-4 
Long-term stay or skilled/semi-skilled work 
(‘overseas compatriot’) 
289,427 47.3 
H-2 Unskilled work (‘working visit’) 282,670 46.2 
F-5 Permanent residence 74,870 12.2 
F-1 Visit families/relatives 16,278 2.7 
Other Business, study and marriage 41,291 6.7 
Source: KIS (2015)  
 
Expectedly, many ethnic Korean communities in those areas protested against it 
and, as a matter of fact, the Korean Supreme Court ruled that the law goes against the 
Constitution regarding the fundamental rights of equality on 29 November 2001(Gwak, 
2012: 38). Complying with the rule, the Korean government had to make ethnic 
Koreans from China and CIS regions also become eligible for the F-4 visa. However, 
instead of reforming ‘overseas compatriot’ visa system into a fully inclusive co-ethnic 
migration system, the government tried to maintain the divide between the two by 
introducing a separate labour migration programme for ethnic Koreans living in China 
and CIS (see Section 5.4.2). While subject to the lesser privileges than ‘overseas 
compatriot’ visa holders, ethnic Koreans from China and CIS regions are allowed to 
freely seek an employment at least in unskilled jobs. In addition, from 2008, the 
government has broadened the chance that they can obtain an F-4 visa which can lead 
them to long-term residence or possibly settlement. Consequently, the number of 
Chinese Koreans (joseonjok) has been rapidly increasing, dominating both (F-4 and H-2) 
co-ethnic migration schemes (Table 5.10).  
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Despite the recent reforms, differential treatment continues between co-ethnic 
migrants from China and CIS regions and those from advanced countries. A detailed 
examination will follow in the next sub-section, but the main point is that despite the 
same ethnicity, co-ethnic migrants from China and CIS regions are still largely excluded 
from the ‘overseas compatriot’ policy; rather, they are approached and managed 
together with other general unskilled foreign migrant workers through the E-9 visa 
(Gwak, 2012; Seol and Skrentny, 2009a). The Korean government operates these labour 
migration systems juxtaposed each other under different policy goals and rationales. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the relation among the three labour migration 
programmes, although the ‘Working Visit Programme’ (H-2) is the main interest for 
this section due to its immediate relevance to (unskilled) service sector jobs (care jobs, 
in particular). 
 
Table 5.10: ‘Overseas Compatriot’ and ‘Working Visit’ migrants by nationality in Korea, 
2014 
Visa Nationality No. of persons % in each visa 
Overseas Compatriot (F-4) 
Total 289,427 100 
China 208,312 72.0 
US 46,165 16.0 
Canada 14,509 5.0 
Russia 4,650 1.6 
Australia 4,267 1.5 
New Zealand 2,149 0.7 
Other 9,375 3.2 
Working Visit (H-2) 
Total 282,670 100 
China 267,922 94.8 
Uzbekistan 12,386 4.4 
Kazakhstan 1,054 0.4 
Other 1,308 0.5 
Source: KIS (2015)  
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5.4.2. Working Visit Programme (WVP) 
 
Admission and Residency 
The ‘Working Visit Programme (WVP)’ was launched in 2007, replacing the previous 
special migrant employment programme for co-ethnic migrants, called the 
‘Employment Management System’ (refer back to Table 5.5). The WVP is an integral 
part of the EPS, so they share some common features: both are basically short-term 
circulatory unskilled labour migration schemes, and both are somehow controlled by 
quotas. 
As summarised in Table 5.11, there are, however, a number of significant 
differences between two, let alone the ethnicity-based eligibility. To begin with, 
admission procedures are different: E-9 visa applicants first have to pass the Korean 
language test, and when a visa is granted, they sign the contract only with the 
designated workplace even before they enter Korea. In contrast, the WVP migrants are 
exempted from the Korean language test24, and enter Korea first if they are granted a 
visa. After completing the official induction/orientation programmes, they make a 
contract with the company they find themselves or a job centre introduces to them. 
Admission priority is given to those who can prove their direct ancestral links to Korean 
nationals (admission through invitation by families or relatives in Korea); other 
applicants having no familial connections can still apply for a visa but they can be 
admitted only if vacancy remains unfilled within the total quota.  
Entitlement to social rights is identical to both E-9 and H-2 migrant workers, but 
labour rights are different. Once admitted, the WVP workers can freely seek 
employment in a wide range of industries (restricted only to unskilled jobs, though). 
Unlike the general EPS workers, they can access to jobs in the service sector, even in 
private homes (refer to Chapter 7 for detailed information on the way in which the WVP 
workers participate in the service sector). On top of that, the WVP workers can change 
their work places at their will, which is a significant privilege compared to general 
unskilled migrant workers. No sector-based yearly quota is applied to the WVP but only 
the total number of migrants (working in Korea) is limited to 303,000 persons. 
 
                                                         
24 The Korean language requirement was abolished in 2011 because the government believed that the test 
was meaningless (too easy) for co-ethnic applicants but only delayed the procedure to admit them.  
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Table 5.11: Comparison between general unskilled labour migration visa (E-9) and 
‘Working Visit’ visa (H-2) 
 Working Visit (H-2) General Unskilled (E-9) 
Applicable to 
Ethnic Koreans from China or CIS, 
aged 25 or above 
 
Foreigners from the countries having a 
formal labour migration agreement 
with the Korean government 
Feature 
▪ Unskilled 
▪ Short-term and circulatory (3 years + 
1 year 10 month) 
▪ Free job search after 
orientation(education) 
▪ Free change of workplace 
▪ Unskilled 
▪ Short-term and circulatory (3 years + 
1 year 10 month) 
▪ Contract before arrival 
▪ Change of workplace not allowed 
 
Quota Total stock limited to 303,000 Sector-based yearly quota 
Employment area 
▪ Manufacturing, construction, 
agriculture/dairy, fishing, storage, 
recycling 
▪ Service (e.g., sales, hospitality and 
institutional/personal care) 
▪ Manufacturing, construction, 
agriculture/dairy, fishing, storage, 
recycling 
 
Change to skilled 
work visa 
Conditionally possible Denied 
Source: Summarised by the author from MOJ (2015) 
 
Settlement and Integration  
In principle, the WVP migrant workers, like general unskilled workers, are irrelevant to 
settlement/integration policies. As it is, they will not be able to meet the requirement for 
settlement. Like the E-9 workers, they can remain only for 4 years 10 months and must 
leave and come back even in the case that they are to be rehired. However, the Korean 
government provides legal opportunities through which they can pursue settlement. 
Firstly, the WVP workers can upgrade their status to an ‘overseas compatriot’ visa (F-4) 
which guarantees repeated visa renewal without re-entry. With an F-4 visa, securing 
permanent residence and even naturalisation becomes much easier. To be eligible, they 
have consecutively worked for over two years for specified industries suffering labour 
deficit most (refer to Table 5.12). Secondly, the WVP migrants can make a special 
application for a permanent residence visa (F-5) directly. In this case, conditions are 
extremely tough: they are expected not only to have longer work record (over 4 years in 
the certain industries) but to prove they have finance to sustain themselves (equivalent 
to per capita GNI of the previous year) or licences for skilled work (Table 5.12). It is 
understandable why the WVP migrants overwhelmingly choose to take the first path for 
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settlement although the upgrade (to F-4) option is not without its disadvantages, such as 
losing access to unskilled jobs.  
 
Table 5.12: Comparison between ‘Overseas Compatriot’ visa (F-4) and ‘Working Visit’ 
visa (H-2) 
 Working Visit’ (H-2) Overseas Compatriot (F-4) 
Applicable 
to 
Ethnic Koreans from China or CIS, aged 
25 or above 
 
Ethnic Koreans who had a Korean 
nationality in the past, or at least one of 
their parents or grandparents have (or used 
to have) a Korean nationality.  
Eligibility 
options 
▪ One registered as a Korean nationality 
when born, and their lineal descendants 
▪ One invited from a close relative in 
Korea who is a Korean citizen or a 
permanent resident 
▪ One who has greatly contributed to the 
national interests of Korea 
▪ Dependent spouse or parents of an 
overseas study visa (D-2) holder 
▪ One who used to work in Korea with a 
H-2 visa and voluntarily returned 
▪ Among ethnic Koreans who cannot 
prove their ancestral links: randomly 
selected within the total quota 
 
▪ Professional employed in Korea for more 
than 6 months 
▪ Skill license holder 
▪ Higher degree holder in science and 
engineering 
▪ Permanent resident of OECD countries 
▪ Foreign government official / law maker 
for more than 5 years 
▪ Representative of overseas Korean 
communities 
▪ Executive officer of a corporation 
▪ CEO of a corporation (valued more than 
100,000 USD) 
▪ Private investor (more than100 million 
KRW) 
▪ H-2 visa holders who having worked 
over 2 years for childcare, 
manufacturing, agriculture/dairy or 
fishing industries 
Labour 
Right 
Restricted to 38 unskilled jobs specified 
by the government 
No restrictions except 38 unskilled jobs 
specified by the government 
Other 
Rights 
▪ Residence: maximum 4 years 10 months, 
re-entry allowed 
▪ Family: not allowed except students 
▪ Settlement: those who having worked 
over 4 years for manufacturing 
agriculture/dairy or fishing industries 
can apply for a permanent resident 
visa (F-5), if meeting income and/or 
skill level criteria. 
▪ Residence: 3 years but repeatedly 
renewable  
▪ Family: spouse and minor children are 
granted visit/stay visa (F-1) 
▪ Settlement: eligible to apply for a 
permanent resident visa (F-5) 
Source: Summarised by the author from MOJ (2015) 
 
Considering how conscious the Korean government has been about the increase in 
unskilled labour migrants, it is surprising to see the Korean government taking a very 
generous and permissive attitude toward the admission and settlement of co-ethnic 
migrants. To be sure, nationalistic sentiment plays a part because there has been a 
societal consensus in granting ethnic Koreans living in other countries special treatment 
including citizenship because many of them left home due to hardships during the 
 116 
 
Japanese colonial period (Kong et al., 2010). An official in an interview with the author 
for the current research legitimised the ethno-specific migration policies by saying: 
 
‘Dongpo’ [a Korean word for co-ethnic migrants] are allowed to come and work 
more freely in Korea for the purpose of strengthening bonds between them and 
their mother country [Korea] and fostering good relationship between Korea and 
the origin country. (Interviewee B, 5 December 2013) 
 
One official in an interview with the author also claimed: 
 
I think favoritism to the migrants of the same ethnicity can be justifiable. Not all 
foreigners can be accepted as social members to the equal level. So, this type of 
frame [of ethnic selection] will continue for a while, I believe. (Interviewee A, 2 
December 2013) 
 
Pragmatic considerations are also conspicuous. The Basic Plans (IPC, 2008, 2012a) 
confirm government’s position to continuously promote close ties with overseas 
Koreans to make the most of their economic potential. The government makes it an 
explicit rule that co-ethnic migrant workers should be chosen over those with other 
nationalities, other conditions being equal, by arguing that “co-ethnic migrants can more 
easily adapt to the Korean society due to their linguistic and cultural similarities” (IPC, 
2008: 10). However, it is expected to become increasingly difficult to expect the second 
and third generation of overseas ethnic Koreans to maintain the same cultural traits 
(including language). Furthermore, recent serious crimes committed by co-ethnic 
migrants challenge the very assumption of co-ethnic migrants’ better social integration 
and ethnicity-based social bond (Sisafocus, 2014). 
 
 
5.5. Marriage Migration Policy 
 
5.5.1. Development of Marriage Migration Policy  
 
One of the most important migration paths to Korea is via marriage. Marriage migration 
is smaller than unskilled labour migration in size but it has no less significance in that 
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marriage migrants are generally long-term residents or citizens, having far broader 
relationship with the society (J Kim et al., 2014). As investigated in the Chapter 4, the 
growth in marriage migrants results from increasing incidences in international 
marriages since the mid-1990s due to demographic, social and cultural factors. 
Although the growth rate of international marriage gradually slowed from 2005, the 
number of marriage migrants (stock) has been on a steady increase. As of 2014, the 
number of marriage migrants is 150,994, accounting for 8.4 per cent in all migrant 
stock.25 As shown in Table 5.13, the majority of marriage migrants are from nearby 
Asian countries, including China (40.2 per cent) and Vietnam (26.3 percent), and over 
85 per cent of them are female spouses married to Korean males.  
 
Table 5.13: Marriage migrant population by origin and sex in Korea (stock), 2014 
Nationality 
Total 
Female Male 
No. of persons % 
Total 150,994 100 128,193 22,801 
China 60,663 40.2  48,575 12,088 
Vietnam 39,725 26.3  39,099 626 
Japan 12,603 8.3  11,380 1,223 
Philippines 11,052 7.3  10,736 316 
Cambodia 4,618 3.1  4,601 17 
Thailand 2,675 1.8  2,605 70 
Mongolia 2,394 1.6  2,312 82 
Other 17,264 11.4  8,885 8,379 
Source: KIS (2015) 
 
When the growth in international marriage reached its peak in 2005, marriage 
migrants’ social adaptation and integration began to surface as a new social challenge. 
Neither the government nor the public has experiences of coping with permanent 
foreign settlers to this scale and growing ethnic and cultural diversities. Adjustment 
failure of marriage migrants, represented by the high rate of divorce among mixed-
marriage couples and consequent family disintegrations, alarmed the government 
(MOGEF, 2012). The growing number of marriage migrants’ children also emerged as 
an urgent policy agenda. To address these issues, the Korean government began to 
                                                         
25 The number of those naturalised from the marriage migration is also significant (accumulatively 
101,507 until 2014). Although they are not technically ‘migrants’ but the government includes them in 
the settlement and integration policy frame. 
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systematically intervene from the mid-2000s over the course of recruitment, admission, 
settlement/integration of marriage migrants and their families.  
In 2006, the Korean government first formalised inter-ministerial efforts to 
manage marriage migrants and their families in the document called the ‘integration 
support for female marriage migrants and mixed-blood families’ (MOGEF, 2006b). In 
the following year, the government launched ‘Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing 
in the Republic of Korea’. The law contains the provisions of special treatments on 
marriage migrants and their children: “the State and local governments may assist 
immigrants by marriage and their children in quickly adjusting to Korean society by 
providing them with education in Korean language, education on Korean institutions 
and culture, support with child care and education, etc.” (Article 12).  
A legal framework specifically aiming at marriage migrants/families was 
established through the legislation of ‘Multicultural Families Support Act’ in 2008. The 
purpose of the Act is “to help multicultural family members enjoy a stable family life, 
and contribute to the improvement of the quality of life and their integration into society” 
(Article 1). Here the term ‘multicultural family’ was adopted as a legal term to refer to 
‘the family comprised of a lawful migrant (or the naturalised) married to a Korean 
national and their children’. The 2011 amendment of the Act expanded the scope of the 
definition of ‘multicultural family’ to include naturalised migrants (and their families) 
under the same policy frame. Adoption of the term ‘multicultural family’ has become a 
subject of much contention, the discussion of which will follow later. The chapter will 
first examine the contents of ‘multicultural family policy’.  
 
 
5.5.2. ‘Multicultural Family Policy’ 
 
Complying with ‘Multicultural Families Support Act’, the government is to provide a 
comprehensive marriage migrants/family policy package known as the ‘Basic Plan for 
Multicultural Family Policy’ every five years. The package, in part, addresses the issue 
on immigration control in accordance with the upper-level immigration governance 
framework examined earlier in the current chapter, it is mainly concerned with 
facilitating a quick social adaptation and integration of marriage migrants and families. 
The first round ran exceptionally for three years from 2010 to 2012, and the five-year 
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long second round commenced in 2013 with the new government. Table 5.14 
summarises the policy ‘goals’ and ‘tasks’ consisting of each Basic Plan. In terms of 
policy goals, the first plan emphasises support for ‘multicultural families’, while the 
second Basic Plan seems to balance it by stressing migrants’ contribution and mutual 
respects. Despite the change in rhetorical tone in policy goals, the policy tasks remain 
quite consistent between the two plans.  
 
Table 5.14: The Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy: 1st and 2nd round compared 
 The 1st Basic Plan (2010-2012) The 2nd Basic Plan (2013-2017) 
Goals 
▪ Support for the settlement and the 
quality of life of ‘multicultural 
families’ 
▪ Support for children of 
‘multicultural families’ 
▪ Enhance capacity of ‘multicultural 
families’ as to contribute to social 
development 
▪ Build a society respecting cultural 
diversity 
T
ask
s 
Strengthen 
admission 
control 
▪ Establish a policy infrastructure for 
service delivery 
▪ Strengthen monitoring on 
international marriage brokers and 
entry screening 
▪ Streamline the delivery system of the 
‘multicultural family’ policies to 
improve effectiveness and efficiency 
of the programmes 
 
Facilitate 
adaptation/ 
integration 
▪ Support for the early adaptation of 
marriage migrants and provide 
social protection  
▪ Help strengthen family (marriage) 
life through a close monitoring 
adaptation/integration process 
▪ Encourage social and economic 
participation of marriage migrants 
Support 
children 
▪ Build a healthy environment for 
children of ‘multicultural families’ 
by providing specialised childcare 
and education programmes 
▪ Support for the healthy growth and 
development of children from 
‘multicultural families’ 
Raise 
awareness/ 
acceptance 
▪ Enhance societal understanding 
and acceptance of ‘multicultural 
families’ and cultural differences 
through public education 
▪ Enhance social acceptance of 
multicultural families’ and cultural 
differences through public education 
▪ Improve social support for cultural 
diversity 
Source: Summarised by the author from MOGEF (2012),  
 
The various policy tasks can be categorised into four policy areas: admission 
control, adaptation/integration support for marriage migrants, support for their children, 
and the enhancement of public awareness/acceptance toward ‘multicultural families’. 
The admission-related policy deals with the marriage migration procedure and the 
regulation of international marriage brokers is a main issue. The adaptation/integration 
policy is related to marriage migrants’ smooth life transition and prompt integration to 
Korean society. Supporting the children of marriage migrants with their successful 
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adaptation and development is continuously stressed in both Basic Plans. The public 
awareness/acceptance policy is intended to educate nationals to develop a more 
accepting attitude toward migrant residents and to build necessary infrastructures for a 
harmonious coexistence. The most conspicuous addition to the second Basic Plan is the 
emphasis on marriage migrants’ economic participation. Already settled marriage 
migrants indeed began to express desires to get involved in broader activities including 
employment. More importantly, the government began to stress ‘capacity building’ and 
‘self-help’ of marriage migrants, which exactly echoes the notion of ‘contribution’ and 
‘responsibility’ in the second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy. 
 
Admission and Residency 
International marriages between Korean males and foreign females have grown fast 
from the early 2000s with the proliferation of private brokers, some of which were 
believed to be unlicensed or scam (S Park, 2011). The central government had not 
directly been involved in managing marriage migration at first. Some of the local 
governments, in an effort to remedy diminishing municipal population, promoted 
international marriages or often directly engaged in the process, for example, by 
supporting expenses of travel and marriage ceremonies (J Kim et al., 2014). In the 
meantime, their growing number and integration issues started attracting public 
attention. Reported were increasing incidents of agency exploitation, fraud marriages 
and settlement failure resulting from divorce or runaway. Experts and civil society 
activists began to call for enhanced management of international marriage (Law Times, 
2009).  
In order to tighten monitoring, the Korean government set up a separate visa type, 
Marriage Migrants (F-6) in 2011. Previously, marriage migrants were categorised and 
managed as a sub-category of other types of family (dependant) migrants.26 The 
tightening took three forms. Firstly, international marriage brokers are now required to 
meet a certain level of financial status to maintain their registration, and are subject to 
regular on-site inspections. Secondly, from 2014 Korean nationals who want to bring a 
marriage-partner from abroad should prove that they have a minimum level of income 
according to their family size: for example, 14,795,000 KRW per annum for a couple 
                                                         
26 Visa types applicable to marriage migrants: F-1-3 and F-2-1 before 2009; F-2-1 and F-5-2 (after 2010); 
F-2-1, F-5-2 and F-6 from 2011.  
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(equivalent to 8,700 GBP) and ‘suitable accommodation’ (KIS, 2014b). The level of the 
income threshold is slightly higher than the national minimum (approximately the first 
percentile of all households). Thirdly, proving a basic level of Korean-language 
proficiency was newly attached as a requirement in 2014. It is worth noting that if the 
couple applying for a marriage migration visa has a child they can be exempted from 
both the income screening and the language test (see also Chapter 7).  
 
Table 5.15: Labour and social rights of marriage migrants in Korea 
Area 
Marriage migrants 
(F-6) 
Labour migrants 
(E-9, H-2) 
Permanent resident 
(F-5) 
Labour rights 
Full access Limited to certain 
skill level and 
sectors 
Full access 
Public 
assistance (tax-
funded) 
▪ Basic Livelihood Security 
▪ Emergency Medical Subsidy  
▪ Disability Grant 
▪ Emergency Medical Grant  
▪ Basic Old-age Pension (conditional) 
▪ EITC (conditional) 
Not eligible Not eligible 
Social insurance 
(contributory) 
▪ National Pension System 
▪ Employment Insurance 
▪ Industrial Accident Compensation 
Insurance 
▪ National Health Insurance 
▪ Long-Term Care Insurance 
Eligible to all Eligible to all 
Social service 
(tax-funded 
with some user-
charge) 
▪ Emergency medical support 
▪ Support to prevent domestic 
violence and prostitution 
▪ Support for lone-parent 
▪ Korean language training service 
▪ Child development/education 
support 
▪ Job finding/training support 
▪ Other 
Eligible to 
Emergency medical 
support 
 
Not eligible 
Source: Adapted from A-n Kim et al. (2012: 56) 
 
Once admitted, marriage migrants can enjoy far greater level of labour and social 
rights, compared to other prominent labour and family migrant groups (see Table 5.15 
above). They are permitted to participate in the labour market without any restrictions. 
They are also entitled to various social welfare provisions. As mentioned earlier, 
contributory social assistances are accessible to most migrants; however, unlike labour 
migrants or even permanent residents, marriage migrants are entitled even to public 
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assistance benefits for poor households. In addition, extensive social service 
programmes are provided to them and their families. It is no surprise to see some, 
including the government itself, criticize that social support on marriage 
migrant/families has been so far too lenient and unevenly distributed to them, causing 
reverse discrimination against nationals as well as other groups of migrants (IPC, 2012a: 
15). The recent emphasis on the balance between support and contribution seems to be 
an effort to evade from such criticism.  
 
Settlement and Integration 
The Korean government assists marriage migrants to quickly settle and be naturalised, 
so, requirements and procedures for permanent residency or naturalisation tend to be 
less demanding and simpler than other types of migrants. Recently, however, conditions 
of settlement of marriage migrants have also been tightened. The government in 2013 
made it a prerequisite for migrants to obtain a permanent residence visa first and wait at 
least two years on probation before applying for settlement. In the interim, the 
government monitors marriage records to prevent ineligible residence. If marriage 
migrants divorce, either upon agreement or at their primary fault, they are denied 
residence status. They are exceptionally allowed to remain for a limited time, however, 
where they are the sole care-givers for Korean-based children. Such measures by the 
government are effectively squeezing the international marriage market. The families 
formed through international marriage, however, continue to grow and there are 
attempts by government to support these families through a programme of integration 
policies. 
In fact, the actual policy resource for the first Basic Plan was disproportionately 
distributed: the largest slice of funding was devoted to adaptation and integration 
policies (40 per cent); the second largest on policies to support the children of marriage 
migrants (31 per cent); and the least on public awareness/acceptance policies (7 per cent) 
(MOGEF, 2012: 7). It shows that the fast and complete adaptation and integration of 
marriage migrants and their children into Korean society is a priority of marriage 
migration policy in Korea. The government expects marriage migrants to embrace a 
new identity as Korean and it maintains that only those who have ‘a voluntary will to 
integrate’ will be supported” (IPC, 2012a: 44). So, full membership and related benefits 
can be granted on the condition of full integration (assimilation, more precisely). The 
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reasons behind the emphasis on full integration are three-fold. Firstly, as mentioned 
earlier, marriage migrants are expected to stay. Secondly, marriage migrants have more 
diverse ethnic backgrounds than labour migrants, which can be a major challenge in 
Korea’s predominantly ethnically and culturally homogenous society. Lastly, but most 
importantly, marriage migrants’ failure in adaptation and integration can jeopardise the 
entire process of production and reproduction of the Korean family, which, I maintain, 
is a key rationale of Korea’s ‘multicultural family’ policy (How these measures, 
combined with welfare/care policies, are related to marriage migrants’ various roles in 
social reproduction to be more closely examined in Chapter 7).  
 
 
5.5.3. ‘Multicultural Family Policy’ and ‘Multiculturalism’ Debate in Korea 
 
A large scale migrant admission and settlement and a consequent ethnic/cultural 
diversity are something new in Korea, and there were no proper Korean words for the 
phenomenon. The term ‘multicultural family’ used to refer to the Korean marriage 
migrant policy is neither a theoretically-grounded definition nor a direct reference to 
‘multiculturalism’ or ‘multicultural policy’ as understood in the West (Y-k Kim, 2009; 
Y-s Lee, 2011). Indeed, it was not academics which popularised the term ‘multicultural 
families’ in Korea. Rather, an NGO - ‘Healthy Family Citizen Coalition’ - in 2003 
suggested the expression ‘multicultural people’ in order to broadly refer to the migrant 
population and their families as an alternative to the then prevalent expressions of 
‘mixed race’ or ‘foreign blood’, which have derogative and exclusionary connotations. 
Since then, the term has been taken up by the policy community, as well as the general 
public. It is interesting to see how the almost accidental adoption of the term 
‘multicultural family’ has influenced the migration (policy) discourse in Korea ever 
since. 
As Castles and Miller (2009: 34) argue, migrant receiving countries come to 
develop into somewhere between a multicultural society and a divisive society 
according to the degree of their openness to migrants’ settlement, granting them of 
citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity. However, it is not so easy to 
pinpoint the exact position of the Korean migration regime in this spectrum. Different, 
often contrasting, policy orientations are mixed up in forming the admission and 
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settlement/integration policies in Korea (J-y Jung and Jung, 2013; M-j Jung, 2010). 
Korean scholars tend to frame this policy discrepancy as a tension between 
multiculturalism and assimilation.  
As noted earlier, the Korean government adopted the term ‘multicultural (family) 
policy’ to describe marriage migrants’ settlement/integration-related programmes, 
which inevitably triggered a debate over how it can be understood in the light of the 
existing understanding of ‘multiculturalism’. Multiculturalism is equally rooted in 
political struggle for ‘minorities’ and challenge against the notion of culturally 
homogenised nation states; however, states have formulated different modes of policies 
with the same ingredients (Joppke, 1996). Multiculturalism is typically associated with 
such elements as ethnically/culturally diversified demographic composition, social 
ideals positively recognising and respecting socio-cultural diversity, and 
migration/migrant policies guaranteeing equal opportunities regardless of race, ethnicity 
and nationality (Troper, 1999 cited from I-J Yoon, 2008: 74). Likewise, the Korean 
multiculturalism debate stretches across those three dimensions of multiculturalism: 
phenomenon, ideals and policies (I-J Yoon, 2008).  
Despite the absence of explicit acknowledgement, the government seems to accept 
the ideals and values which multiculturalism entails such as tolerance of diversity, 
making them integrated in the settlement/integration regime developed in Korea (JT 
Kim, 2012; Y-s Lee, 2011). Multiculturalism is often positively mentioned by the 
Korean government as universal human rights or equality (anti-discrimination at least) 
(S-u Park, 1995; Seol, 1995; I-J Yoon, 2008) and a remedy for Korea’s exclusive 
nationalism, ethnic-based stereotyping and hostility (AE Kim, 2009b). One 
congressman in a seminar on a multicultural society hosted in the National Assembly 
asserted:  
 
We [Koreans] stand at a crossroad. Multiculturalism may open up a new frontier 
for us. So it is important for Koreans to genuinely accept foreigners residing in 
Korea as neighbours and to respect them. (Yonhap News, 2012) 
 
Another participant in the seminar said: 
 
Respecting and protecting cultural and racial diversities benefit Korea as the 
biodiversity does to the nature by preventing it from degrading. (Yonhap News, 
2012) 
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Approaching multiculturalism as a recognition of and respect for diversity is also 
found in the two related legislations: “National, municipal, and local governments shall 
make efforts to take measures such as education, public communication activities, and 
correction of unreasonable instructions in order to ensure that Koreans and foreigners in 
Korea understand and respect each other's history, culture and institutions” (Article 18, 
Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea, 2007); “The State and local governments 
shall take measures, such as education and advocacy activities for understanding diverse 
cultures, as necessary for preventing social discrimination and prejudice against multi-
cultural families and for encouraging members of society to acknowledge and respect 
the cultural diversity (Article 5, Act on the Support for Multicultural Families, 2010).  
With regard to two remaining dimensions, i.e. phenomenon and policies, 
scepticism arises on whether it is appropriate to use the adjective ‘multicultural’ to refer 
to the current Korean migration regime. First of all, Korea does not have sufficient 
demographic and cultural diversity to reach the stage of multiculturalism: the migrant 
population occupies a comparatively small portion of the total population, around 3.5 
per cent, albeit the growth has been rapid and the migrant population is dominated by 
Korean Chinese and other nationalities from within Asia. Even ethnic Korean labour 
migrants and marriage migrants may have limited multicultural impact on the society. 
Ethnic Korean labour migrants are culturally very similar to native Koreans, not to 
mention that most of them are fluent Korean speakers. Even if marriage migrants are at 
the centre of the multiculturalism debate, ironically marriage migrants are more likely to 
become absorbed into the culture and custom of the destination country rather than 
maintain their own cultural identities, communities and customs (JT Kim, 2012). In this 
regards, some researchers suggest that Korea is simply a mixed-ethnic country rather 
than a multicultural country (Jeon, 2012; Joe, 2012). 
On top of that, the contents of the Korean ‘multicultural family policy’ are 
different from those of the traditional migrant destination countries which also term 
their migration/migrant policies as multicultural policies, notably Australia and Canada, 
and the UK’s ‘Race Relations Policy’ in the same vein.27 Migrants under multicultural 
policies in traditional destination countries are allowed to maintain their distinctive 
                                                         
27 Multicultural policies, including the case of the UK, have been increasingly challenged in recent years 
by higher expectations for integration/assimilation. 
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cultures and form ethnic minorities as long as they conform to national laws while 
governments ensure equal treatment and promote successful integration (Castles and 
Miller, 2009). It is worth noting that (unskilled) labour migrants are the majority in the 
total migrant population but largely excluded from the ‘multicultural family’ discourse. 
In fact, the Korean government seems to betray its ideological manifestation of 
multiculturalism, by denying their family/social rights as well as the chance of long-
term residence or settlement (Jeon, 2012; AE Kim, 2009a; Ko, 2008). It remains to be 
seen whether Korea will go beyond the political rhetoric and eventually harmonise its 
multicultural ideals with the actual policy implementation in the future.  
 
 
5.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
My examination above has identified characteristics of the Korean migration regime of 
three major migration routes (migrant categories in each route). Despite the early 
reluctance and policy failures, the Korean government has quickly developed a 
comprehensive migration system. In a nutshell, the Korean migration regime can make 
a typical example of so-called ‘managed migration’ regarding both admission and 
settlement/integration policies. The Korean government has been actively engaged in 
managing the migration flow and existing migrants with various policy instruments, 
making its migration regime multi-faceted. A key instrument is to stratify different 
migrants by the axes of skill, ethnicity, gender and class, with regard to how they are 
controlled and what rights they are accorded.  
First of all, the Korean migration regime is characterised by a skill level-specific 
labour migration. Despite the government’s expressed preference over skilled or 
professional labour migration, unskilled labour migration has dominated the stream. 
The Korean government takes a ‘dualistic approach’ to reverse this situation by seeking 
to invite more skilled migrant workers while restricting the number of unskilled workers 
and the length of their stay (Castles and Miller, 2009: 188). Unskilled migrant workers 
are highly instrumentalised for the purpose of economic development (Seol and 
Skrentny, 2009b). They are required to work in designated workplaces during the fixed 
term lest they disturb the domestic labour market by taking jobs from the native 
workforce. Tight restriction on applicable industries and quotas are justified in the same 
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vein. Then every effort is made to make sure their return home after the contract. Fixing 
their stay up to 4 years and 10 months is one of the government’s devices to prevent the 
settlement of unskilled migrant workers. In countries of origin there is a large pool of 
unskilled labour migrant candidates wanting to seize an opportunity for a relatively 
high-paying job in Korea, while employers, in the destination country, have little chance 
to recruit native-born workers. As long as these structural conditions persist, Korea will 
soon face a test on whether its temporary worker programme will operate as hoped. 
Employers and migrants may find ways to prolong their mutual dependence, as 
happened under European guest worker programmes (Martin, 2013).  
Secondly, Korea has developed an ethno-specific migration regime. The 
government explicitly favours migrants having the same ethnic background by 
introducing special migration programmes. Co-ethnic migrants are allowed much higher 
chance of employment and settlement. It is very interesting to see how a democratic 
nation state which is built on constitutional citizenship actively embraces a certain 
group of ‘foreigners’, drawing on a very sentimental notion of ‘same blood’ and grants 
them privileges. Discrimination based on nationality has been eradicated to the large 
extent by law but discrimination based on ethnicity has been newly created (NH-J Kim, 
2008). Promoting co-ethnic migration may be seen as Korea’s aspiration to maintain a 
racially and culturally homogeneous nation.  
However, this may not always be the case when considering the fact that the 
Korean government is actively attracting skilled labour migrants and marriage migrants 
without any ethnic preference attached; rather it is keen on channelling in migrants from 
so-called ‘advanced countries’ in the West who have obviously very different racial and 
cultural backgrounds. Therefore, the preference for co-ethnic migrants should be 
understood in relative terms. They are preferred over other foreigners but they are less 
desirable than skilled migrants, not to mention the native-born (Seol and Skrentny, 
2009a). Admittedly, the Korean government approaches co-ethnic migrants with a very 
pragmatic consideration: to make the most of cheap(er) labour having minimum 
adaptation difficulties thanks to geographical, linguistic and cultural proximity (refer to 
Chapter 4). This explains why co-ethnic migration is most noticeable in the unskilled 
labour migration in Korea. Putting the first and the second axis of stratification together, 
the Korean labour migration regime can be illustrated as Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: Labour migration regime of Korea by skill and ethnicity (visa type) 
Note: a Not all F-4 visa holders are labour migrants. 
 
Thirdly, adding to the axes of skill and ethnicity, Korea has developed a highly 
gendered structure of migration regime although there is no gender-specific entry 
control in all migration routes. As set out in Table 5.16, the unskilled labour migration 
is extremely male dominated whereas the marriage migration is highly feminised and 
the co-ethnic migration is more evenly distributed. The difference between the general 
unskilled and co-ethnic labour migration can be explained by the sector restriction of 
the EPS: co-ethnic migrant workers are granted access to jobs in the service sector 
which gives female migrants more employment chances, but general unskilled migrant 
workers are restricted to typically male dominant jobs such as heavy industries and 
construction. Another pillar of the highly gendered migration pattern in Korea is 
marriage migration. The major pattern of international marriages in Korea is the 
marriage between a Korean male and a migrant female.  
One thing obvious here is that this extreme feminisation of marriage migration is 
far from the outcome of natural relations in the private realm of love, considering, for 
example, unconventionally wide age gaps between partners. The overall condition 
around marriage migration looks very similar to the phenomenon known as ‘mail-order 
bride’, although it is becoming more regulated than commercialised in Korea now (H-K 
Lee, 2008). As analysed in Chapter 4, the dimension of political economy is at work in 
the national and international levels here: most female marriage migrants are from 
nearby poorer Asian countries and they get married to Korean males who have 
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relatively disadvantageous social and economic backgrounds. So the Korean migration 
regime is also ‘classed’ as much as gendered in both labour and family migration.  
 
Table 5.16: Gender structure in the Korean migration regime, 2013 (person) 
 
Total Male % Female % 
General unskilled (E-9) 246,695 223,117  90.4  23,578  9.6  
Co-ethnic Unskilled (H-2) 240,168 136,342  56.8  103,826  43.2  
Marriage (F-6) 116,917 17,895  15.3  99,022  84.7  
Source: KIS (2014a) 
 
To conclude, I argue that a migration regime is ultimately related to how a country 
defines its membership. The criteria regarding skill level, ethnicity, gender and class 
dictate the nation state’s membership selection (Baral, 2011). The Korean government 
is also extremely cautious on deciding ‘who can be legitimate members’. The 
government, on the one hand, wants to make sure that the migration growth may not 
undermine a cohesive national identity (Parreñas and Kim, 2011), and, on the other 
hand, it is motivated by pragmatic considerations. In doing so, the government 
privileges co-ethnic migrants (preferably skilled) and marriage migrants. It is important 
to note that the Korean government needs migrants for their productive contribution to 
complement the labour deficit, but it needs them for reproductive labour as well to 
replenish the demographic and care deficit. This is particularly the case for female 
migrants. Their varied reproductive activities are conditioned not just by the migration 
regime but also by the other policy areas, (social) care policy, most significantly. The 
next chapter investigates the regime of care provision in Korea, which allows us to 
ultimately examine how those two policy regimes intersect in formulating the 
reproductive labour of migrants.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CARE REGIME OF KOREA 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the patterns and changes of (social) care policies in the Korean 
welfare state28. The chapter starts with overviewing the development of core social 
security programmes and illuminates the characteristics of the Korean welfare (state) 
regime by engaging with the existing welfare state regime discussions (Section 6.2). 
Against this broad backdrop, Section 6.3 discusses changes in the society and the policy 
environment specifically around the issue of ‘care’. The section examines how 
demographic, socio-cultural and economic factors have contributed to forming the ‘care 
crisis’ in Korea. Then it explains how the Korean government has approached the care 
crisis (care reform platform) and how we can best understand the care reforms 
(analytical frame). Drawing on this knowledge, Section 4 and 5 closely analyses how 
care responsibility has been (re)distributed on the macro-level (between the state, the 
market and the family) and the micro-level (between mothers and fathers in home) 
respectively through various policy instruments. In the last section, I summarise the 
findings and discuss how the current Korean care regime is producing mixed results 
with different groups and in different levels, and how the evolving characteristics of the 
Korean welfare state regime are embedded in the recent care reforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
28 The welfare state in this chapter refers to a set of public policies and institutions that aim to protect 
citizens against varied social contingencies. This does not, however, necessarily presume the adequate 
level or coverage of social protection in it. 
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6.2. The Korean Welfare State 
 
6.2.1. Development of the Social Security System in Korea 
 
The welfare state in Korea is termed by law as a ‘social security’ system (Framework 
Act on Social Security). The Korean social security system currently consists of five 
‘social insurances’, one ‘public assistance’ and varied types of ‘social (welfare) services’ 
(Table 6.1). The social insurance programmes include the ‘National Pension System 
(NPS)’, the ‘Employment Insurance (EI)’, the ‘Industrial Accident Compensation 
Insurance (IACI)’, and the ‘National Health Insurance (NHI)’ and the ‘Long-Term Care 
Insurance (LTCI)’. The primary function of the NPS, the EI and the IACI is income 
maintenance, while the NHI and the LTCI are for health and personal care. The ‘Basic 
Livelihood Security (BLS)’ and the ‘Basic Old-age Pension (BOP)’ can be grouped as 
public assistance programmes. Both the BLS and the BOP are tax-funded and means-
tested welfare programmes, which aim at guaranteeing the minimum standard of 
livelihood of citizens. Social services incorporate a variety of public programmes, 
which are usually co-financed with tax and user payments and typically target children, 
older people and the disabled.  
 
Table 6.1: Structure of the Korean social security system 
Social Insurances Public Assistances Social Services 
▪ National Pension System 
▪ Employment Insurance  
▪ Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance 
▪ National Health Insurance 
▪ Long-Term Care Insurance 
▪ Basic Livelihood Security 
▪ Basic Pension 
▪ Welfare services for 
children, older people and 
the disabled 
▪ Medical social work 
▪ Welfare Services for 
women and family 
▪ Other services 
Source: NHI website, http://www.nhis.or.kr/static/html/wbd/g/a/wbdga0301.html (accessed on 13 March 
2015) 
 
The Korean welfare state took its root in the early 1960s. Starting from special 
pension schemes for both civil servants (in 1960) and the military personnel (in 1962), 
the Korean government subsequently introduced social insurance programmes: the 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) in 1964, the National Health 
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Insurance (NHI) in 1977, the National Pension System (NPS) in 1988 and the 
Employment Insurance (EI) in 1995. These social insurances have all gone through 
several reformation stages. They were usually made available to the workers in major 
companies and the public sector first due to the relative easiness of introduction, 
administration and financing as well as their strategic importance in industrialisation 
and politics (refer also to the sub-section 6.2.2), and then the coverage was gradually 
expanded.29  
In contrast, the development of public assistance has been less dramatic. The first 
public assistance programme, the Livelihood Protection (LP) enacted in 1961 had 
remained largely unchanged until a whole new programme called the Basic Livelihood 
Security (BLS) finally replaced it in 2000. The BLS is regarded as one of the landmark 
welfare reforms of the economic crisis-time administration (1998 to 2003), in that the 
BLS, for the first time in Korea, guarantees the national minimum regardless of 
demographic conditions or workability30. The significance of the BLS as a last-resort 
social safety net, nevertheless, is often challenged. The most contested issue is that it 
prioritises family care responsibility by mandating a means-test on other family 
members to decide the entitlement. In principle, the BLS disqualifies those who have 
other immediate family members (parents, children and sons/daughters-in-law) deemed 
to have sufficient resources to support themselves and the poor family members. 
Most recent social security legislations in Korea are elderly-related: the Basic 
(Old-age) Pension (BP) and the Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI). The Korean 
government introduced a non-contributory flat rate income support, called the Basic 
Old-age Pension, in 2008 to support the livelihood of older people (aged 70 or over) 
whose income level is at or lower than the 70th percentile. Given that the national 
pension was fully universalised only from 1999, many older people will have failed to 
meet the minimum contribution period (20 years) for the full pension benefit by the 
time they retire. The government aims to prevent them from falling into old-age poverty 
                                                         
29 For example, the NHI was first implemented in 1977 with the public sector workers including private 
school teachers and the workers in major enterprises (having 500 or more employees). It was not until 
1989 when the programme finally covered the whole population. The NPS started with salaried workers 
in 1988 and then gradually expanded to include the workers in smaller businesses and the self-employed, 
making it a proper national pension in 1999. The expansion of the EI, however, was much quicker - it 
reached every single employee in just three years of introduction- than other social insurances in an effort 
to mitigate the impact of the economic downturn and the labour market restructuring during the Asian 
economic crisis of 1997. 
30 Those who are able to work should participate in workfare programmes to become entitled to the BLS. 
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by supplementing their income through this basic pension benefit. In 2014, the 
government reformed the programme and changed its name to the Basic Pension: the 
age threshold was lowered to 65, and the benefit level was doubled to 200,000 KRW 
per month (equivalent to 118 GBP)31. The Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) was also 
introduced in 2008 in an attempt to alleviate the care burden of families. The LTCI is a 
social insurance which specifically aims to address the care needs of older people aged 
over 65 having geriatric diseases or frailty. The LTCI benefit is non-means-tested, so 
the degree of disability (difficulty living independently) is the only eligibility criterion. 
The LTCI, together with the recently expanded childcare services, is a main pillar of the 
Korean social care system. Both are to be examined in greater detail further below.  
To sum up, by 2008 Korea had rapidly become equipped with core social security 
programmes - social insurance, public assistance, and social services, which can be 
found in advanced welfare states. The development of the Korean social security system, 
however, has been dominated by social insurance programmes. Social insurance has 
been favoured by the successive Korean governments partly because it can be an 
effective tool to protect productive labour without requiring a huge contribution from 
the government. Social programmes for 'non- or less- productive' populations such as 
older people and children began to develop only from very recently. The development 
of the Korean welfare state has not been a linear process but a dynamic one in which 
different policy ideas and rationales have competed under the given socio-economic and 
political situations. Then how can we make sense of the development trajectory of the 
Korean welfare state and the patterns of its social policies? The next section addresses 
this question.  
 
 
6.2.2. Evolution of the Korean Welfare (State) Regime 
 
Before 1990s, East Asian countries were largely ignored in the study of the welfare state 
and regime typology with few exceptions such as C Jones (1990) or Midgley (1986). 
Following Esping-Andersen (1990), studies of East Asian welfare have gradually 
expanded in volume, earning an important place in comparative social policy (Esping-
                                                         
31 The benefit level, however, is no more a flat rate but varies (minimum 100,000 KRW) in accordance 
with the income level.  
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Andersen, 1999; Hudson and Kühner, 2009; Ku and Jones, 2007). The focus of the 
debate has been whether East Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong 
and/or Singapore can be fitted into the original welfare state triad of Esping-Andersen 
(1990) together with Japan, or whether they can form an additional distinctive regime 
type (Ku and Jones, 2007).  
Findings have yet been incongruent. Powell and Kim (2014) identified six 
different ways suggested so far to categorise the Korean welfare state: ‘liberal’, 
‘conservative’, ‘hybrid’, ‘the East Asian welfare model as the fourth regime’, ‘the East 
Asian welfare model as a distinct regime’ and ‘underdeveloped’. Furthermore, some are 
sceptical of making a homogenous constellation within East Asia (Ramesh, 1995; White 
and Goodman, 1998). This sub-section does not intend to further engage with the 
welfare state modelling literature; instead, it aims to highlight the commonly observed 
characteristics of the Korean welfare (state) regime and trace its evolutionary path.  
For those scholars who consider Korea (and aforementioned East Asian states) to 
have a distinctive welfare regime, a leading approach is to frame the Korean welfare 
state as ‘a developmental welfare state’ (SK Kim and Kim, 2008; H-j Kwon, 2007a; Y-J 
Lee and Ku, 2007) or ‘a productive (or productivist) welfare state’ (Holliday, 2000; 
Hudson and Kühner, 2009, 2012; Kuhnle, 2002; Wilding, 2008). The two terms are 
used interchangeably more often than not. For example, Holliday (2000) and Gough 
(2001) share the same components in their definitions of ‘the productive welfare 
capitalism’ and ‘the developmental welfare state’, for example, a subordinate position 
of social policy to economic policy.32 Both terms take ‘the political economy approach’ 
(Powell and Kim, 2014) and denote overarching policy logics of the macro-economic 
management of a state and social policy implementation. A main analytical element in 
both frames is the relationship between development and welfare, or between economic 
policy and social policy (Gough, 2001; Holliday, 2000). 
However, it is also possible to distinguish both terms by their conceptual origins 
and ranges. Midgley and Tang (2001), for example, find the early root of the concept 
‘developmental welfare’ from the late nineteenth century interventionism challenging 
the dominance of laissez-faire and Social Darwinist theories. In the East Asian context, 
                                                         
32 Holliday’s conceptualisation of the productivist welfare capitalism is one of the broadest, and he 
suggested three different forms of the productivist welfare state: facilitative, developmental-universalist, 
and developmental particularistic (Holliday, 2000: 710).  
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the idea of ‘developmental welfare state’ can find its origin from the term 
‘developmental states’ which was coined to describe the governmental strategy for an 
efficient industrialisation exemplified by Japan since the mid-1920s, and subsequently 
emulated by other Asian economies (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000; Johnson, 1999; White, 
1988). In this sense, ‘developmental state’ at least in the East Asian context can be 
understood as certain logics or patterns of the macro-economic management of a state, 
but the state is not necessarily the ‘welfare’ state. On the other hand, ‘productive 
(productivist) welfare state’ is more directly related to the pattern of the welfare state 
whose policy orientations emphasise workfare, self-reliance, investment in human 
capital and the effectiveness of social policies.  
I consider the term ‘a developmental welfare state’ is more appropriate for Korea 
before the 1997 economic crisis and ‘a productive welfare state’ after the crisis, 
although I do not think they are clear-cut periodisations or mutually exclusive 
approaches. The Korean security system became more fully institutionalised during and 
after the crisis period. In addition, the term ‘productive welfare’ has a direct historical 
reference point in Korea which is when the former President Kim Dae-jung mentioned 
‘productive welfare’ as a new national vision in the National Liberation Day speech on 
15 August 1999. 
 
A developmental welfare state: development first 
The early history of the Korean (welfare) state was characterised by its developmental 
aspects. According to Gough (2001: 178), a developmental state can be defined “as a 
state where elite policy makers set economic growth as the fundamental goal and pursue 
a coherent strategy to achieve it. This can be combined with different social policies, but 
all entail the explicit subordination of social policy to economic policy and economic 
growth”. There is nothing new, of course, to view social policy as an instrument for 
promoting economic competitiveness. For example, Titmuss (1974) and Furniss and 
Tilton (1977) suggested that such a view of the purpose of social policy marked out a 
particular type of welfare state - the ‘industrial achievement-performance’ model in 
Titmuss’ terms and the ‘positive’ state in the terms of Furniss and Tilton. In the 
‘industrial achievement-performance’ model, the purpose of social policy is to provide 
the minimum standard of social security, but social policy remains secondary to the 
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economy. In the ‘positive’ state, social welfare exists to the extent it does not hinder the 
economic objectives of growth and efficiency. 
Indeed, the subordinate positioning of social policy is the first characteristic of the 
Korean developmental state. From 1960 Korea adopted developmentalism as a macro-
economic management strategy with a strong emphasis on the strategic role of the 
government (White, 1988; Woo-Cumings, 1999 Tang, 2000). A wide range of policies 
has been devoted through the various government interventions with the sole purpose of 
successful industrialisation. The belief that economic development and its trickling 
down in the long run is the best way to deliver social welfare for people was politically 
supported. Nevertheless, social (welfare) policy was not rejected but adopted in a way 
which would serve the developmental goals (H-j Kwon, 2007a). In fact, many social 
programmes were introduced at much lower levels of socio-economic development than 
the European countries (Hort and Kuhnle, 2000), or at the point when neither party 
politics nor leftist social movement were strong enough (Aspalter, 2006).  
However, social programmes were carefully targeted and selectively implemented 
by the government. It is a shared characteristic of the East Asian developmental states to 
privilege politically important interest groups in the application of social security 
benefits and the control of governmental spending (Tang, 2000). Military personnel, 
civil servants and employees from major companies/industries became the first 
beneficiaries of social programmes because they were strategically important not only 
for strengthening the legitimacy of the authoritarian governments (1960 to 1987), but 
also for the continuous economic development (Aspalter, 2006). As highlighted earlier, 
Korea first introduced contributory social insurance programmes while denying or 
delaying the introduction of tax-funded or more universal social programmes including 
social assistance and social services up until recently. It is argued that the social 
insurance based social security system could effectively minimise the state’s financial 
input by avoiding universalised social entitlement while ensuring industrial stability (H-
j Kwon, 2007a, 2007b).  
Limited state input in social welfare necessitated a heavy reliance on the family 
and the market for the welfare resource including care. As Abu Sharkh and Gough 
(2010) suggest, if we take a ‘welfare regimes’ approach rather than the ‘welfare state 
regimes’ approach, the importance of other welfare contributors become more 
prominent in the welfare mix in Korea (see also JW Kim, 2004). Despite the variety of 
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social programmes introduced, the level of social expenditure has been very low, failing 
to reach even half of the OECD average (refer to Appendix 6.1). Although Korea had 
nearly all types of social security programmes in place before 1998, the role of the 
Korean state in welfare provision was largely limited to a ‘regulator’ of the social 
security system rather than a ‘provider’ or a ‘financer’ (Shin, 2000). In this regard, we 
may call Korea in this period merely ‘a developmental state’ rather than ‘a 
developmental welfare state’.  
 
A productive welfare state: balance between development and welfare 
The developmental (welfare) state of Korea was seriously challenged from the late 
1990s. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 provided a critical juncture which revealed 
the fundamental limitations of the Korean welfare state based on the assumptions of 
continuous economic development and full employment. When the unemployment rate 
sharply rose and the economic growth rate plummeted from 1998 (refer to Appendix 
6.2), the legitimacy, as well as the accumulation function, of the Korean developmental 
welfare state was seriously undermined. An intense neoliberal economic restructuring 
process ensued as mandated by the World Bank and the IMF as conditionality to the 
bailout loans. The social security system turned out to be far too weak to successfully 
absorb impacts from the economic crisis and the economic restructuring. Demand for 
fundamental welfare reforms was mounting from inside and outside.33  
Although the Korean economy began to recover, the policy rationale of 
‘development first’ and (re)distribution later through trickle-down was fast losing 
political support. So the relationship between development and welfare needed 
redefining. The crisis time administration (1998 to 2003) formally adopted ‘productive 
welfare’ as a new paradigm for the Korean welfare state. The Korean government began 
to emphasise a balance between economic growth and welfare (YH Kim, 2003). Under 
this paradigm, the status of social policy was elevated from a subordinate position to an 
indispensable partnership with economic policy (Office of the President, 1999). A series 
of social programmes were either substantially reformed or newly adopted during this 
period. The nature and form of those programmes were varied: from workfare to social 
investment; from selective to universal programmes. The rapid expansion of the welfare 
                                                         
33 Strengthening the social safety net was actually included in the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(see World Bank, 2000). 
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state in the midst of a severe economic constraint and a neo-liberal economic 
restructuring may seem unexpected or even “paradoxical” (H-j Kwon, 2007a; S Kwon 
and Holliday, 2007). However, as mentioned above, it was an inevitable result of the 
urgent necessity for stronger social programmes in order not only to deal with acute 
social problems caused by the economic crisis but also to facilitate the economic 
restructuring process to restore the economy to its pre-crisis state.  
The mixed adoption of social programmes of different natures/forms under the 
slogan of ‘productive welfare’ made researchers form dividing opinions on the exact 
(regime) character of the Korean welfare state. It can make a comparable case with the 
New Labour’s ‘third way’ which was not coherently applied across different policy 
sectors, but used as a pragmatic and “pick and mix” strategy (Powell, 2000: 57). The 
Korean government acknowledged that the productive welfare had been essentially 
informed from the ideas of ‘the third way’ of Giddens (1998) and the related policy 
reforms of the advanced welfare states (Office of the President, 1999). However, I am 
sceptical of equalising the ‘productive welfare’ of the Kim administration with ‘the 
third way’ because the context of each was totally different. In the Korean history, there 
had been neither the first way (a genuinely liberal/neo-liberal capitalism) nor the second 
way (a fully-fledged welfare state) policies to reform through the third way. Until the 
point when the productive welfare regime was declared, only one way had existed in 
modern Korea, developmentalism. 
The legacy of the developmental welfare state was not completely phased out by 
the productive welfare regime (SK Kim and Kim, 2008). The productive welfare 
approach, however, marked the shift in a dominant welfare rationale in Korea from the 
previous governments’ residual and reluctant stance toward social welfare to a more 
universal and positive one. By the end of the 1990s, for example, the main purpose of 
social insurances had shifted from its original aim, from a tool for limited social risk 
pooling for core workers in key industries and professional groups to a system for wider 
social risk pooling and income redistribution. Thus even if the structure of Korean 
welfare regime may seem unaltered, its policy purposes have changed significantly 
(Peng, 2009; Peng and Wong, 2008). Some may be reluctant to call it a total paradigm 
shift (YH Kim, 2003), yet, it seems obvious that Korea is making a rapid move toward a 
more universal welfare state in which government’s greater welfare responsibility is 
acknowledged (Y-M Kim, 2008; Kuhnle, 2002).  
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A social investment welfare state? 
I do not object to labelling the current Korean welfare state regime a productive (or 
productivist) regime, but the evolution of the regime continued, adding new elements. 
The ideas and institutions of productive welfare of the Kim Dae-jung government (1998 
– 2003) was succeeded by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003 – 2008). Staying in 
the same line with the productive welfare to a large degree, the new government staged 
‘social investment’ as a new welfare paradigm (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 
2006). Valuing social investment, of course, is not an entirely new element to the 
Korean welfare state history. As Gough (2004) stresses, the focus of productivist social 
policy is social investment rather than social protection - the traditional focus of western 
social policy. However, the social investment approach from the mid-2000s in Korea 
became more explicit and developed some novel elements, reflecting a changing policy 
environment. The Roh government started with multiple challenges: the economic 
performance was not as great as hoped, and poverty and income-inequality were ever 
worsening; besides, the total fertility rate continued to decline, making ageing and care 
needs rising social concerns (Peng, 2011b). In these contexts, social investment was 
welcomed as a comprehensive solution to save the economy, the welfare state as well as 
the regime’s political stability.  
The policy report ‘Vision 2030’ was a policy blueprint of the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration’s social investment welfare state. In ‘Vision 2030’, the government 
argued that welfare is not consumption but investment for humans and a sustainable 
economy (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 2006). The social investment strategy 
typically emphasises human capital development and activation policies, and children 
and (inactive) women are primary considerations (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lister, 2003). 
Likewise, ‘Vision 2030’ targeted children and women (or broadly ‘family’) (H-S Yoon, 
2011). Universal childcare and (re)training of the inactive workforce (especially of 
females) were mentioned as major policy measures (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 
2006). Although the expression ‘social investment’ became less frequently used 
officially since then, subsequent administrations of Lee Myung-bak (2008 - 2013) and 
Park Geun-hye (2013 - to present) inherited the policy directions suggested in ‘Vision 
2030’ to a large degree regarding care and women (family) policies, although they are 
ideologically different (conservative) from the Roh government. One social care policy 
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expert in an interview with the author for the current research explained why social 
investment gained wide political support: 
 
The social investment discourse was formally introduced for the Roh 
government’s social policy. The idea that welfare can be an investment appealed to 
both the left and the right; both social [welfare] experts and economists. In 
addition, policies to support children and women served as a powerful populism 
for both progressive and conservative governments. Consequently, there was little 
political conflict in adopting the social investment strategy. (Interviewee E, 2 May 
2015) 
 
The Korean government began to see care as an effective solution to address a 
variety of social issues such as low-fertility, population ageing, obstacles against 
women’s employment, poverty and gender equality (Peng, 2011b). Furthermore, care 
can create jobs when the social service market is formed both for children and older 
people. In fact, the government highlighted welfare (care) as “a new growth engine for 
the sustainable economic development” (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 2006: 39). 
Here the relationship between welfare and economy (development) was redefined once 
again. Their relationship was more positively framed than in the productive welfare 
regime: welfare not just assists the development but it can also actively generate and 
sustain the development. So, social policy was no more subordinate to economic policy 
in Korea and it began to be approached as an essential element for the nation’s social 
and economic sustainability. In this regard, ‘social investment state’ rather than 
productivist welfare state may be a more appropriate term to describe the social policy 
developments since 2003 (Wilding, 2008).  
I suggest that the path from the developmental welfare state to the productive 
welfare state and/or the social investment welfare state be understood as a continuum 
with overlapping rather than separate phases. So far welfare regime scholars’ portrayals 
of the Korean welfare (state) regime have tended to be somewhat static. I do not suggest 
that the path of the regime development in Korea has been a natural or autonomous 
process, since there have always been political and ideological forces competing one 
another. However, the development of regimes did happen path-dependently under the 
given socio-economic and political situations. What I highlight here is the fact that the 
development of the Korean welfare (state) regime should be viewed as dynamic and 
evolutionary in nature. Only in doing so, we can fully understand why care has become 
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a centre piece of the recent welfare reformations in Korea and how different regime 
approaches have been applied to different care policies.   
 
 
6.3. Care and the Korean Welfare State 
 
6.3.1. Mainstreaming of Care in Korea 
 
As argued in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2), ‘care’ is a central element in 
explaining the transformation of contemporary welfare states. The Korean welfare state 
is not an exception. As a domain of the welfare state policy activities, “care has been of 
varying significance historically in terms of how it has been approached by public 
policy” (Daly and Lewis, 2000: 290). Historically speaking, care had not taken up an 
important position within the Korean welfare state until the late-1990s. Compared to 
social insurances and public assistances, social (care) services for children, older people 
and the disabled in Korea has been slower to develop despite gradual improvements 
(Peng, 2011a). The absence of both public and (affordable) private market sources of 
care had rendered the family the only viable source of personal care in Korea until the 
significant remodelling of social care policies started from the early- 2000s (S-H Lee, 
2013; Peng, 2009).  
This underdevelopment of care originates from institutional and cultural legacies 
of the Korean welfare state. As reviewed earlier, the successive governments in Korea 
have developed a social insurance-centred social security system which makes 
contributions a condition for social entitlement (H-j Kwon, 2007b). As social 
entitlement was predominantly attached to productive labour and contribution, the 
economically inactive, i.e., 'unproductive', population such as children, not-working 
women and older people were largely marginalised from the formal welfare state 
provision. Furthermore, the Korean culture traditionally normalised the view that care is 
a private (or family) matter and (female) family members should assume primary care 
roles. Combined with the social insurance-based social security system and the 
familialistic care culture, the Korean welfare state has not only reinforced stratification 
based on status in the labour market, but also encouraged a gendered division of male-
breadwinner (production regime) and unpaid female care giver (reproduction regime) in 
 143 
 
Korea. The Korean government hardly expressed any intention to collectivise care until 
the point when it realised that the assumptions of the male breadwinner/female 
housewives model and unpaid family/female care input could not be taken for granted 
any more (see Sub-section 6.3.2).  
Entering into the new millennia, the policy environment around care began to 
rapidly change. Having major social programmes already in place, care, gender equality, 
and social (welfare) services were surfacing as huge and urgent social policy issues. The 
Korean government launched several task-forces and even established a separate 
ministry to address those issues.34 In addition, the Kim and Roh governments located 
social care provision in a wider perspective of gender equality/relations rather than a 
simply an area of social service (S-H Lee, 2013).35 When the conservative government 
took office in 2008 in Korea, people initially feared that welfare retrenchment would 
follow, but the government not only stayed on the same social policy track with the 
previous progressive governments, but also further expanded social care in its 
commitment to social investment (Peng, 2011b).  
In fact, care began to dominate Korean politics and remains a high priority today. 
Korean policy makers become increasingly interested in ‘care’, ‘women’s economic 
participation’ and ‘gender equality’. This is because, in part, the social and political 
expectation has been increasing for the welfare state to make ‘gender equality’ an 
explicit policy goal (Daly and Lewis, 2000). Promoting women’s (equal) employment 
emerged not just as an economic issue but it also became part of the ‘equality agenda’ in 
Korean politics along with democratisation and liberalisation, as in the case of the 
‘second wave of feminism’ in the 1960s to 70s (Williams, 2002). Conversely, the 
supply of women’s paid labour is related to the concerns over the supply of their care 
labour because women’s changing roles both in the family and in the market have 
especially important implications on the balance between care demand and supply (Daly 
and Lewis, 2000: 290-1).  
 
                                                         
34 ‘Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF)’ was established in 2001, which specialised in 
operating women and family-related policies for children, young adults and migrant families. 
35 It is interesting to note that the Roh government transferred the childcare duty from the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MOHW) to the Ministry of Gender and Equality (currently, the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family) in 2004 in order to deal with childcare from a gender mainstreaming perspectives. 
Although the MOHW took the care duty back in 2008, the incident shows the intensified politicisation on 
care and gender issues in Korea (for the detailed discussion of gender politics between the ministries at 
that time, see S-H Lee, 2013).  
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6.3.2. Care Crisis in Korea 
 
The changing policy environment propelling the recent politicisation of care in Korea 
since the early-2000s can be summarised as a ‘crisis of care’. The crisis comes from the 
growing care deficit to which various factors from both the demand side and the supply 
side have contributed. For example, a number of demographic and economic factors can 
act as pressures to increase demand for care whereas socio-cultural factors can 
effectively decrease the supply of care (Daly and Lewis, 2000; Lister et al., 2007). This 
sub-section investigates how Korea has been experiencing its own care crisis and what 
factors have been involved in it.  
 
Demographic factors: declining fertility and population ageing 
A shift in the demographic profile is one of the leading factors contributing to the care 
crisis in Korea. Demographic ageing is a shared experience in most advanced countries 
and some developing countries as well, but what sets Korea apart is its rapid speed of 
ageing. As shown in Figure 6.1, the combination of the declining fertility rate and the 
extended life expectancy has rapidly transformed Korea into one of the fastest ageing 
societies. The current figure 12.2 per cent does not rank high among the OECD 
countries (refer to Appendix 6.3) but the ageing speed is remarkable. What worries the 
government most is the ageing projection: the figure is expected to reach 24 per cent in 
2030 unless the current fertility rate significantly improves (Statistics Korea, 2014a). 
The expected increase in the highly aged population (aged 80 or above) in Korea is 
much more striking (Figure 6.2). According to the UN’s scenario (UN-DESA, 2013b), 
the proportion of the highly aged group in Korea is expected to reach 19.4 per cent in 20 
years, making Korea one of the most aged societies in the world. The Korean 
government has been profoundly alarmed by this demographic transition and 
projections, fearing that fast ageing with the extremely low fertility may significantly 
undermine the nation’s economic potential by shrinking the productive population while 
increasing ‘burden’ of social welfare (care) for older people (Government of Korea, 
2005, 2010).  
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Figure 6.1: Ageing trend in Korea (%, age) 
Source: Compiled by the author from Statistics Korea (2014a); e-National Index, TFR, Life index, 
http://www.index.go.kr (accessed on 5 April 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Projections on the percentage of the population aged 80 or over, selected 
countries (%)  
Source: UN-DESA (2013b: 23-6) 
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Socio-cultural factors: diversifying family forms and changing attitudes toward 
family life and care 
The Korean welfare state has long assumed a family structure where the father, as a 
household head, earns a living while the mother, often as a daughter-in-law, cares for 
cohabitant family members. This assumption has been challenged by the changes in the 
form and the composition of the family, which in turn have a significant impact on the 
demand and the supply of care. The first noticeable change in the family over the recent 
past in Korea is the gradual shrinking of the family size. As shown in Figure 6.3, the 
average household size has reduced by half between 1980 and 2010. The decline of the 
average family size has resulted from the dramatic increase in the one-person 
households, combined with a gradual decrease in the multi-person households. 
Declining of large families is directly related to the gradual decrease in the multi-
generation households (Statistics Korea, each year).  
These changes in the family size and generation compositions can have especially 
significant implications on older people. As presented in Figure 6.4, the percentage of 
older people living together with their children sharply decreased: older people are 
increasingly living independently either as a couple or alone. Living separately from 
their children does not necessarily mean that older people do not receive care from their 
children anymore. However, the shrinking household size and declining proximity 
among families can mean the reduced availability of personal care by family members, 
especially in the case of one-person households. In addition, as traditional care relations 
between the family members cannot be automatically presumed, the older people may 
require more non-kinship based care sources. Until this point, I have tended to construct 
older people as primarily ‘care-receivers’; however, their roles in care provision for 
partners and grandchildren has been significant in terms of frequency and length (KEIS, 
2012: 61). In this regard, changes in forms of the family can affect the way in which care 
is provided in multiple directions. 
Another significant change in the family is the increase in female-headed 
households. Figure 6.5 shows the number of female-headed households and their 
marital statuses. Here ‘female-headed household’ refers to a family unit in which a 
female adult is responsible for the livelihood of other co-living members. Until the mid-
1990s, female-headed households resulted typically from the death of the male 
household heads (usually the husband or the father), but recently reasons have become 
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diverse compared to a generation ago. Loss of a male breadwinner is becoming a less 
frequent reason; instead, any more and more females have become major providers of 
livelihood for the family even with their male partners since the mid-1990s. In addition, 
while ‘remaining unmarried’ has been a more common reason to become a female-
headed household, the cases by divorce have been on a more constant increase.  
It is important to note that the ageing trend and the increase in one-person 
households and female-headed households are related to each other: due to women’s 
longer life span and increasing divorce rate, many one-person households are headed by 
lone mothers or elderly females. According to Statistics Korea (2010), female-headed 
households are smaller in size (1.93 persons) than male-headed households (3.2 
persons), and female household heads tend to be older than their male counterparts (54 
compared to 47.6). Ever diversifying family forms in Korea presents emergent social 
risks by weakening family welfare/care capacity because such types of families are not 
compatible with the Korean social security system based on the assumption of a male-
breadwinner/female-housewife family model (S-H Lee, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Change in the household size in Korea (%, person) 
Source: Statistics Korea, National Census (each year) 
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Figure 6.4: Change in the household makeup of the families with the aged 65 or over in 
Korea (%, person) 
Source: e-National Index, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=2926 
(accessed on 1 May 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Increase in female-headed households and their marital statuses in Korea (%, 
person)  
Source: Statistics Korea, National Census (each year) 
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Along with changes in family structures, as Daly and Lewis (2000) pointed out, 
changing norms about marriage, family, kin responsibilities and the expected (care) role 
of women in the family can also alter the conditions under which care is appreciated and 
provided. Choice not to get married began gradually to be accepted and cultural 
pressure to maintain marital relationships has substantially been weakened (refer to 
Chapter 4). While gender equality begins to be acknowledged in public life, the long-
held assumptions of children’s care obligations for their elderly parents and women’s 
primary care responsibilities began to be resisted. Many women in marriage/maternity 
ages are willing to choose to pursue career or other activities over conforming to the 
traditional expectations. At the same time, some aged parents actually opt to live 
independently or in a facility if they require assistances rather than living together with 
children (MOHW, 2011: 122). This may be associated with to the wider societal 
changes of a post-industrial society such as an increasing ‘individualisation’ (Beck, 
2002).  
 
Economic factors: women’s labour market participation 
Women’s labour market participation is also related to both care demand and care 
supply. If they are the main care givers for young children and adult dependants at home, 
their employment can mean a loss of a primary care giver, at the same time, it 
necessitates alternative care resources to make up the resultant care deficit. As shown in 
Figure 6.6, despite slight fluctuations, women’s labour market participation rate in 
Korea has gradually risen. The age cohort 30 to 39 shows higher participation rate, and 
the increase has been accelerating over the recent years. It has significant implication 
for care because females belonging to this group are supposed to be in the highest need 
of childcare services, considering the average age of giving birth to the first child is 
30.73 as of 2013 (Statistics Korea, 2015d). Although the female labour market 
participation rate has been low compared to the OECD average (Figure 6.6), the 
deteriorating job security of ‘male-breadwinners’ due to the changes in the labour 
market such as increasing ‘flexibility’ has created more pressures on women to seek and 
maintain paid work outside the home, making ‘dual-earner families’ more common 
(Baek et al., 2011; Peng, 2011a).  
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Given that public care provision was limited until very recently, many married 
women tried to deal with the pressure of combining paid work and care responsibilities 
by taking up temporary or part-time work while they continued to be a primary care 
provider in home. Figure 6.7 shows a stark contrast between males and females in 
employment patterns. Despite the gradual increase, the number of female regular (full-
time) workers is much smaller than for their male counterparts, but the number of 
female irregular workers started to exceed the growth of male irregular workers from 
2008. Part-time jobs available for women were not only limited in supply in the Korean 
labour market where the male full-workers are dominant, but also tended to be poor in 
quality (Statistics Korea, 2010). In these situations, women have often been forced to 
make a choice between work and care (S-k Kim et al., 2012). These challenges that 
women face between work and family-life/care became an important background for the 
care reforms from the early-2000s because the Korean government considered them 
main obstacles to raising both the fertility rate and women’s labour participation rate 
(Government of Korea, 2010: 25-6). 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Trend in the women’s labour market participation rate in Korea (%) 
Note: a 2013 data. 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015c); OECD LFS, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
LFS_SEXAGE_I_R# (accessed on 10 May 2015) 
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Figure 6.7: Gender difference in the labour market participation in Korea (1,000 persons) 
Note: Regular workers refers to full-time workers while irregular workers represent temporary workers, 
part-time workers and other atypical types of workers. 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015b) 
 
To sum up, demographic, socio-cultural and economic factors have contributed to 
the care deficit the care crisis in Korea either by increasing demand or by decreasing 
supply of care. It is important to see that these factors are inter-related and often 
mutually reinforcing. For example, the ageing trend and the increase in one-person 
households are a related phenomenon. Women’s changing roles in the family and the 
market are also inseparable. In addition, the welfare state itself should be considered as 
an influential factor in the care balance. To illustrate, the government’s intention to 
encourage women’s integration into paid work can trigger the care demand from parents 
and the supply as a consequence. In this regard, it is essential to consider institutional 
dimensions in analysing the care crisis in order to avoid reading off the care crisis and 
care policies a linear cause and effect scenario. The welfare state does not simply react 
to the crisis but it also can be proactive against the crisis by transforming its care 
policies.  
 
 
 
 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Regular Male
Regular Female
Irregular Male
Irregular Female
 152 
 
6.3.3. Care Reforms in Korea 
 
The care crisis in Korea revealed the limitations of the existing care arrangement 
presuming the familial care provision and women’s unpaid care labour within the 
family. Finding optimal ways to address the growing care deficit became an utmost 
policy goal for the Korean welfare state. It is important to see that care reforms in Korea 
are an integral part of the government-led policy response to low fertility and population 
ageing. Deeply concerned with the demographic crisis and its economic implications, in 
2004 the government launched the ‘Presidential Committee on Ageing and Future 
Society’, specifically aiming to develop and coordinate policies to tackle the low 
fertility and ageing-related issues. Based on the newly legislated ‘Framework Act on 
Low Birth Rate and an Ageing Society’, the Committee has developed mid- to long-
term policy roadmaps, called the ‘Basic Plan for Ageing Society and Population’36 
(hereafter the Basic Plan) (Government of Korea, 2005, 2010). The Committee renews 
this policy roadmap every five years and related ministries and local governments are 
required to set up implementation plans every year. The first round of the Basic Plan 
was effective from 2006 to 2010 and the second five year round has just begun in 2011.  
As presented in Table 6.2, the Basic Plan consists of three main policy areas: ‘Low 
fertility’, ‘Ageing’ and ‘Growth Engine’. The first two areas are directly relevant to the 
childcare and eldercare policies respectively. The third one is concerned with the 
development of human resource which also has certain implications for the labour 
market participation of women and older people as well as migrants. The Basic Plan is a 
far-reaching policy blueprint related to various policy areas, namely, health, social 
security, labour market, education and migration with an overarching goal of boosting 
the fertility rate (Government of Korea, 2005, 2010). At the centre of this pan-
government collaboration lies ‘care’. The importance of public support for childcare and 
work-home harmonisation has been repeatedly stressed. It has been identified that the 
main reasons for not getting married and not having a child were firstly ‘unstable 
employment status and negative career prospect’, secondly ‘difficulty maintaining 
work-home balance’ and thirdly ‘insufficient support (cash and facilities) for childcare’ 
(S-k Kim et al., 2012; S-s Lee et al., 2009). So the government understood that the 
measures to reduce women’s care burden and to help them reconcile work and family 
                                                         
36 It is also known as ‘Saeromaji’ in Korean which literally means welcoming the new (society).  
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responsibilities would be an effective way of raising the fertility rate (Government of 
Korea, 2010).  
 
Table 6.2: Structure of the ‘Basic Plan for Ageing Society and Population’ 
Areas ‘Low fertility’ Area ‘Ageing’ Area ‘Growth Engine’ Area 
Goals 
▪ Strengthen social support for 
marriage, childbirth and 
childrearing  
▪ Support work and home 
reconciliation 
▪ Raise sound future 
generations 
▪ Strengthen income 
maintenance of older 
people 
▪ Healthy and well-cared 
elderly life 
▪ Form an elderly-friendly 
social environment 
▪ Utilise potential labour 
forces such as women 
and older people 
▪ Develop 
competitiveness of the 
human resource 
▪ Raise an elderly-
related business 
Key Policy 
instruments 
▪ Support for marriage and 
pregnancy 
▪ Cash support (Childcare 
allowances, Childcare fee 
support, Early childhood 
education fee support) 
▪ Expand quality childcare 
facilities 
▪ Leave arrangement 
(maternity, paternity and 
parental leave) 
▪ Personal care services for 
new-born babies and mothers 
▪ National Pension 
▪ Basic Pension  
▪ Long-Term Care 
Insurance 
 
▪ Active labour market 
policies for women 
and older people 
▪ Active ageing 
▪ Utilise migrant 
workforce 
 
Note: The table is based on the first round (2006 - 2010), but all elements are shared with the second 
round (2011-2015) 
Source: Government of Korea (2005) 
 
Analytical Frame 
The next two sections (6.4 and 6.5) investigate how care reform agenda listed above 
have been realised into actual policy making. In doing so, I track the changes in the 
Korean care policies mainly from 2003 and onward, and over a decade of care policy 
reformation process is here referred to as ‘care reform’, while the changes after 2008 
until now are typically referred to as the ‘recent’ care reform.37 Before examining the 
care reforms in detail, here I first introduce an analytical frame for the following 
sections. Given that it is extremely difficult to quickly remedy shrinking care resources 
by reversing demographic and socio-cultural trends, any care reform needs to engage in 
rebalancing existing care resources and responsibility to address the care deficit. As 
                                                         
37 This time frame covers four governments (presidents): two progressive - Kim Dae-jung (1998 – 2003) 
and Roh Moo-hyun (2003 – 2008) and two conservative - Lee Myung-bak (2008 - 2013) and current Park 
Geun-hye (2013 - 2018). 
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Lister et al. (2007) identify, care policy involves the redistribution of care responsibility 
which happens at three different levels: firstly, between state, market and family; 
secondly, within family members; and thirdly, between national and transnational 
resources. I analyse the first two levels of care redistribution here and the third 
dimension will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
To study the Korean care regime and its reforms, the section here adopts, with 
substantial modification, the framework suggested by Daly and Lewis (2000). The main 
strength of their framework is that it allows us to investigate both the macro and the 
micro level of care redistribution. Table 6.3 shows how a care regime can be 
conceptualised and empirically indicated in each level of care redistribution. The macro-
level dimension refers to the division of care between the state, market and family,38 
and the micro-level dimension is concerned with the care division between family 
members. Both dimensions of care rebalancing are informed by each set of empirical 
indicators. The purpose of care policy and its instruments (e.g. finance, benefits and 
regulations) are crucial indicators in analysing a care regime on the macro-level. Who 
actually provides care labour on what conditions either in public or private care 
institutions, in other words, ‘employment regime of care worker’, is also an important 
consideration in the macro level analysis. In contrast, particular care benefits and 
services promoting/discouraging the division of care among family members, 
specifically between mothers and fathers, are to be analysed for the micro-level care 
rebalancing. The patterns of economic activities of women at caring age will be 
highlighted again in the micro-level analysis. Then we can trace the directions in which 
the care reform(s) has altered the division of responsibility between the state, market 
and family and between men and women within the family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
38 Community (or the third sector) is often combined in the care regime research but the current study 
excludes it because the roles of community have not been strongly implicated in recent care reforms in 
Korea. 
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Table 6.3: Analytical frame to examine the Korean care regime 
Dimensions Macro-level Micro-level 
Conceptual 
References 
The division of care responsibility 
between the state, market and family 
The division of care responsibility 
among individuals within the family 
Empirical 
Indicators 
▪ Care policy structure: policy 
purpose and scope 
▪ Care policy instruments: finance, 
benefits and regulations 
▪ Employment patterns of care 
workers 
▪ Benefits and services in facilitating 
sharing of care between family 
members 
▪ Relations between care givers and 
recipients 
▪ Patterns of economic activity of 
women at caring age 
Reform 
Trajectories 
An alteration in the distribution of 
care responsibility between sectors 
An alteration in the distribution of 
caring activities among individuals 
within family  
Source: Adapted from Daly and Lewis (2000: 287) 
 
 
6.4. Care Rebalancing on the Macro-level 
 
With regard to the mix of care provision, Korea has been often referred to as a 
‘familialistic’ regime based on a strong male-breadwinner model and the heavy reliance 
on family care resources (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Empirical research has repeatedly 
confirmed that family indeed has assumed the largest care responsibility in the Korean 
welfare state due to the insufficient public care provision and a limited private care 
market (Baek et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2011; Ochiai, 2009; Peng, 2009). However, this 
diagnosis on the Korean care regime should not be considered as a frozen picture. Care 
regime is subject to change over time and so is the Korean care regime. Researchers 
have investigated how the state and the market (and the community) have altered the 
existing family dominant ‘care mix’ or ‘care diamond’ over time. Ochiai (2009: 72), for 
example, argues that Korea has developed “a familialistic welfare regime combined 
with liberalism” by highlighting the increasing involvement of the market in the care 
provision. Peng (2011a: 908) sees Korea moving to “a modified form of familialism” 
rather than a full care socialisation despite the increased government’s care input in 
recent years. Existing literature has focused on care policy developments during the 
Kim Dae-jung (1998 – 2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003 – 2008) administrations (e.g., 
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S-H Lee, 2013; Peng, 2009, 2011b). However, as shown in Table 6.4, although policy 
developments during the Roh government (2004-2008) were most substantial, the 
reforms continued after 2008, ever changing the dynamics of division of care on the 
macro-level. The remaining part of the section will examine in more detail the contents 
of the childcare and eldercare reforms. 
 
Table 6.4: Care policy developments in Korea 
Period Childcare development Elder development 
before 1992 
▪ Limited number of private nurseries for poor 
families and workplace nurseries 
▪ Limited public eldercare 
services for the poor elderly 
▪ Legislation of the ‘Welfare of 
the Aged Act’ (1981, 1997 
revision) 
  
1992 - 2003 
(President 
Kim Y-s & 
Kim D-j) 
▪ Legislation of the ‘Child Care Act’ (1991) 
▪ ‘Childcare fee support’ introduced (1999) 
▪ Maternity leave extended 90 days (2001) 
▪ Parental leave became paid (2001)  
2004 - 2008 
(President Roh 
M-h) 
▪ Complete revision of the ‘Child Care Act’ 
(2004) 
▪ Subsidy to care facilities increased (2004) 
▪ ‘Childcare fee support’ increased (2004) 
▪ Parental leave extended to1 year (2004) 
▪ Childcare worker certificate upgraded) (2004) 
▪ Care facility certification system implemented 
(2005) 
▪ Paternity leave extended to 5 days (2008) 
▪ Legislation of ‘Act on Long-
Term Care Insurance’ (2007) 
▪ Residential and domiciliary care 
services through the LTCI 
▪ Eldercare worker certificate for 
the LTCI 
▪ Basic eldercare service (home 
visit) for non-LTCI recipients  
▪ Comprehensive eldercare 
service (home visit and day care 
centre) for the poor elderly 
among the non-LTCI recipients 
 
2009 - 2012 
(President Lee 
M-b) 
▪ ‘Care (cash) allowance’ for homecare families 
introduced (2009) 
▪ Replacement of parental leave increased to 
40% (2011) 
after 2012 
(President 
Park, G-h) 
▪ ‘Childcare fee support’ and ‘Early childhood 
education fee support’ universalised (no 
means-test), cover 100% of the standard fee 
(2013) 
▪ Parental leave applied to children aged 8 or 
under (2014) 
▪ ‘A father’s month’ introduced (2014) 
▪ LTCI reform: refined the 
eligibility standard (2014) 
Source: MOHW website, http: http://www.mw.go.kr 
 
 
6.4.1. Childcare Reforms 
 
The expansion of childcare is a central feature of the care reform since 2004. Before 
2004, parents with young children had to rely on other family members when they 
needed extra care source. Public childcare facilities/services were extremely limited and 
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private care facilities available were expensive and their qualities were not guaranteed. 
There were no cash benefits for parents who wanted to take care of the children 
themselves or hire nannies. A virtual absence of affordable alternative childcare sources 
made it extremely difficult for dual-earner families or lone parents to reconcile work 
and care. Seeing this as a main culprit against fertility, the government decided to 
assume a greater role in providing childcare by either strengthening the existing 
programmes or introducing new ones (Government of Korea, 2005). Under the ‘Basic 
Plan for Ageing Society and Population’, a series of policy plans have been developed 
specifically for childcare: namely, ‘Saessak Plan 2006 - 2010’ and its revised version 
‘Aisarang Plan 2009 - 2012’ (MOHW, 2009). Following these policy plans, various 
childcare programmes have been reformed or newly introduced. As all key programmes 
became fully operative from 2009, the government’s financial input in childcare started 
to rapidly expand (Table 6.5). The total budget has been tripled between 2009 and 2014. 
The largest portion of the budget was allocated to finance ‘Childcare Fee Support’ (for 
institutional childcare), followed by ‘Homecare Allowance’ programmes (for home-
based childcare), which are two main pillars of the Korean childcare system. 
 
Table 6.5: Government spending on childcare by programme in Korea (million KRW, %) 
Programme 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 % 
Total 1,710,430 2,127,510 2,478,380 3,028,567 4,131,345 5,273,950 100 
Childcare Fee 
Support 
1,282,168 1,632,204 1,934,611 2,391,291 2,598,219 3,329,228 63.1  
Homecare 
Allowance 
32,390 65,664 89,794 102,646 880,950 1,215,319 23.0  
Subsidy for care 
facility operation 
354,976 404,621 418,100 501,360 594,908 702,404 13.3  
Childcare 
infrastructure 
40,896 25,020 35,875 33,270 55,268 26,868 0.5  
Note: It only includes the central government budget.  
Source: MOHW, Childcare statistics (each year), http://www.mw.go.kr 
 
Institutional childcare 
The most important instrument for the childcare reform has been to expand the 
institutional childcare provision. There are two different types of ‘childcare facilities’ in 
Korea: ‘childcare centres (Orinijib in Korean)’ and ‘kindergartens (Yoochiwon in 
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Korean)’.39 Although both facilities provide institutional care for children before formal 
schooling starts typically at age 6, they differ to some degree. First of all, the primary 
function of childcare centres, albeit with some educational elements, is care while 
kindergartens are more directly related to early childhood education. In addition, 
childcare centres not only cover wider age groups (0 to 5) than kindergartens (3 to 5 or 
above), but also often operate longer and flexible hours (e.g., outside of nine to five). 
Childcare centres have been a primary venue to deliver childcare in Korea and the focus 
of the care policies. This section also mainly discusses the policies regarding ‘childcare 
centres (Orinijib)’. 
The supply of childcare facilities has quickly expanded since the legislation of the 
‘Child Care Act’ in 1991 (a legal base of childcare facilities). The Kim Young-sam 
government (1993 - 1998) then played a decisive role to the growth of childcare 
facilities (S-H Lee, 2013). Increasing the level of institutional childcare was needed to 
address the growing demand for affordable care provision from families, but it was 
important for the government at that time for its successful bid to a OECD membership 
(M-w Lee et al., 2012). The government not only set up more publicly-funded childcare 
centres, but it also encouraged private enterprises to establish childcare centres of 
varying types. Consequently, the number of childcare centres has rapidly grown, while 
the number of kindergartens has remained largely unchanged (Figure 6.8). Along with 
the increase in childcare facilities, the number of childcare workers has also rapidly 
increased (For a discussion of characteristics of childcare workers, refer to Chapter 7).  
 
                                                         
39 Each is governed by different laws and ministries. The former is governed by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare whereas the latter by the Ministry of Education and each has a separate qualification control 
over the staff although Koreans equally called them both ‘teachers’. Attempts to merge two systems of 
‘care’ and ‘education’ have so far failed due to strong vested interests, although both ministries agreed to 
share the same curriculums for the age groups from three to five.  
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Figure 6.8: Increase in childcare institutions in Korea 
Note: The number of the childcare workers here includes only ‘teachers’ in childcare centres and 
kindergartens. The combinable data is available from 2001. 
Source: Compiled by the author from Statistics Korea (2015e); Statistics Korea (2015f); e-National Index, 
http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=3022&clas_div=&idx
_sys_cd=848&idx_clas_cd=1 (accessed on 5 April 2015) 
 
Childcare centres in Korea can be categorised into seven types: public, social 
welfare corporations, private corporations/institutions, private (enterprises), home-based 
(enterprises), parents’ coops, and work place. Public childcare centres are those 
established and run by the central or municipal government(s) whereas other types of 
facilities are set up by varying private entities, although they are also subsidised and 
supervised by the government. The proportion of for-profit private care providers 
(private and home-based enterprises) has been ever increasing, occupying 88 per cent as 
of 2013 while public 5.3 per cent (Statistics Korea, 2015e). With the supply of childcare 
centres ever growing, institutional childcare became increasingly available; however, 
the extreme commercialisation of childcare often discouraged (low to middle income) 
families’ access to institutional childcare due to the care cost (fee). In addition, disparity 
among care centres in terms of facility conditions, curriculum and quality of childcare 
workers began to grow (MOGEF, 2006a).  
In order to deal with these issues, subsequent governments did not choose to fully 
socialise the institutional childcare (by making them public); instead, they have 
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maintained the principle of ‘care provision through the market’. There have been much 
debate and political struggle regarding the mode of institutional childcare provision: 
progressive experts and social ministries proposed a more public form of childcare 
facilities, but childcare centre owners and economic ministries preferred marketised 
provision (Peng, 2011b). Eventually, the latter won the battle not just because it was 
virtually impossible to revoke the existing vested interests of the market care providers, 
but also because promoting the care market and job creation through it suit well the 
ideals of the ‘social investment welfare state’ in Korea (S-H Lee, 2013; Peng, 2011a). 
Instead, the government has strengthened a qualification requirement for childcare 
workers and tightened the monitoring of private care providers. In addition, the 
government provided common curriculums (Nurigwajung in Korean) for both childcare 
centres and kindergartens to level the quality between facilities.  
To effectively relieve families of childcare cost, the government substantially 
increased ‘Childcare (facility) Fee Support’ (Boyookryo Jiwon in Korean). It is a 
subsidy for parents who send their child (aged 0 to 5) to a childcare centre. Childcare 
Fee Support was first introduced in 1999 but it covered only the families below the 
national poverty line until 2005. Then the threshold was gradually lowered to include all 
the families at and below the 50th income percentile by 2009 and the 70th by 2012. 
According to the second childcare master plan (Aisarang Plan 2009 - 2012), the 
government decided to universalise the Childcare Fee Support, firstly for the children 
having special needs such as very young children (aged 0 to 2), children with a 
disability and children from the ‘multicultural families’ (refer to Chapter 5) (MOHW, 
2009). Finally, Childcare Fee Support has been completely universalised and equalised 
from 2013. The benefit level has also been raised and now it covers the standard fee (set 
by the government) at the 100 per cent level.40  
Thanks to the increase in childcare facilities and care facility fee support, the 
proportion of children receiving institutional care of all children under five has rapidly 
expanded (Figure 6.9). One thing to note is that children under two, who used to be 
taken care of at home, are now increasingly attending childcare centres (Figure 6.10). 
We can see that the childcare reform in Korea since 2004 has substantially 
institutionalised the childcare provision, especially for the very young children over the 
                                                         
40 It is often the case that facilities charge separate fees for extracurricular activities and other user 
benefits.  
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last two decades.  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Increase in childcare institutions and enrolled children in Korea 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015e) 
 
 
Figure 6.10: The number of children attending childcare centres by age in Korea 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015g) 
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Home-based childcare 
The government introduced another type of childcare benefit called ‘Homecare 
Allowance (Yangyooksudang in Korean)’ with different rationales. The government 
childcare reform was focused on expanding the institutional care provision and the 
support for the parents using a care facility, so the parents not using a care facility felt 
discriminated (M-w Lee et al., 2012). There was another concern that the increase in the 
Childcare Fee Support may cause an unnecessary demand for institutional care even 
from the parents having very young children (aged 0 to 2) for whom homecare by 
parents may be more desirable for their development (MOHW, 2009). So, in an attempt 
to make a ‘balance’ between institutionalised care and homecare, the government 
introduced a cash allowance in 2009 for the primary care givers (parents or 
grandparents) who take care of the children at home. Until 2012, the homecare cash 
benefit of 100,000 KRW per month was given only to the family whose income level 
was less than the 120 per cent of the national minimum livelihood when they take care 
of very young children (aged 0 to 2) at home. As of 2013, the Homecare Allowance has 
been increased to 200,000 KRW per month (equivalent to 118 GBP), and the 
entitlement has been universalised to all children aged 0 to 5 staying at home, and no 
other conditions are attached to the eligibility (Table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.6: Childcare cash benefits per month in Korea, 2014 (KRW) 
Age Childcare Fee Support (A) Homecare Allowance* (B) A/B 
0 406,000 200,000 2.0 
1 357,000 150,000 2.4 
2 295,000 100,000 3.0 
3 - 5 220,000 100,000 2.2 
Note: *Children in rural areas receive slightly larger allowances.  
1,000 KRW is equivalent to 0.6 GBP.  
Source: MOHW website, http://www.mw.go.kr 
 
When comparing the benefit level of two benefits, however, we can see that the 
Homecare Allowance can hardly be an incentive for home-based care since the level of 
the Childcare Fee Support is two to three times higher than that of the Homecare 
Allowance. Given that all parents having under school-aged children are entitled to use 
childcare facilities for 12 to 24 hours almost for free, many parents may well choose to 
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send their children to care centres although some of them do not actually need to. The 
level of Homecare Allowance is too low either to compensate family carers for their 
opportunity cost of choosing care over paid-work, or to hire nannies if they want to 
keep the very young children at home for the development and safety reasons. So, it 
seems that the Homecare Allowance is not the measure for the Korean government to 
actively promote the homecare but an attempt to avoid the accusation of the reverse 
discrimination against the homecare families. Consequently, despite the introduction of 
the Homecare Allowance, a strong incentive remains to the institutional care, which, I 
believe, is exactly what the Korean government has intended. A lawmaker who has been 
leading the childcare policy design, including the Homecare Allowance, talked about 
the (im)balance between institutionalised care and home-based care in a media 
interview: 
 
Around 2003, the childcare budget was very small, and the [childcare] 
infrastructure was very poor. The Roh government increased the supply of 
childcare centres and invested a lot. The balance between care facilities and 
homecare could’ve been considered then. But, at that time, formal childcare 
services were poorly equipped, so the government had to focus on investing on 
facilities. The subsequent Lee government was on the same track [of expanding 
care facilities]. A difference was that Lee government was more market oriented 
than the Roh government. The issue of balancing home-based care with 
institutionalised care should’ve been raised earlier. But the situation is getting 
better as the Homecare Allowance has expanded to reach all families from this 
year [2013]. Unlike the previous year, we observe some toddlers under two 
returning to home. (Baby News, 2013) 
 
 
6.4.2. Eldercare Reforms 
 
Compared to childcare, the policy development on the eldercare has not been as 
dramatic and complicated (see Table 6.4). Before the introduction of the Long-Term 
Care Insurance (LTCI) in 2008, only the very poor elderly could receive limited public 
care services. Families had to take care of older people themselves or use an expensive 
private facility without any government support. The introduction of the LTCI marked 
an important shift in the eldercare regime in Korea. To begin with, the care 
responsibility for the older people was for the first time publicly acknowledged as 
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shared responsibility beyond individual families. Table 6.7 summaries the main features 
of the LTCI. Compared to the previous eldercare systems, the LTCI is a universal 
benefit for older people. The entitlement is solely based on their care needs 
(mental/physical conditions). The care services under the LTCI are diverse and more 
consumer-oriented rather than providers. Most importantly, however, the LTCI is a 
‘social insurance’ by which care burden (cost) is socially redistributed both between 
classes and generations. Along with the subsidy from the government, users (families) 
are required to pay a certain percentage (15 to 20) of service charge in addition to their 
social insurance premium when applicable.41  
 
Table 6.7: Eldercare regimes compared in Korea 
Regime LTCI system (since 2008) Previous systems 
Legal bases 
‘Act on Long-Term Care Insurance’ 
(2007) and The Welfare of the Aged Act  
The Welfare of the Aged 
Act’(1981, 1997 revision) 
Entitlement 
▪ Universal to older people (aged 65 or 
above) who require care services due to 
mental/physical conditions  
▪ No means-tested 
▪ Selective to the poor elderly  
▪ Means-tested  
 
Services 
Types of service to be chosen by the 
consumers (the recipient/family) 
Services to be chosen by the 
provider (the authority/facility) 
Funding 
Mix of the social insurance fund, the 
government subsidy and the user 
payment 
The government subsidy 
Source: LTCI website, http://www.longtermcare.or.kr/portal/site/nydev/MENUITEM_CAREINFO 
 
LTCI benefits and coverage 
People aged 65 or above, or exceptionally those having geriatric diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s although they are younger than 65, can apply for the LTCI benefit without 
a means-test. Applicants are to be medically examined and screened according to the 
severity of their conditions (disability). When proven entitled, they can choose a 
suitable care service(s). The LTCI provides three types of benefits: ‘Residential Care’, 
‘In-home Care’, and ‘Family Care Allowance’. The Residential Care is for those who 
require intense care while staying in a facility (nursing home or elderly hospital) for an 
extended period of time. The In-home Care provides either a personal care at the 
                                                         
41 The family under the poverty line is exempted from the user charge. 
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recipient’s home (home-visit care) or short-term/day care at the centre. The Family Care 
Allowance is a cash subsidy to the recipients who are under very exceptional 
circumstances: in case of having contagious diseases or living in the area where no care 
facilities are available in the vicinity e.g. remote rural towns. So, the Family Care 
Allowance, unlike the Homecare Allowance in the childcare policy, is not a universally 
applicable cash allowance for the family who choose home-based care. Interestingly, 
the LTCI allows (and pays) people to provide care service for their own family 
members at home if the care giver has a relevant care worker certificate, but only one 
hour of care work per day will be paid through the LTCI. As seen in Table 6.8, the total 
volume of the LTCI finance has fast grown as the programme expands. Expectedly, 
insurance contribution (premium) from families is the most important source of the 
revenue, while the central government’s financial input is limited. The spending has 
also rapidly increased, but the revenue was proportionately spent for both ‘Residential 
Care’ and ‘In-home Care’ while the payment for ‘Family Care Allowance’ has been 
nominal. 
 
Table 6.8: Finance of the LTCI in Korea, 2008 - 2013 (million KRW, %) 
   Item 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 % 
R
ev
en
u
e
 
Total 868,974  2,084,929  2,877,741  3,263,144  3,561,673  3,831,212  100  
Contribution 477,011  1,199,551  1,831,555  2,142,332  2,369,669  2,542,098  66.4  
Central 129,408 245,948 353,237 418,163 444,493 494,126 12.9  
Local 257,476 618,486 649,531 647,469 672,528 708,870 18.5  
Other 5,079  20,944  43,418  55,180  74,983  86,118  2.2  
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
Total 554,900  1,908,462  2,589,135  2,787,758  2,937,322  3,317,962  100  
Residential Care 262,858  754,498  1,033,623  1,221,075  1,396,220  1,598,158  48.2  
In-home Care 164,572  985,020  1,374,034  1,374,494  1,329,687  1,493,255  45.0  
Family Care 
Allowance 
564  1,656  1,316  1,049  984  1,027  0.0  
Administration 107,897  135,720  144,137  155,571  166,256  178,159  5.4  
Other 19,009  31,568  36,025  35,569  44,175  47,363  1.4  
Source: MOHW, LTCI statistics yearbook (each year) 
 
The number of the LTCI applicants has almost doubled since the introduction, 
accounting for 10.9 per cent of the total elderly population as of 2013 (Table 6.9). Only 
about half of the applicants (53.6 per cent) have been screened qualified for the benefit. 
Consequently, the overall coverage of the LTCI has been modest, covering just about 
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six per cent of the total elderly population (aged 65 or above). According to a panel 
survey (KIHASA, 2011), 40.6 per cent of people answered that they would apply for the 
LTCI service if possible, so we can assume that the care demand has not been fully 
addressed despite the rapid expansion of the LTCI system. The deficit may grow bigger 
when the ageing population increases.  
 
Table 6.9: The accumulative number of LTCI applicants and beneficiaries by each year in 
Korea (person, %) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Applicants (A) 355,536 522,293 622,346 617,081 643,409 663,776 
Recipients (B) 214,480 286,907 315,994 324,412 341,788 355,727 
Population 65+ (C) 5,086,195 5,286,383 5,448,984 5,644,758 5,921,977 6,071,994 
Application Rate (A/C) 7.0  9.9  11.4  10.9  10.9  10.9  
Qualification Rate (B/A) 60.3  54.9  50.8  52.6  53.1  53.6  
Coverage (B/C) 4.2  5.4  5.8  5.7  5.8  5.9  
Source: MOHW, LTCI statistics yearbook (each year), reformatted by the author 
 
LTCI facilities and workers 
The implementation of LTCI requires a sufficient supply of care facilities and care 
workers working for them. The total number of care facilities was 8,318 when the LTCI 
was launched in 2008 and quickly increased to 14,560 by 2009 (MOHW, LTCI statistics 
yearbook). However, as shown in Figure 6.11, since 2009 the total number of eldercare 
facilities has been largely unchanged ever since despite a small increase in very recent 
years. One trend to note is a steady growth of residential care facilities although In-
Home Care (home visit care and day care) has been a more frequent form of the LTCI 
care service. Another point is that eldercare provision is, as in the case of childcare, also 
highly marketised: public eldercare facilities only account for 1.5 per cent as of 2013, 
while individual businesses (74.7 per cent) and public corporations (23.3 per cent) act as 
major providers (MOHW, 2014a).  
In order to staff the LTCI services, the government arranged a new category of 
social care profession, called ‘yoyangbohosa’. This qualification (certificate) is given to 
exclusively to the eldercare workers working for the LTCI facilities. ‘Yoyangbohosa’ 
has doubled in number over the last five years, becoming primary care workers for the 
LTCI services (Table 6.10). They provide a wide range of personal care such as nursing 
 167 
 
and bathing, and the skill level expected for the job is similar to or lower than that of 
social workers or nurses. Despite the demanding work, employment conditions are 
much poorer. Nevertheless, there was a huge supply of ‘yoyangbohosa’ over the early 
years of LTCI. The new care worker certificate was welcomed as a new job opportunity 
for older married women in particular (Um, 2013). It also suited the government’s job 
creation strategy by stimulating the growth of the social (service) market (Government 
of Korea, 2005). The number of ‘yoyangbohosa’ continued to grow until 2011 but 
sharply decreased by half and stabilised afterwards. This is mainly because, considering 
the total number of recipients and facilities, half a million care workers in 2011 turned 
out to be an over-supply. It is worth noting that the expansion of eldercare through 
LTCI has been facilitated by activating market sector involvement, both for facilities 
and workers, so the role of the government has been largely limited to an insurer and 
regulator (Government of Korea, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 6.11: Growth in eldercare facilities in Korea (number) 
Source: MOHW, LTCI statistics yearbook (each year) 
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Table 6.10: Care professionals working for the LTCI in Korea (person) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 125,334 204,226 473,944 491,797 252,280 263,661 
Yoyangbohosa 113,756 190,026 455,058 471,938 233,459 243,689 
Nurse 5,324 7,063 8,870 9,409 9,295 9,766 
Social worker 4,195 4,979 7,136 7,347 6,751 7,054 
Physiotherapist 1,002 1,217 1,490 1,608 1,626 1,993 
Doctor 1,034 922 1,373 1,488 1,142 1,152 
Dental hygienist 23 19 17 7 7 7 
Source: MOHW, LTCI statistics yearbook (each year) 
 
 
6.4.3. Reform Trajectories in the Macro-level 
 
I have examined the recent policy developments on childcare and eldercare in Korea 
with regard to finance and policy instruments such as facility, service, cash and other 
regulations. We can identify overall directions of policy changes as to rebalancing care 
responsibility between the state, the family and the market. First of all, the state started 
to assume (and plans to continue to) a bigger responsibility in providing care by 
expanding existing care programmes as well as legislating new care services. Figure 
6.12 shows the changes in the public expenditure (defined as percentage of GDP) on the 
family and elderly sectors since 1991. The spending for older people sharply increased 
during the economic crisis period (1997 - 2000). After the temporary drop, the spending 
rose again from 2006. In comparison, the public spending on the family benefits has 
shown a more persistent growth. The increase from the-2000s is noticeable. There have 
also been changes in the proportion of each area in the total public spending in Korea: 
the family-related expenditure has become increasingly important over the recent years 
while the proportions of other spendings such as health, survivors and incapacity-related 
benefits have largely remained unchanged or even diminished (refer to Appendix 6.4).  
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Figure 6.12: Public spending on the elderly and the family sectors in Korea as percentage 
of GDP (%) 
Note: Family sector spending is the government expenditure on family-related programmes in the form of 
cash, service and tax-breaks, but it excludes the spending on older people-related programmes. 
Source: Korea Statistics, Social welfare expenditure (each year) 
 
However, the state’s care commitment differs between children and older people. 
Although the size of the government’s financial contribution for the elderly sector is 
substantially larger than that for the family sector, it does not necessarily mean that the 
state assumes a bigger responsibility for the eldercare than for the childcare. If the 
subsidies to the pension programmes are excluded, the government’s contribution to 
funding the eldercare is much smaller. As highlighted earlier, the finance of the current 
eldercare system in Korea (the LTCI system) is mainly dependent on the family’s 
insurance contribution despite the public subsidies (J-W Kim and Choi, 2013). The 
entitlement screening is strict to control the coverage. Besides, it does not provide cash 
benefits (only with rare exceptions). In contrast, the family/children-related benefits are 
funded by tax and the entitlement has been largely universalised. Furthermore, the 
benefits come in more diverse forms (services, cash allowance and tax-breaks) and the 
level is more generous. One social care policy expert in an interview with the author for 
the current research explained the rationales behind these differences:  
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targets deserving social investment; however, older people are not productive 
population, so they were largely excluded from the social investment frame. 
(Interviewee E, 2 May 2015, emphasis added) 
 
In a similar vein, the former president Lee Myung-bak highlighted the importance 
of childcare when he pledged a full universalisation of childcare for children under the 
school age in the New Year Address by asserting that: 
 
Low fertility and ageing are a serious challenge to our future. Increasing the 
fertility will become a central task for the government, and I will commit myself to 
this effort. To alleviate the care burden of the family, I will expand the childcare 
support for children from birth to the age 5. Investment on childcare is not just a 
matter of welfare, but also an investment on the future and a tool to address a low 
fertility and an ageing society (KTV, 2012).  
 
His mentioning “investment on the future” reminds us of the idea of “a child-
centred social investment strategy” of Esping-Andersen (2002: 20) and Lister (2003: 
427)’s term “children as citizen-workers of the future”. In this regard, we may think the 
Korean welfare state is performing well in realising ‘intergenerational justice’42 (in fact, 
it was ranked as the top second only following Estonia among 29 OECD countries) 
(Vanhuysse, 2014: 12). However, a caution is required here. Despite the recent rapid 
increase, the absolute scale of the family benefits, not to mention the total public 
expenditure, is far from being a high level: the current spending of 1.14 per cent in GDP 
on family/children-related benefits does not even reach the half of the OECD average 
(refer to Appendix 6.5).  
When it comes to the delivery of care, the role of the market (private care 
providers) has remained most significant. Not only was it found extremely difficult to 
reverse the initial intuitional settings i.e., market-based care provision, but, as pointed 
out above, the Korean government also supported the idea of job creation through the 
expansion of social market in the care sector. As a result, for-profit individual 
institutions still far outnumber public ones both for childcare and eldercare. Some 
efforts have been made to increase the number of the public childcare facilities, but it 
was not the case for the eldercare provision. While acknowledging (and promoting) the 
market dominance in the care provision, the government, instead, has tried to regulate 
                                                         
42 The ‘intergenerational justice’ is an indicator to show the overall welfare conditions for children 
against those for older people (see also Schraad-Tischler and Azahaf (2013)) 
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the quality by introducing accreditation and certificate system for both facilities and 
care workers. Due to the high demand and the lower qualification requirement for 
eldercare workers, older and less-skilled care workers, including migrant care workers, 
are entering the eldercare facilities (refer to Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of the 
characteristics of eldercare workers). Despite the significant role of the market in care 
provision, it may be misleading to label the recent care reform as a purely 
‘marketisation’ since the government is extensively regulating care facilities and care 
workers.  
The critical question remaining is then how much of the care burden of families 
has been reduced. It seems clear that the recent care reform has contributed to making 
care responsibility shared beyond family boundary, i.e. ‘de-familialisation’. However, 
the degree to which care is de-familialised varies in the childcare and the eldercare. 
Families with young children now have options between home care and institutional 
care. The government is planning to supply more childcare facilities and diversify their 
operations to cater to the different time demand from working families (Government of 
Korea, 2010). On the contrary, families with the dependent elderly continue to have 
difficulty finding affordable alternative care resources when they fail the screening. The 
LTCI is currently covering less than 6 per cent of the total ageing population, and user 
fees added to the existing insurance contribution are a substantial financial burden for 
families when their service use, highly likely, is prolonged. 
 
 
6.5. Care Rebalancing on the Micro-level 
 
The care regime analysis on the micro-level investigates who actually performs the 
caring and attempts to find any elements in benefits and services encouraging (or 
discouraging) the redistribution of care responsibility among family members. The 
Confucian ideal of ‘filial piety’ has provided a strong sense of moral obligation for 
children’s care for their ageing parents and other family dependants (Pascall and Sung, 
2007; Won and Pascall, 2004 J-W Kim and Choi, 2013). Although gradually challenged 
over the recent decades, this normative imperative around care responsibility has been 
institutionalised as a form of ‘care by family members first’ principle in Korea. Even 
when the nuclear family becomes a prevalent form of household, some of the key social 
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protection programmes still presuppose the mutual care responsibility within the family, 
the public assistance benefit, for example (refer to the sub-section 6.2.1).  
It is important to see, however, that this traditional care culture has gendered 
implications. Women, as mothers, wives, daughters and daughters-in-law, are expected 
to perform more direct care activities for children and ageing parents (typically for in-
laws) (Sung, 2003; Sung and Pascall, 2014; Um, 2012; Won and Pascall, 2004). In 
contrast, men in Korea are often allowed to escape direct care-giving in exchange for 
providing material support (Peng, 2009). As highlighted earlier in the chapter, Korea’s 
social security system as well as the employment pattern has privileged male full-time 
workers, which, in turn, have reinforced this gendered division of care: women’s direct 
and men’s indirect and familial care obligations (S-H Lee, 2013; Peng, 2009). In this 
regard, the Korean welfare familialism is “deeply gendered” as much as “filial” (Peng, 
2009: 11). This part of the section examines how and to what extent the recent care 
reforms have attempted to dismantle this gendered structure of care division in Korea. 
 
 
6.5.1. Dual Burden on Women 
 
According to a government-funded large-scale survey research (refer to Table 6.11), 
mothers assume the largest care role for children when they are home regardless of 
children’s age or earning types while fathers are rarely involved in childcare in either 
case. For dual-earner families, grandparents on mother’s side (presumably, 
grandmothers) are also important care providers along with other informal care sources. 
In the case of eldercare, children (including sons/daughters-in-law) continue to assume 
the biggest personal care duty (Table 6.12). The data does not tell gender differences, 
but considering the care culture discussed above, daughters and daughters-in-law rather 
than sons and sons-in-law would make primary care givers for older people. While the 
disproportionately heavy care responsibility on the family as a unit has been challenged 
and (attempted to be) socialised, the imbalance in care work between genders (mothers 
and fathers, in particular) has remained largely unquestioned until very recently. 
Women’s care duties in home despite their increasing labour market participation are 
rendering them a ‘dual burden’. 
 
 173 
 
Table 6.11: Primary care givers for children who do not use formal institutional care 
services, 2010 (%) 
 
Children aged Earning type 
0-3 4-6 Singe-earner Dual-earner 
Case (n) 113 85 183 12 
Father 1.6 0.7 1.3 0.0 
Mother 76.9 86.9 84.9 40.1 
Grandparents(father side) 5.2 2.0 3.9 1.8 
Grandparents(mother side) 2.5 1.5 0.6 24.9 
Relatives 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 
Friends and neighbours 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 
Domestic worker 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Other informal 9.5 5.4 5.9 33.2 
None (alone) 3.8 1.6 2.3 0.0 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 
Source: Cho et al. (2010: 428) 
 
Table 6.12: Primary care givers for older people who are entitled to the LTCI care 
services, 2010 - 2013 (%) 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cases (n) 270,320 324,412 341,788 378,493 
Children (including 
sons/daughters-in-law) 
36.5 36.2 36.2 36.7 
Partners 23.8 23.5 23.1 22.7 
Other 12.9 14.1 15.2 16.1 
Nursing care workers 19.7 18.5 16.7 15.0 
None (alone) 3.4 3.9 5.0 5.5 
Relatives 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Friends and neighbours 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Grandchildren 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Parents 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 
Source: MOHW, LTCI statistics yearbook (each year) 
 
A deeply dualised labour market has contributed to forming the care imbalance 
between genders. As Figure 6.13 shows, the labour market participation rate of women 
aged between 20 and 60 has gradually increased, but women who are at typical caring 
ages (30 - 39) continued to exit from work, maintaining ‘M shape’ over the last 14 years. 
Men’s labour market participation, on the contrary, peaks at the age cohort 40 - 49 and 
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it remains high (90 per cent or above) until they reach the retirement age, making a huge 
gender gap in the employment pattern. The Korean government diagnosed this situation 
where women are compelled to leave work for care has resulted from “full-time based 
employment practice” and “disproportionately heavy care burden on women” 
(Government of Korea, 2010: 27). This has posed a serious challenge for the Korean 
government which wants to increase women’s economic participation and the fertility 
rate at the same time, which requires guaranteed ‘time for care’. This is the context in 
which the Korean government began to formally adopt ‘work-home reconciliation 
policies’.  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Gendered patterns of labour market participation rates by age in Korea (%) 
Source: Statistics Korea, Survey on the economic activities (each year) 
 
 
6.5.2. Work-home Reconciliation Policies 
 
The Korean government enacted the ‘Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-family 
Balance Assistance Act’ in 2007, replacing the previous ‘Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act’. The new law features various ‘leave programmes’ (reformed or 
newly introduced) as a key policy leverage to realise the reconciliation between work 
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and family life by redistributing the care time as well as care costs. There are currently 
three types of care-related leave programmes available in Korea: maternity/paternity 
leave, parental leave and family care leave. Maternity leave was the first 
paid/employment protected leave in Korea in 1953. At first it was for 60 days and then 
extended to 90 days from 2001. Employed women can now claim it before and after the 
birth for total 90 days. Salaries are paid at 100 per cent of the previous salary (the 
replacement rate) for the first 60 days, paid by the employer. The remainder is paid at 
100 per cent of earnings up to a ceiling of 1,350,000 KRW through the Employment 
Insurance. Fathers can have a much shorter leave, for three to five days, and only for 
three days they are paid.  
It was parental leave that has received a spotlight of the work-home harmonisation 
policies. So it has gone through several reforms. Parental leave was introduced in 1988, 
and it was then unpaid and only for women who have a child under age one. It became 
possible in 1995 for the father to claim a parental leave instead of the mother. It was not 
until 2001 that parental leave became paid as a means to alleviate care burden of the 
family: first 200,000 KRW per month (118 GBP) and subsequently increased to 400,000 
KRW from 2004 and 500,000 KRW from 2007. Currently, either mothers or fathers on a 
parental leave get paid 40 per cent of their previous standard income with the ceiling of 
1,000,000 KRW (minimum 500,000 KRW).43 The age restriction of a child for the 
parental leave entitlement has also been significantly relaxed: from under age 1 to age 3 
(2006), to age 6 (2010) and finally to age 8 as of 2014. 44  Combining 
maternity/paternity leave and parental leave, parents can claim 12 (fathers) to 15 
(mothers) month-long paid leave. 
As you see Figure 6.14, working parents are increasingly benefitting from parental 
leave. The percentage of mothers (with a child under age one) using parental leave was 
57.7 per cent in 2012 and 62.3 per cent in 2013.45 The number of fathers also has been 
rapidly increasing: male applicants account for about 4.5 per cent as of 2014 in the total 
parental leave claimants, more than doubled in less than five years. However, it 
confirms that there has been a huge gender gap in taking up the parental leave: in other 
                                                         
43 But 15 per cent of the total payment is to be paid only when they come back to the original workplace 
and continue to work there for another 6 months in order to provide an incentive for a return to work. 
44 Instead of taking a full leave, either parent use a shorted worktime scheme for a year.  
45 The earliest data available for an international comparison (see OECD, Child-related leave, 
http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm) 
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words, 95.5 per cent of the parental leave claimants are mothers. In order to further 
encourage fathers’ care sharing, the government introduced the so called ‘father’s month’ 
scheme in 2014. If a parental leave is transferred from one to another parent, the second 
user, usually a father, receive a financial incentive (the 100 per cent salary replacement 
with the ceiling of 1,500,000 KRW for the first month). Although it is not mandated to 
fathers, Korean fathers can have a longest and fairly generous parental leave by OECD 
a comparison (OECD, OECD Family database).46 Despite the recent rapid increase in 
cases and the additional incentive, the proportion of fathers on a parental leave is still 
numerically insignificant, less than two per cent in the total male workers having a child 
under 1 (refer to Appendix 6.6).  
 
 
Figure 6.14: Use of parental leaves in Korea (person, %) 
Source: e-National Index, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1504 
(accessed on 1 May 2015) 
 
Korea has developed a full package of leave programmes.47 The government has 
hoped that expansion of leave arrangement would not only prevent ‘career disruption’ of 
                                                         
46 See http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf 
47 In 2013, the Korean government also introduced ‘Family Care Leave’ to provide time to look after 
other family members regardless of age. A total of 90 days (can be used in split) of leave is guaranteed 
every year.  
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working mothers but also positively influence parents’ fertility decision (Government of 
Korea, 2005, 2010). So far, these policy goals are far from being accomplished. Despite 
the improvement in the take-up rate, not all workers can make the full use of leave 
arrangement. According to a survey by the Ministry of Employment in 2013, most 
common reasons for not using parental leaves are firstly ‘specific work commitment’ 
(50.8 per cent), secondly ‘difficulty finding a substitute’ (18.6 per cent), and thirdly 
‘ small staff size’ (13.6 per cent).48 So, availability of leave programmes is largely 
dependent on the applicant’s labour market status (the type of a job and company). 
Employees in the public sector and large companies which have more capacity to 
rearrange job duties or provide substitutes are more likely to be in a position to fully 
utilise leave programmes. To most full-time based workers in small and medium sized 
companies, taking a leave can be a very challenging decision for both their careers and 
the companies.  
 
 
6.5.3. Reform Trajectories in the Micro-level 
 
The recent care reform has engaged in redistributing care responsibility between family 
members through a policy frame of work-home harmonisation (Government of Korea, 
2010). Various types of leave arrangement have been reformed or introduced as main 
policy instruments to rebalance care responsibility between family members, between 
mothers and fathers in particular. However, their effectiveness has so far been limited. 
For one thing, the number of fathers who actually use leave programmes is far smaller 
than mothers, although the entitlement for leave has become largely gender-neutral. The 
reasons behind are manifold. First of all, care culture is still discouraging for men to 
become a primary care giver for children. In addition, it is not easy for men to choose to 
care instead of female partners in the dualised Korean labour market where male 
workers tend to earn more and have a better job security. Male breadwinners’ exit from 
the labour market for an extended period of time may jeopardise their career and 
ultimately the family’s livelihood. The partner’s leave programme, ‘father’s month’, is 
                                                         
48 Source: e-National Index, 
http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd= 
3030&stts_cd=303002&clas_div=&idx_sys_cd=852&idx_clas_cd=1 (accessed on 1 May 2015) 
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regarded a viable care option only for employees in the public sector and a few large 
companies.  
Consequently, women’s dual burden remains largely unchanged. The national 
survey on the time use conducted every five years49 shows that despite the recent 
government effort the gender gap in the care time use persists (Figure 6.15): women are 
assuming much of the care/domestic work regardless of their employment status. It 
seems apparent that the expansion of social care provision including leaves does not 
necessarily lead to an equal redistribution of care in the household level. From a legal 
perspective, the idea of work-home reconciliation is institutionalised as a means to 
promote ‘gender equality’ in Korea. However, on the actual policy level, work-home 
reconciliation is treated as a concept only for women. As a matter of fact, the Ministry 
of Employment, the main governance body for the work-home reconciliation policy, 
categorises the work-home harmonisation policy as one of the women-specific 
programmes.50 The goal of the work-home harmonisation policy is to make sure that 
women remain in and return to the labour market after performing care work when 
necessary. In other words, care policies are instruments to support women to become 
‘citizen the worker’ over the life-course (see Lewis, 2001). Drawing on Fraser (1994), I 
can argue that the Korean welfare state has attempted to get rid of some barriers to help 
women combine paid-work (or ‘breadwinning’) and care-giving, but it has not been 
equally keen on encouraging men to perform both on the same conditions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                         
49 The 2014 results are not available yet.   
50 MOEL website, http://www.moel.go.kr/view_policy.jsp?cate=7&sec=8&smenu=2 
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Figure 6.15: Time used for care/domestic work per day by gender and earning type, 2004 
and 2009 (minutes) 
Note: Survey on married couples aged between 20 and 60.  
Single earner households are the cases in which only husbands are employed.  
The figure includes time used for domestic work (cooking, cleaning, etc.) and care work for family 
members.  
Source: Statistics Korea, Time use survey (each year) 
 
 
6.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The Korean welfare state has made a significant progress over the last several decades 
through policy expansions and reforms. Social insurance programmes have been 
substantially expanded in coverage and the public assistance programme was redesigned 
to effectively serve as a basic social safety net. The social service care also started to 
develop rapidly. Korea seems to have been similarly experiencing a new social risk of 
contemporary western welfare states, care deficit, which has resulted from the ageing 
population, increasing women’s labour market participation and changing norms 
regarding care provision (Bonoli, 2007; Taylor-Gooby, 2004).  
The recent policy efforts have been centred on reforming three areas of policies - 
childcare, eldercare and work-home reconciliation, which have affected the way in 
which care responsibility/cost is divided on both the macro-level and the micro-level. 
Korea’s traditional care regime associated with strong familialism and women’s 
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uncommodified care labour began to change. It is evident that the care mix in Korea has 
become more complex as the state is assuming more responsibility in financing, 
providing and regulating care, and the roles of market and family have changed 
accordingly. Nevertheless, the direction and outcomes of such changes have not always 
been straightforward or coherent. How and to what degree have the recent care reform 
altered existing, both highly familiarised and feminised, patterns of the division of care? 
The Korean government intends to de-familialise care by primarily expanding 
institutional care for children and older people. Cash benefits which tend to promote 
familial/home care are small (for childcare) or exceptionalised (for eldercare). Some 
families, however, have difficulty finding an available care facility due to the 
insufficient supply or poor quality. Heavy reliance on private care facilities has 
increased a chance of additional financial burden for families. Families with older 
people in need of care have more trouble finding affordable pubic care provision due to 
stringent screening and high user charge in LTCI, let alone insurance contribution. So 
the role of the family is still critical in eldercare both as a financer and as a direct care 
giver. In short, Korean care reform makes a case that care policies generate de-
familialisation and re-familialisation of care at the same time (see Leitner, 2003). Then, 
how far has care been defeminised in the household level? The government has intended 
to relieve women’s care burden, but not necessarily to equalise it with men, although 
care has been framed a part of the ‘gender equality’ agenda. Consequently, no signs of 
meaningful change have been found in care rebalancing between genders. The 
government expanded paid leave programmes, including a father-specific leave, but 
they have been disproportionally taken up by mothers and it is not readily available to 
all workers due to different employment status. So far, care reforms in Korea may have 
been successful in helping with families in general, but they have not been so beneficial 
for women in specific (Peng, 2011a).  
Currently, care reform affects different groups in a different way. Families with 
children can enjoy wider social care provision than ones with older people. Mothers’ 
reconciliation between care and paid-work, rather than fathers’, has been the primary 
policy goal of the work-home reconciliation policy, notably leave programme. These 
mixed results of the care reform reflect the government’s mixed, thus sometimes 
confusing, approaches to providing social care (Peng, 2011a). Greater state commitment 
to care provision and enhanced gender equality have been implicated in care reform, but 
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pragmatic and instrumental considerations have also played their parts. Socialising care, 
from the state’s point of view, can help achieve various economic objectives such as 
utilising inactive female labour force and creating new jobs in the social service market. 
Most importantly, however, the recent care reform in Korea is fundamentally an 
instrument for raising the fertility rate; in other words, it aims primarily at solving 
demographic crisis rather than care crisis per se. Care reform, therefore, needs to be 
understood as complex intersections of several key policy issues simultaneously such as 
low fertility, gender equality and economic growth. Such considerations are clearly 
mirrored in the design of the care reform. 
My examination of the Korean care regime here has shed new light also on 
understanding of the Korean welfare state regime. Korean care reforms from the early 
2000s have been initiated by the state itself as intentional and precautionary measures in 
order to prevent negative repercussions of the demographic transition and help keep 
vitalising the economy through social policies. In this regard, the increasing 
socialisation of care does not necessarily mean the Korean welfare state has fully 
broken from the developmental legacy. At the same time, a rapid socialisation of 
childcare and a promotion of the social market have been informed by social investment 
ideals. Encouragement of women’s labour market participation through work-home 
reconciliation policy is a typical productivist agenda. Above all, the most defining 
feature of Korea's care reform is that very pragmatic policy discourses are constantly 
recurring, one of which is that the government firmly believes they not only ‘should’ 
but also ‘can’ control people’s production/reproduction behaviours through public (care) 
policies as is in the interest of the nation.  
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERSECTIONS OF THE MIGRATION REGIME AND THE 
CARE REGIME IN KOREA 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In preceding chapters, I have examined the development and characteristics of both the 
migration regime and the care regime in Korea. The current chapter investigates how 
those two seemingly separate domains of policies are interconnected. More specifically, 
I analyse how migrants are engaged in varied types of care work at the intersections of 
those policies. As suggested in Chapter 1 and 2, work of care is defined as (social) 
reproductive labour for the research. I aim to demonstrate how the Korean government 
has attempted to address Korea's care crisis by mobilising migrants’ reproductive labour 
in various settings and the social reproduction of humans through a combination of 
policy instruments. 
Migrants’ social reproductive activities in Korea are configured at the intersections 
of the migration regime and the care regime including the care worker employment 
regime. Two categories of migrants, co-ethnic (labour) migrants and marriage migrants 
emerge pertinent to the function of social reproduction under the Korean migration 
regime. Co-ethnic migrants are the only group of migrant workers who have access to 
service jobs, some of which are directly related to what we can consider as care jobs 
here.51 In addition, marriage migrants are selected here since they take a different route 
of migration, i.e. family migration, into Korea, and their reproductive roles are different 
but as equally significant as those of the co-ethnic labour migrants. Social reproductive 
roles of those migrants are patterned across different domains of care. The roles 
typically involve the provision of care for children, older people (and other dependants), 
and, equally importantly, other types of reproductive works such as general 
                                                         
51 As examined in Chapter 5, there are two types of co-ethnic labour migrants in Korea: unskilled 
circulatory labour migrants (H-2 visa holders) and semi- or skilled labour migrant workers (F-4 visa 
holders). It is important to be aware of the difference between them throughout the chapter although my 
focus lies on the former group of co-ethnic migrants. 
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house/maintenance works and biological reproduction if we broadly define the concept 
of care (also refer to Chapter 2).  
Based on the findings from preceding chapters on the migration regime (Chapter 5) 
and the care regime (Chapter 6), two types of intersections can be identified between the 
migration regime and the care regime, as presented in Table 7.1. Some of migrants’ 
social reproductive roles are distinctive at each area of care, for example when they 
exclusively look after either young children (childcare) or the aged (eldercare). For 
organisational purposes, I have simply divided the roles of migrants into childcare and 
eldercare. Reality, however, can be more complex. Borders between the care domains 
can easily be blurred (indicated as dotted lines in the table) and migrants can sometimes 
perform various tasks of care, especially when they work in private homes or work for 
individuals. In addition, it should be reminded that the biological reproduction of 
humans (and their socialisation) must be viewed as one of the care roles (marriage) 
migrants assume in Korea, which I posit it in the category of childcare. Drawing on this 
analytical frame, the rest of the chapter closely examines each intersection in turn: co-
ethnic migrant workers in paid care work (Section 7.2) and marriage migrants in unpaid 
care work (Section 7.3), followed by a concluding discussion (Section 7.4).  
 
Table 7.1: Intersections between the migration regime and the care regime in Korea 
 
Migration Regimes 
Labour Migration 
(Co-ethnic Migrants) 
Family Migration 
(Marriage Migrants) 
C
are R
eg
im
es 
Childcare 
▪ Domestic workers (‘Gasadowoomi’) 
▪ Nannies (‘Yoogadowoomi’) 
▪ Roles as wives and mothers  
Eldercare 
▪ Eldercare workers (‘Ganbyeongin’ 
and ‘Yoyangbohosa’) 
▪ Roles as daughters-in-law 
  
 
Intersection 1: Co-ethnic Migrants in 
Paid Care Work 
 
Intersection 2: Marriage 
Migrants in Unpaid Care Work 
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7.2. Intersection 1: Co-ethnic Migrant Workers in Paid Care Work 
 
The first intersection is established between co-ethnic (labour) migration and care. This 
takes a form of paid care work by co-ethnic migrants in both homes and institutions. 
The types of care work they provide can be both childcare as nannies (‘Yoogadowoomi’) 
and eldercare as eldercare workers (‘Ganbyeongin’ and ‘Yoyangbohosa’). Domestic 
workers (‘Gasadowoomi’) are considered here as a type of care workers performing an 
essential reproductive function in homes. Although I examine them in the childcare 
context, domestic workers can also be engaged with eldercare and other types of care 
activities.  
 
 
7.2.1. Employment Regime of Co-ethnic Migrants in the Service Sector 
 
Before examining the way in which co-ethnic migrants are engaged in various types of 
care jobs in detail, it is necessary to comprehend the employment regime of migrant 
workers in the service sector in general. Care-related jobs such as domestic workers, 
nannies and care workers are defined as ‘unskilled service jobs’ by the labour migrant 
(employment) policies in Korea. Migrants’ access to unskilled service jobs in Korea is 
made exclusively available to co-ethnic migrant workers.52 The majority of them are 
Korean Chinese who have obtained typically an H-2 visa through the Working Visit 
Programme (WVP), or few have F-4 visas (refer to Chapter 5 for the visa specification).  
At first, migrant workers, including co-ethnic migrant workers had been 
completely prohibited from entering the service sector until 2002. Nevertheless, it was 
speculated that a substantial number of migrants (as the undocumented then) were 
already employed in the service sector.53 Recognising the increasing demand for 
migrant workers in the service sector, the Korean government introduced a special 
labour migration programme specifically targeted at co-ethnic migrants, called the 
Employment Management System (EMS), in December 2002. The EMS extended 
                                                         
52 Some family migrants including marriage migrants are also allowed to work in the low-skilled service 
sector, but this section focuses on labour migrants. 
53 According to a survey, “among 260,000 foreign residents without a proper document in Korea who 
reported their residency between March and May 2002, 21 per cent of them (54,000) were employed in 
the service sector, and about 10,000 of (female) migrants were working as domestic workers.” (H-K Lee, 
2004 cited in Um, 2012: 98) 
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employment opportunities for co-ethnic migrant workers to the service sector, together 
with manufacturing and construction industries. Korea came to open an official channel 
for unskilled migrant workers to be employed in the service sector for the first time. The 
Working Visit Programme (WVP) has replaced the EMS since 2004 along with the 
launch of the Employment Permit System (EPS). The government limited the applicable 
jobs, but it has gradually expanded the list from just 6 job categories54 in 2004 to 29 in 
2010, including private care work and domestic work (refer to Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: List of service jobs open to co-ethnic migrants under the WVP in Korea 
Category Business examples 
Hospitality Hotels, inns or restaurants 
Sales Sales of goods, produce or livestock 
Disposal and Recycling Disposal of refuse or recycling of material 
Transportation Warehousing or distribution (on land) 
Publishing Publishing of books, magazines or others 
Maintenance and Support Building maintenance or cleaning 
Tourism Tour agencies 
Repair Repair of cars and motorcycles 
Personal Service Bathing and laundry service 
Social (welfare) Service Care work (in institutions) 
Domestic employment Domestic workers or nannies (in home) 
Source: Summarised from MOJ (2013: 35-9) 
 
The Korean government has not only expanded the range of permitted jobs but it 
also eased regulations on co-ethnic migrants’ employment activities so that they could 
freely find and change workplaces, which is not permitted in the case of other general 
unskilled migrant workers. In addition, the government gave up the sectoral allocation 
of co-ethnic migrants in 2010. While the government imposes a limit on the total 
number (stock) of co-ethnic migrants, currently 303,000, their employment has become 
entirely subject to market mechanisms. Under the current WVP system, companies in 
the listed sector can hire up to ten co-ethnic migrant workers according to their business 
(staff) size. One of the most significant developments in the Korean labour migration 
regime is that families also can legally employ migrant care workers for 
                                                         
54 They were restaurant, building maintenance, business support, social service, cleaning and others (Seol, 
2007). 
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domestic/personal care through the special co-ethnic labour migration programmes 
since 2002. Under the current WVP system, families can hire one migrant care worker 
either when they are dual-earner families or lone parents with children, or when they 
have other dependants who need personal care such as the sick, the disabled or older 
people with limited mobility (Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3: Family-employer qualification to hire migrant care workers in Korea 
Job category Family-employer specifications 
Domestic workers or 
nannies 
▪ Dual-working parents or lone parents having one or more 
children regardless of age, or 
▪ Family having long-term (6 months or longer) patients or the 
disabled 
Private nursing (or similar 
service) workers  
▪ Family having members with limited mobility including the 
disabled and older people having dementia, or 
▪ Family having member(s) aged 80 or over 
Source: S Choi et al. (2013: 3) 
 
It is extremely difficult to figure out precisely what proportion co-ethnic migrant 
workers are working for each category of service job. The difficulty originates, in part, 
from the nature of their employment regime in the service sector. Co-ethnic migrant 
workers tend to work for small service businesses or private homes often without formal 
contracts. They are also subject to more frequent changes of workplaces and in many 
cases they do not report to the government. Consequently, their employment record 
cannot be effectively collected, or it becomes easily outdated. According to a recent 
government-commissioned large scale survey, 23.4 per cent of co-ethnic migrant 
workers are currently (or until recently) working for the service sector (refer to Table 
7.4) (Chung et al., 2013a). We need to be aware that there is a possibility that the 
service sector is underrepresented here since the survey samples are collected through 
the list of enterprises, which excludes the employment by individuals and families. In 
fact, the service sector occupied much higher proportion in other studies: 57.5 per cent 
(J-y Lee et al., 2008) and 55.9 per cent (Gwak, 2012). 
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Table 7.4: Co-ethnic migrant workers by industry in Korea, 2012 (%) 
Industry Total Male Female 
Manufacturing 72.9 84.0 54.8 
Agriculture incl. livestock 0.7 1.2 0.0 
Construction 2.8 4.2 0.6 
Services 23.4 10.7 44.6 
Total 100 100 100 
Note: Total n=987 
Source: Adapted from Chung et al. (2013a: 333) 
 
The service sector comprises a vast variety of jobs (refer back to Table 7.2). 
Obtaining statistical data on care jobs (domestic workers, nannies and other care 
workers) has additional barriers. Care jobs often do not receive a separate occupational 
recognition in the employment statistics, falling in the category of ‘other’. In other cases, 
different types of care jobs are often grouped together, making it impossible for 
researchers to figure out exact break-downs. A small number of studies provide 
relatively detailed occupational distribution of co-ethnic migrant workers in the service 
sector. However, the results are mixed with significant similarities and differences. To 
illustrate, I present two studies published at the similar time point (2008 and 2010) on 
co-ethnic migrants’ labour market participation patterns (refer to Table 7.5). Different 
groups of researchers carried out the researches adopting different methods. 
Understandably, the two studies produced very different results. The first noticeable 
difference between two studies is about the proportions of agricultural industry. The 
study of J-y Lee et al. (2008) was carried out in a major city (Seoul) so there were no 
migrant workers found working in agriculture. There are also differences in the 
domestic/care-related jobs. The proportion of those industries are much smaller in 
Chung et al. (2010)’s study because their sampling method excluded individual or 
family employers. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect higher proportion of private care 
workers.  
There are, however, some significant similarities to be found between the studies. 
To begin with, both studies similarly indicate that a large number of co-ethnic migrant 
workers are hired in manufacturing and construction industries as in the case of general 
unskilled migrant workers. For the service sector jobs, co-ethnic migrants are 
concentrated on restaurant jobs, domestic work and care jobs. In addition, both studies 
clearly show the highly gendered employment structure. Males are overrepresented in 
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manufacturing but limited in the service jobs (only moderately significant in restaurant 
business). In contrast, female migrants are concentrated in restaurant, domestic and 
other care jobs.  
 
Table 7.5: Co-ethnic migrant workers by occupation in Korea (%) 
 Occupation 
J-y Lee et al. (2008), Total n=991 Chung et al. (2010), Total n=987 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Manufacturing 
worker 
14.2 23.7 4.5 66.2 80.1 40.9 
Agricultural 
worker 
n/a n/a n/a 1.8 2.4 0.9 
Construction 
worker 
28.2 54.4 1.2 6.1 8.8 1.1 
Restaurant staff 27.4 7.4 48.1 18.6 3.3 46.6 
Domestic worker 
and Nanny 
10.2 0.0 20.7 2.2 0.0 6.3 
Care or nursing 
worker 
4.8 0.8 9.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 
Other service 
worker 
4.0 0.8 8.6 1.1 0.9 1.4 
Sales person 
11.1 12.9 8.0 
0.4 0.3 0.6 
Office worker 0.4 0.3 0.6 
Other 2.9 4.0 1.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Compiled from J-y Lee et al. (2008) and Chung et al. (2010) 
 
 
7.2.2. Co-ethnic Migrants in Childcare 
 
Migrant care workers in home-based childcare 
 
The way in which co-ethnic migrant workers engage in childcare is primarily to work as 
domestic workers via either commuting or living-in. Families can hire migrants 
specifically for childcare (nannies), but it is less frequent. No quantified data exist to 
show how many co-ethnic migrant workers work as domestic workers or nannies. It is 
mandatory for co-ethnic migrant workers to report to the labour office within 14 days 
when they begin to work. But the overall report rate is less than 50 per cent across 
industries, and the rate of workers in the service sector tends to be lower, presumably 
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less than ten per cent. As of 2012, 3,471 co-ethnic migrant workers reported to begin 
work as domestic workers or nannies. So, researchers simply speculate that the number 
now between several thousands and tens of thousands (S Choi et al., 2013; Y-k Choi, 
2014).  
In the global north, families have been increasingly relying on paid care workers to 
provide care for children and older people, and migrants have become main providers 
instead of native-born workers (Kilkey et al., 2010; Lutz, 2002, 2008b Anderson and 
Shutes, 2014). As reviewed in Chapter 2, researchers have shown that the employment 
of migrant workers for domestic and care work reflects the interconnection between 
policies and social changes happening at the household, national, international and 
global level (Williams, 2012; Williams and Gavanas, 2005). From the destination 
countries’ perspective, women’s increasing labour market participation and the resultant 
care deficit which is not alternatively addressed due to the asymmetrical distribution of 
care responsibility across genders in the household level and the ‘retrenchment’ of the 
welfare state have been suggested as most important contexts behind the migrantisation 
of domestic/care work (Anderson, 2014; Kilkey, 2010b; Lister et al., 2007; Williams, 
2014; Williams and Gavanas, 2008; Zhou, 2013).  
Growth in paid domestic work in Korea is situated in the both similar and different 
contexts. As of 2014, 116,000 are employed on a home-based work as domestic 
workers or nannies (Statistics Korea, 2015a).55 It can be estimated a similar number of 
households purchase home-based care services in one form or another although the 
exact data is simply not available. Such practices once were thought to be exclusive to 
rich families, but they have become widespread among dual-earner families. Many 
Korean families are adopting the ‘adult worker model’; however, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the division of care work, including house chores, between genders has not 
been equalised. So, the need for buying-in extra care source can be essential for working 
mothers who have to juggle between multiple responsibilities. An interesting difference 
from the western experiences is that growing reliance on migrant care workers is 
happening in parallel with the social care expansion as examined in Chapter 6. 
Although public childcare service has recently been substantially expanded, institutional 
childcare does not always fit the parents’ working schedules. Besides, parents of very 
young children prefer home-based personal care for safety and development reasons: 
                                                         
55 The figure includes ‘any other unclassified jobs’. No further breakdowns by job are available.  
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94.6 per cent of parents with a child under one year expressed a preference for home-
based care, and 81.5 per cent among those with a child between one and two years (M-
w Lee et al., 2012). Employing native-born domestic workers or nannies, however, has 
become increasingly difficult and costly because native-born workers tend to avoid 
these jobs due to poor economic return compared to work intensity and limited social 
rights attached to such jobs like other care jobs (J Yoon et al., 2011). So the market 
system alone would not sufficiently provide home-based domestic workers or nannies.  
The Korean government has responded to the growing demand for home-based 
childcare service in two ways. Firstly, it launched a government-run domestic 
worker/nanny provision system.56 The government began to directly recruit, (re)train 
and provide home-based childcare workers, called ‘aidolbomi’ in Korean. After a long 
piloting stage from 2007, the programme became fully operational from 2012 when the 
‘Aidolbom [Childcare] Support Act’ was enacted. ‘Aidolbomi’, literally means ‘persons 
who taking care of children’, is a lower-skilled care profession distinguished from the 
existing childcare workers working for childcare centres and kindergartens.57 Any 
parents of children under age 12 can purchase this service hourly (two to six hours) or 
full day (six hours or more), but the priority is given to working parent(s) rather than 
poor families. Households whose income level is below the national average can receive 
government subsidy from 25 to 75 per cent of the total fee according to their income 
level. Those household above the income threshold can use the service at 100 per cent 
user charge.  
The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), the governing body, says 
that this programme has been introduced to serve three purposes: to enhance the welfare 
of children, to support parents’ work-home reconciliation, and to create jobs for middle-
aged women in career disruption.58 Accommodating ‘varying types of care preference’, 
the Ministry said, an important motivation to implement this programme, such as 
parents working non-traditional hours or those who prefer personal care for their very 
young children aged under two. Although only in the early stage, the popularity of this 
new programme has been growing due to its flexibility and expected quality (since it is 
government-run). However, the financial burden on the family remain largely the same 
                                                         
56 However, this programme does not replace the market but complements it.  
57 Note that this study keeps the term ‘aidolbomi’ to distinguish them from institutional childcare 
workers.  
58 MOGEF, https://idolbom.mogef.go.kr/EgovPageLink.do 
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since most middle-income families get no government subsidy. The challenge for the 
provider (the government) is the stable supply of appropriate care workers. The 
programme has had difficulty recruiting candidates from the native-born workforce and 
has suffered from high staff turn-over mainly due to low pay. According to a recent 
survey, many ‘aidolbomi’ expressed the view that payment does not reach their 
expectations (Y-k Choi, 2014: 74). In addition, there is a mismatch issue: ‘aidolbomi’ in 
most cases only provides childcare.59 Families wanting living-in domestic workers 
have to turn to migrant domestic workers.  
As Table 7.6 shows below, affordability is the most frequent reason to hire migrant 
domestic workers (49 per cent). While the scarcity of the native-born domestic workers 
is the third most important reason, the patterns of care work that they can provide are 
also crucial such as possibility of au pair and willingness to assume multiple roles. As 
indicated above (Table 7.3), the WVP regulations demand that migrant care workers be 
hired only for a care purpose; however, almost all migrant domestic workers undertake 
various housework tasks such as cooking and cleaning along with childcaring (refer to 
Appendix 7.1). This explains why it is rare to hire migrant workers solely as ‘nannies’ 
in Korea. Researchers have found that it is not easy to determine what constitutes 
‘domestic work’ and how it is different from ‘care work’ (Kilkey, 2010b; Kilkey and 
Perrons, 2010). If domestic workers live in as ‘one of the family’, it becomes 
particularly challenging to maintain the boundary between different roles (Lan, 2003). 
Despite the extra workload, the living-in option also suits migrant care workers since 
many co-ethnic migrant workers are typically middle-aged Chinese Koreans and they 
often migrate alone for family and financial reasons, so they need an accommodation 
and work at the same time (S Choi et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
59 In 2014, the government added a so called ‘comprehensive service’ option which provides both 
childcare and domestic work only on a part-time base. 
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Table 7.6: Primary reasons to hire migrant domestic workers in Korea 
Primary reason Percentage 
Relatively cheaper 49.0 
Possible to live in together (au pair) 22.8 
Difficult to find native-born workers 13.5 
Willing to do housework in addition to childcare 8.1 
Attentive to children 2.7 
Feeling comfortable to supervise 1.9 
Suitable for the specific needs of the family 1.5 
Other 0.4 
Total 100 
Note: Total n=259 
Source: Y-k Choi (2014: 264) 
 
As a second solution to the increasing demand for home-based childcare service, 
the Korean government has taken some measures to further stimulate the supply of 
migrant childcare workers. Firstly, as mentioned above, the government permitted 
unskilled co-ethnic migrant workers (H-2 visa holders) to work as care workers in 
homes. Besides, entry to care jobs has been extended to even semi-/skilled co-ethnic 
migrant workers (F-4 visa holders) since 2010, which their access to other types of 
unskilled occupations is still restricted (Donga Ilbo, 2010). To further encourage the 
supply, the government decided to provide additional incentive to co-ethnic migrants in 
the same year: when they continue to work as domestic workers, nannies and 
nursing/care workers (in home or facility) for the same employer over a year, they were 
given a chance to ‘upgrade’ their visa (from H-2 to F-4), which guarantees longer 
(possibly permanent) stay and enhanced social rights. Becoming domestic/care workers 
became one of few routes to lead to a long-term employment and residency for co-
ethnic migrant workers (refer to Chapter 5). However, this ‘upgrade card’ was discarded 
later in 2011 on the ground that this programme may cause co-ethnic migrant workers 
to compete for the same jobs with native-born care workers (Gwak, 2012). Knowing 
that families currently hiring migrant domestic workers or nannies demand a stable 
(long-term) employment, the government revived this scheme only for childcare 
workers (nannies) from 2013 when it started a migrant nanny training programme. So 
now co-ethnic migrant nannies can apply for a F-4 visa when they have worked for the 
same employer for two years after completing the training programme.  
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Due to an expanded employment opportunity and an incentive for co-ethnic 
migrant workers, the Korean society has witnessed a rapid growth in the migrant care 
worker market over the last decade. While the government officialised co-ethnic 
migrant workers’ employment in the home-based childcare, employment practices 
remained entirely marketised: parent employers have to recruit them either through 
personal introduction or private agencies. No qualification control was put in place for 
migrant domestic workers or nannies working in homes. As their numbers are 
increasing, cases of crime and child abuse started to be reported and concerned parents 
asked for the government-level intervention often through a coalition with civil society 
groups and media (Baby News, 2012). 
To deal with it, the government launched an official training programme 
specifically for migrant nannies in May 2013.60 The programme is administered by a 
quasi-governmental corporation, Korea Immigration Service Foundation (KISF), under 
the auspice of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the immigration bureau of Korea. The 
programme runs for 40 hours, on Sundays for five weeks. The students (migrant 
workers) are responsible to pay the full fee of 250,000 KRW (equivalent to 150 GBP). 
The curriculum consists of ten subjects, whose topics cover child development, child 
safety, playing with children, roles of childcare workers, the Korean childcare culture as 
well as relevant immigration regulations for them. 61  Despite the brevity of the 
programme, the introduction of a migrant nanny training programme is a significant 
move in that the migrant nanny began to be officially recognised as a type of childcare 
worker, and in that it meant the first qualification control of migrant childcare workers 
in Korea. An employee from KISF emphasised the significance of this training scheme 
in a media interview: 
 
Migrants used to work as nannies without clear legal foundations or training and 
this nanny training programme can educate and provide qualified migrant nannies 
so that they take care of children based on a mutual trust with hiring parents 
(Yonhap News, 2014a)  
 
                                                         
60 Other than co-ethnic migrants (both H-2 and F-4 visa holders), migrants with permanent residency (F-
2 and F-5 visa holders) and marriage migrants (F-6) can also register for the training programme. 
61 KISF, http://www.kisfbs.com/edu/01.php 
 195 
 
KISF is also running its own migrant nanny job shop through which trained 
migrant nannies are advertised, and potential (parent) employers review the information 
on training, health and criminal records of migrant nannies. Migrant care workers can 
find a job through other routes (agencies or job shops), but the KISF job shop 
guarantees the identity, criminal record clearance and training. The government made 
this programme a prerequisite for the aforementioned ‘visa upgrade’ of co-ethnic 
migrant nannies.  
 
Migrant care workers in institutional childcare 
Unlike the case in the home-based childcare, co-ethnic migrants’ involvement in 
institutional childcare is extremely limited. It is closely related to the employment 
regime of care workers, as a part of the care regime, in Korea. Compared to domiciliary 
childcare workers, childcare workers in institutions require a high level of training and 
proficiency. As examined in Chapter 6, there are two types of childcare institutions: 
childcare centre and kindergarten. It is typically required that two year-long university 
level or equivalent education and field practice to become childcare workers in 
childcare centre and four year-long university level or equivalent training is required for 
care workers in kindergartens. Childcare workers to be hired in government-operating 
institutions are often expected to have competitive qualifications and longer experience.  
In Korea both types of childcare workers are legally and socially acknowledged as 
‘teachers’ and are held respectful by parents at a similar level to school teachers. 
Although work is demanding and the pay level is not so high, institutional childcare 
workers are highly sought-after positions in the Korean labour market, especially 
among female graduates with relevant degrees. Kindergarten teachers tend to work in 
better working conditions, so job opportunities in kindergartens are ever more 
competitive even among native-born workers. The high level of the professionalisation 
of care workers has made it virtually impossible for migrants to access jobs in 
institutional childcare. The Korean government continues to emphasise the 
enhancement of the quality of institutional childcare workers throughout the recent care 
reforms so the (unskilled) co-ethnic migrant workers’ engagement in the institutional 
childcare is likely to remain discouraged.  
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Degree of migrantisation of childcare 
The policy measures examined above have aimed to facilitate the supply of home-based 
migrant childcare workers who may fill the gap not fully addressed by native-born 
domestic/care workers alone. It should be reminded that the Korean government has 
given a universal cash benefit for households with children aged 0 to 5 to subsidise 
home-based childcare costs from 2009. The combination of the legalisation of migrant 
childcare workers and the introduction of a cash subsidy for the home-based childcare 
seems to be a perfect formula to stimulate a phenomenon called ‘migrantisation of 
childcare’ in Korea’s highly marketised care worker employment regime. However, the 
degree to which childcare is migrantised has been limited to the home-based care setting 
due to several reasons. First of all, the level of cash benefit is too low to hire domestic 
childcare workers and there is no other government support for outsourcing childcare, 
e.g. tax benefit in Korea. So, if possible, utilising universal (and almost free) 
institutional childcare can be a more reasonable choice for most families rather than 
buying-in childcare at homes on their own expense.  
Secondly, the migration regime effectively limits the expansion of the migrant 
domestic workers or nanny market. Protecting the native-born workers’ employment 
opportunity has been a strong rationale. Under the current migration regime, only co-
ethnic migrant workers (most importantly, H-2 visa holders) can work as care workers, 
they alone would not fully accommodate the demand for migrant domestic workers and 
nannies considering the total admission quota. The actual relevant labour pool can be 
much smaller by the fact that virtually all migrant domestic worker and nannies are 
females in a certain age cohort (30s to 50s) with previous childcare experience (Y-k 
Choi, 2014).  
Thirdly, the quality issue keeps reoccurring. Some malpractice cases by migrant 
nannies such as ID fraud, abuse and abduction have been reported. The recent 
government effort to control quality and reliability by introducing a training programme 
does not seem to fully recover parents’ confidence toward hiring migrant domestic 
workers and nannies. Given that most families wanting to hire migrant care workers 
prefer the living-in type, we can see why the quality-related issues play a big part. 
Besides, the KISF official nanny job shop does not seem to have been active: from 
January 2014 to now, only 25 migrant applicants and 18 family customers are 
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advertised.62 For these reasons, migrant care workers tend to be considered just as the 
second best. A preference to native-born childcare workers is not new but migrant 
nannies have been often hired because they cost less and they are simply available. 
However, the lack of supply has driven up the cost of hiring migrant care workers as 
well, almost reaching the level of the native-born care workers. Congressman Geum-
Rae Kim reported to the government in 2010 that hiring ‘joseonjok’ (Chinese-Korean) 
nannies had been increasingly expensive over the recent years: 1,100,000 KRW per 
month in 2008, 1,300,000 KRW in 2009 and 1,400,000 KRW to 1,500,000 KRW in 
2010, and he also maintained that they attempted to increase their salary level through 
collusion (Yonhap News, 2010). The increase can have a significant impact on the 
migrant care workers’ competitive edge against government-provided ‘aidolbomi’.  
Lastly, as we have seen above, the government has been attempting to make the 
domestic/childcare jobs, the social service market in general, as a way to increase the 
labour market participation of native-born middle-aged women. The government started 
this programme only to provide ‘childcare’ but now the service includes ‘domestic work’ 
as well. Consequently, in order to remain competitive, migrant domestic workers and 
nannies are forced either to work long as au pair, or to consider finding other types of 
care jobs which are less regulated but in more demanding working conditions such as 
eldercare.  
 
 
7.2.3. Co-ethnic Migrants in Eldercare 
 
Migrant care workers in private eldercare  
Over the recent decades, taking care of older people is becoming a huge challenge for 
the working family especially when they cannot take care of themselves due to health 
reasons. They need somebody to provide essential personal care whether they are at 
home, in a nursing home or in a hospital. If they are qualified for the Long-Term Care 
Insurance (LTCI) benefits, they get residential or domiciliary care from the LTCI care 
workers. Otherwise, families have to take care of older people themselves or recruit 
private eldercare (or nursing) workers are called ‘ganbyeongin’ in Korean. It is one of 
two types of eldercare professions which migrant workers can take in Korea, together 
                                                         
62 See http://www.kisfbs.com 
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with ‘yoyangbohosa’ which is to be explained later on. Same to the case of childcare, 
among labour migrants, only H-2 and F-4 visa holders are allowed to have these care 
jobs. Again, there is no accurate statistical data on this type of migrant care workers 
(‘ganbyeongin’), but it is suggested that about 70 per cent of the total ‘ganbyeongin’ is 
Korean Chinese migrants (Kukmin Ilbo, 2012).   
Families can hire co-ethnic migrant workers to have them take care of older people 
as well as long-term patients and the disabled (refer back to Table 7.3). Although there 
are cases that migrant ‘ganbyeongin’ work at employers’ homes but more frequently, 
they work at medical or long-term care facilities because their care-receivers often 
require medical interventions at hand. The involvement of medical facilities for both 
acute and long-term care puts eldercare workers, including migrant eldercare workers, 
in a rather unique employment configuration. From a legal perspective, migrant 
‘ganbyeongin’ is ‘home employment’; the same as domestic workers or nannies. Most 
families directly recruit ‘ganbyeongin’, typically through private care worker agencies. 
It is interesting to see that in many cases, migrant ‘ganbyeongin’ provide care in the 
hospitals or care facilities, but those institutions rarely have responsibility for the 
management of ‘ganbyeongin’. Consequently, hiring families cannot be convinced of 
the quality of care migrant ‘ganbyeongin’ provide, and migrant ‘ganbyeongin’ often fall 
victim to the exploitations of the agencies.  
Employing native-born personal eldercare workers has become extremely difficult 
and costly. This is why the immigration authority has opened this job area to unskilled 
migrant workers since 2002. Hardly is any policy intervention operating for the home 
employment of eldercare/nursing workers as well as domestic/childcare workers, which 
put workers in these jobs, either natives or migrants, in an extremely precarious 
condition. Despite the increasing eldercare burden of families due to the rapid ageing, 
an increase in geriatric diseases and the diminishing family care potential, the Korean 
eldercare system had been extremely limited until recently in terms of coverage, care 
services and care workforce. The absence of public provision of eldercare workforce 
and related regulations has created a highly marketised and segmented eldercare worker 
market, at the bottom of which co-ethnic migrant eldercare workers have found a niche.  
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Migrant care workers in institutional eldercare 
With a launch of the LTCI in 2008, a more professionalised form of eldercare 
workforce has emerged, which has had a huge implication on migrant eldercare/nursing 
workers. Despite the increasing supply of relatively cheap migrant eldercare workers, 
private eldercare workforce could not meet all the demand, not to mention a huge 
financial burden of families outsourcing eldercare. Relieving eldercare burden from 
families is one of the most important elements of the recent care reforms in Korea, as 
examined in the previous chapter. The introduction of the LTCI brought about a 
significant change to the eldercare workforce as well as finance, coverage and services 
of the Korean eldercare system. The expansion of the institutional (both residential and 
home-visit) eldercare through the LTCI has created a new type of eldercare profession 
(certificate) named ‘yoyangbohosa’, replacing previously used several different, thus 
confusing, names to refer to institutional eldercare workers (refer to Section 6.4.2 in 
Chapter 6). 
Law demands that each LTCI eldercare facility employ certain number of 
‘yoyangbohosa’ according to the patient-care worker ratio. To staff newly created 
eldercare institutions, the job of ‘yoyangbohosa’ has been passionately promoted by the 
Korean government as a new employment chance, for middle-aged women in particular 
(Um, 2012). In order to work as a ‘yoyangbohosa’, candidates must go through 240 
hour-worth training consisting of lectures and practicum, and then pass the official 
certification test. Current or previous care workers, e.g. ‘ganbyeongin’ or nursing aides, 
can benefit from the reduced training hour according to their certificates or experience. 
Since there are no other conditions attached, such as on age, sex or education level, a 
large number of people have been trained and issued certificates. The number of 
certified native-born ‘yoyangbohosa’ alone soon exceeded the demand from LTCI 
facilities although the actual working number is much smaller due to poorer working 
conditions of care jobs in general.  
The government has opened the opportunity to certain groups of migrants. 
Unskilled co-ethnic labour migrants and marriage migrants were initially considered for 
this new type of care job certificate. Later on, the chance has been extended to other 
family migrants such as those with permanent residency visas (F-5) and their 
dependants (F-2). The Immigration Law did not limit the employment activities of 
migrants with F-2 and F-5 visas but the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) used 
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to prevent them from joining the eldercare workforce. In the beginning, a migrant 
candidate was required to present a Korean language test score for the training itself but 
the language requirement was dropped later. Being certified as a legally recognised 
eldercare worker, i.e. ‘yoyangbohosa’, may increase employment potential with better 
conditions for migrants than working as ‘ganbyeongin’.  
However, despite this legal training and employment channel, it seems that not 
many co-ethnic labour migrants have had certificates, and that even those with 
certificates might have had difficulty finding a job in LTCI institutions in reality. One 
reason must be that the training to become a ‘yoyangbohosa’ itself can be challenging 
(difficult, long and expensive) for (unskilled) migrant workers. A more important 
reason is that now migrant care workers have to compete with native-born care workers 
over the same eldercare jobs at the LTCI facilities, where employing native-born 
‘yoyangbohosa’ is preferred. This point of preference will be revisited later. So having a 
certificate itself cannot guarantee a migrant a job in LTCI facilities.  
A consequence of the recent institutionalisation and professionalisation of 
eldercare workers in Korea is the formation of a dual market of eldercare workers 
between ‘ganbyeongin’ and ‘yoyangbohosa’. Although there are no official statistics 
available to show actual number of migrant eldercare workers, the majority of co-ethnic 
migrant eldercare workers are working as ‘ganbyeongin’ outside of the LTCI system. 
Empirical research proves that the distinction between unprofessional ‘ganbyeongin’ 
and professional ‘yoyangbohosa’ is rather arbitrary because their actual functions and 
the required level of skill are similar (Um, 2012).  
In reality, however, ‘ganbyeongin’ has become migrants’ care jobs and they are 
subject to poorer work conditions not to mention the lack of recognition as a profession. 
On the contrary, ‘yoyangbohosa’ has become jobs for native-born care workers working 
at institutional settings with better employment status. As Um (2012) argues, this newly 
established stratification in the eldercare labour market resulted from the discrepancy 
between the migration regime and the care (worker) regime. In other words, co-ethnic 
migrant workers continue to be framed as ‘unskilled’, and it contradicts the 
professionalisation tendency of care workforce. Although co-ethnic migrant workers are 
technically allowed to access the job, their employability is systematically hampered. It 
is interesting to witness that the division and the consequent discrimination are 
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happening in the Korean care worker market even between co-ethnic migrants and the 
native-born who are allegedly share the same racial, ethnical and cultural identity.  
 
Degree of migrantisation of eldercare 
Co-ethnic migrants’ involvement in eldercare has been fast growing. Demand for 
affordable migrant eldercare workers from families is ever increasing in the market. The 
expansion of the state social eldercare services has created a new demand. The Korean 
government has facilitated co-ethnic migrant workers to take eldercare jobs by easing 
immigration controls for them and by granting relevant training opportunities. However, 
the institutionalisation of eldercare and professionalisation of eldercare workforce have 
largely discouraged co-ethnic migrants from working at LTCI institutions. As a result, 
co-ethnic migrants have become increasingly concentrated at the less regulated care job 
market where native-born care workers are chronically in short supply due to low 
income, demanding workload and poor social recognition as professionals.  
There is virtually no cash benefit for eldercare (granted only for very exceptional 
cases and its level is extremely low) in the Korean LTCI system. If families with a 
dependent elderly cannot benefit from the LTCI care services, they have to address it by 
themselves or by buying-in care workers from the market. Thus, the limited coverage of 
the state elder care system may continue to necessitate the migrantisation of eldercare in 
Korea. Currently, migrant elder workers are complementing this gap in the state social 
care capacity at the bottom of eldercare workforce.  
 
 
7.2.4. Discussion 
 
Migrant workers’ involvement in both childcare and eldercare in Korea has been 
growing in volume, partly taking over some of family and state care responsibility. The 
growth, however, is neither uniform nor straightforward: the government policies have 
constantly reconfigured how and to what extent they are engaged in different care areas. 
Ongoing reformation of the welfare state regarding the provision of social care has 
further complicated the mode of migrants’ engagement in the paid care work. The 
Korean government has been playing important roles in migrants’ increasing 
involvement in care jobs. It has eased the immigration rules so that migrant workers 
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take up a range of care jobs such as domestic workers and child/eldercare workers. Even 
more proactive measures have been often taken. The government introduced relevant 
care worker training programmes and job finding services for migrant care workers. It 
also provides an incentive of visa upgrade to migrant care workers when they work long 
enough in the care sector. It is rather surprising considering that the Korean government 
has been always concerned about the possibility that migrant workers take away jobs 
from native-born workers. The government seems to admit that the deficit in care 
resource cannot be fully addressed without migrant care workers despite the recent 
expansion of the social care system.  
Ironically, the increasing inclusion of migrant workers in the care sector in Korea 
has been institutionalised by a very exclusive racial (ethnic) division in the 
migration/employment regime. In other words, only co-ethnic migrant workers are 
allowed to have care jobs, systematically excluding all other types of migrant workers. 
Why is it so ethno-specific? The complete ethnicisation of the migrant care workforce is 
a direct outcome of state policies and the absence of policies at the first place. Co-ethnic 
migrants had started taking care jobs even before the introduction of the special labour 
migration programme allowing their entry into the service sector. The scale was already 
too extensive for the government to deny the reality and drive them out of the service 
sector. In addition, the special labour migration programme for co-ethnic migrant 
workers allows free job-seeking/moving activities, and it has encouraged them to 
function almost in the same way to native-born workers in the labour market. So, 
limiting the access to care jobs only to co-ethnic migrants seems to be an inevitable 
compromise for the government which wants to minimise the labour market disruption 
by migrant workforce while providing much demanded migrant service workers.  
Another reason for the ethno-specific care migrantisation can be found on the 
nature of care work itself and care tradition of a country. Care work can be very 
intimate and relational often to the level found between family members. Foreign care 
workers are new to Korea where care work has been performed largely by families 
alone. Speaking same language and having similar cultural codes make it possible for 
co-ethnic migrant workers to do the jobs. So in terms of preference, native-born care 
workers are absolutely preferred and co-ethnic migrant workers become the only 
alternative left. It should be also noted that ethno-specific care migrantisation in Korea 
is a part of a more general preference for migrants with the same ethnic background. 
 203 
 
The Korean migration regime has been constructed in a way which helps maintain a 
racial and cultural homogeneity of Korea as much as possible. This puts Korean 
families in a very different situation from the family of the western countries where 
family employers are often in a situation to choose a preferred migrant care worker 
based on ‘racial differences’ or stereotyping, for example, a choice between Latin 
American and Eastern European care workers in the UK (Williams, 2010; Williams and 
Gavanas, 2008).  
However, preference is changing. There has been criticism against limiting the 
care market only to co-ethnics because it may have increased the cost of co-ethnic 
migrant care workers by shrinking the supply, and it limits the choice for care workers. 
As a matter of fact, there are increasing cases reporting that some families are hiring 
Filipina for domestic workers or nannies because they are not only cheaper than 
‘Joseonjok (Korean Chinese)’, but they also speak English which is good potential for 
children’s education (Donga Ilbo, 2012). Under the current migrant regime, hiring a 
Filipina as a care worker in any type is illegal unless she is a marriage migrant. Whether 
to open the service sector to other migrant workers has been a recurrent agenda, given 
that the pool of co-ethnic migrant care workers is expected to reach the limit sooner or 
later compared to the increasing demand (S Choi et al., 2013).  
However, the chance does not seem wide at the moment. One official in an 
interview with the author for the current research explained the government’s stance on 
opening the service sector to other types of migrant workers: 
 
Generally migrants’ employment in the service sector has been limited. Instead, 
the government has rather generously allowed compatriots [co-ethnic migrants] to 
work in various service jobs. Some industries have repeatedly requested to widen 
the door. However, the government is very cautious about it. The service sector 
plays a significant role in the overall job market. Once certain sectors become open 
to migrant workers, it will be very difficult to reverse it, and it may negatively 
affect the national workers’ employment conditions. (Interviewee D, 5 August 
2014) 
 
It should be highlighted that the way in which co-ethnic migrant care workers are 
engaged in paid care work differs between childcare and eldercare, which leads, 
consequently, to the different levels of care migrantisation. In childcare, migrant 
workers are incorporated typically in home-based care jobs as domestic workers and 
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nannies, while they are not found in the institutional childcare. On the contrary, co-
ethnic migrants’ involvement in eldercare is more visible than in childcare. Unlike in 
childcare, most of them are working as eldercare or nursing workers within institutional 
settings although many are directly hired by families. These differences in the level of 
migrantisation result from the different systems of social care provision and the care 
worker employment regimes of childcare and eldercare in Korea. Simonazzi (2009: 16) 
argues that “national employment models also interact with care regimes to shape the 
features of the care labour market, which in turn affect both the quantity and the quality 
of labour supply and the degree of dependence on migrant carers”. As examined in 
Chapter 6, both the childcare system and the eldercare system have been increasingly 
socialised, redistributing families’ care responsibility. However, care for children is 
much more universalised and institutionalised. This is because educational 
considerations (human resource development) are strongly embedded in the Korean 
childcare system. Childcare is more highly valued in Korea’s social investment frame as 
it directly contributes to raising the next generation. So, the childcare regime requires 
more skills and qualification from childcare workers. Childcare workers are mostly 
young females having higher standard of qualifications. Therefore, unskilled migrant 
care workers’ entry to the institutional childcare becomes extremely difficult.  
In contrast, care for older people is less universalised and much more dependent on 
the market, and elder-care workers are mainly older women with lower level of 
qualification (Peng, 2010; Um, 2012). So, migrant care workers find much wider 
employment opportunity either in the home-based childcare market (typically as a 
domestic worker) or in the less-regulated eldercare market. Recently, the 
institutionalisation of eldercare and the professionalisation of eldercare workers are 
being undertaken in an effort to control quality and cost as a part of the comprehensive 
care reform package in Korea. This may mean better working conditions for migrant 
care workers, but, at the same time, it can negatively affect migrant care workers by 
further pushing them down to the private care job market where they are forced to 
tolerate poorer working conditions than native-born licensed eldercare workers. This 
occupational ladder, of course, is subject to change by how these jobs are defined, 
regulated and valued in the future (Kofman, 2012).  
As summarised in Table 7.7, the care worker regime is dualised according to 
ethnicity, ancestral linksto be precise, and skill level as well as care setting (home-based 
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or institutional). Native-born care workers occupy care jobs in higher skill levels in 
institutional settings, while migrant care workers tend to take up low-skilled care jobs in 
home-based care settings.  
 
Table 7.7: Care worker regime in Korea 
Skill level Area Migrant care workers Native-born care workers 
High 
Childcare 
(no participation) ▪ Childcare ‘teacher’ in 
institutions 
Eldercare 
▪ ‘Yoyangbohosa’ in 
institutions (low participation) 
▪ Social worker, Nurse, 
‘Yoyangbohosa’ in 
institutions 
Low 
Childcare 
▪ Domestic worker, Nanny in 
homes 
▪ ‘Aidolbomi’ in homes (low 
participation) 
Eldercare 
▪ ‘Ganbyeongin’ in homes or 
institutions 
(limited participation) 
 
 
 
7.3. Intersection 2: Marriage Migrants in Unpaid Care Work 
 
The second intersection between migration and care in Korea can be observed in private 
homes where marriage migrants perform various care works including physical 
reproduction of family (members), i.e. reproductive labour, as wives, mothers, and 
daughters-in-law. Unlike the case in co-ethnic labour migrants, it takes a form of unpaid 
care work. This section investigates what kind of social reproductive roles marriage 
migrants assume in Korea, how national government policies intervene in this process 
both within the nation state and by acting transnationally, and why this particular form 
of the migration-social reproduction nexus has emerged in the Korean welfare state. It 
should be noted here that this section focuses on female marriage migrants. As 
examined in Chapter 4, marriage migration to Korea is a highly feminised flow. Over 
85 per cent of marriage migrants are so-called ‘foreign brides’ marrying Korean males. 
Related state policies have also focused on female marriage migrants marrying Korean 
males. 
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7.3.1. Marriage Migrant Policies across the Life-course 
 
Various policies targeting marriage migrants and their families are rather interestingly 
called the ‘multicultural family policy’ in Korea. Based on the ‘Multicultural Families 
Support Act’ of 2008, the Korean government has formulated comprehensive policy 
plans for marriage migrants and their families every five years, and currently its second 
round (2013 - 2017) is under way (refer to Section 5.5.2 in Chapter 5). Although not 
explicit in the law, it is evident that the multicultural family policy presumes a certain 
type of marriage migration: female migrants married to Korean men (by birth) and 
cohabitating in Korea’ (Seol et al., 2009: 127). As a consequence, other types of 
marriage migration, such as foreign husbands or marriages between migrants, become 
largely irrelevant to the policy. This is not only because marriages between female 
migrants and Korean males are a dominant form, but it also because the way in which 
marriage migration polices are formulated in Korea has been privileging this specific 
arrangement of marriage migration.  
The multicultural family policy has been designed to support marriage migrants 
and their families across their life-course (MOHW, 2008). As Table 7.8 shows, the 
multicultural family policy comprises all the stages of family life which a typical 
(female) marriage migrant might go through: from marriage preparation, the formation 
of a family and the expansion of a family by having children even including possible 
dissolution of family (set out in six stages). A range of policies are specified for each 
stage of the cycle. I argue that those policies intend to assist marriage migrants to 
perform various reproductive roles which can be translated into the roles of wives, 
mothers and daughters-in-law following the life-cycle of married women in the family.  
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Table 7.8: ‘Multicultural Family Policies’ across Marriage Migrants’ Life-course 
Stage Policies 
Marriage preparation 
before migration 
▪ Regulation on international marriage agencies and human 
right protection 
▪ Pre-marital orientation to prospective marriage migrants 
▪ Pre-marital orientation to inviting persons 
Family formation 
▪ Language support 
▪ Information and advice services for living 
▪ Social protection (social security) 
▪ Support family revelations and prevention of family crisis 
Child bearing/rearing 
▪ Maternity support 
▪ Childcare services 
▪ Health service for mothers and children 
▪ Enhancement of parents’ childcare skills 
Child education 
▪ Support for children’s language, academic and emotional 
development 
▪ Support for children in poverty or other crisis 
▪ Enhancement of parents’ child education capacity 
Family capacity-building 
▪ Enhancement of marriage migrants’ economic independence 
▪ Enhancement of marriage migrants’ social participation 
Family (Marriage) 
dissolution 
▪ Support for single parent families and vulnerable children 
Source: MOHW (2008: 14), summarised by the author 
 
 
7.3.2. Marriage Migrants as Wives  
 
The Korean government assists its citizens in finding wives, forming families and 
maintaining marital relationships. As argued in Chapter 4, the rapid increase in marriage 
migration in Korea is related to the phenomenon of 'bachelor surplus' resulting in some 
men having had difficulty finding a marriage partner and forming a family. Failure to 
marry in Korea is traditionally seen as a personal and family crisis of reproduction, so it 
tends to be problematised and stigmatised although these attitudes are changing. It is 
also perceived as a public problem, however, as delay and decline in marriage can lead 
to failure to reproduce the next generation and translated into sub-replacement fertility 
levels. The Korean government, therefore, has been concerned to address this 
‘reproductive crisis', and admitting more (female) marriage migrants has been explicitly 
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discussed as one of the solutions to guarantee the demographic sustainability of the 
country.  
Much policy effort has been made to maintain and streamline the supply of 
marriage migrants. In the early 2000s when the marriage migration industry first 
emerged in Korea unfettered by government regulation, there were reports of 
widespread abuse against migrant women, including human rights violations and 
deceived or forced marriages (Seol et al., 2005). As a consequence, the governments of 
sending countries such as the Philippines and Cambodia warned their citizens not to 
marry Korean men and temporarily halted marriage migration to Korea or sought 
similar measures. Facing this crisis in ‘bride outsourcing’, the Korean government 
began to regulate the industry, and in an effort to appease concerns it dispatched 
government officials (called ‘international marriage migration officers’) to the major 
sending countries to share information with their governments and to help coordinate 
the export of marriage migrants to Korea. The Korean government has established an 
inter-governmental consortium with main marriage migrant sending countries including 
China, Vietnam and Philippines. Through this overseas collaboration channel, the 
Korean government operates local marriage migrant consulting services (and call 
centres) which run information sessions for prospective marriage migrants to educate 
them about the Korean language, family/care cultures and laws (MOGEF, 2012: 47).63  
Once migrants arrive in Korea and the legitimacy of the marriage is confirmed, 
they can enjoy the highest possible level of social inclusion and benefits as migrants. 
Firstly, accessible language support and various information/advice services are to be 
provided to help their transition. Marriage migrants are encouraged to attend the official 
social integration programme and are given various incentives to do so. For example, if 
they successfully complete the programme, they are exempted from presenting a 
language proficiency test score when applying for a change from marriage migration 
visa to a permanent residence visa, and a more simplified procedure is applied to them 
when they finally attempt to claim citizenship. In sum, the Korean government has 
amended the nationality law in favour of marriage migrants. Compared to other types of 
migrants, marriage migrants can obtain citizenship more easily. They have, for example, 
a much shorter probationary period (two years rather than the more general five years) 
                                                         
63 See MOGEF, http://www.mogef.go.kr/korea/view/policyGuide/policyGuide06_04_01.jsp 
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before they are eligible to claim citizenship, and those with a child are exempt from the 
written component of the citizenship test.  
Following admission and initial adjustment, ensuring the stability of families 
formed through marriage migration is the next key objective of Korea’s multicultural 
family policy. Sustained marital relations are regarded as a barometer of the successful 
integration of marriage migrants and a prerequisite for continuing reproduction of 
members of the society. As the number of international marriages increased in the first 
decade of the 2000s, so did divorces among such families. Divorce cases in 
multicultural couples peaked at ten per cent of all national divorces in 2011, and about 
73 per cent of those cases were divorces between Korean males and migrant females 
(refer to Figure 7.1). Although their rate of divorce was not disproportionately high 
compared to native people, the government saw their divorces (and consequent family 
breakdowns) indicating the failure of multicultural families (MOGEF, 2012). 
Maintaining the family is a crucial element in the ‘multicultural family policy’ to realise 
its policy goals of ‘social reproduction through migrants’. This is why, interestingly 
enough, the divorces among marriage migrants have served a strong rationale to justify 
the government’s extensive policy interventions in marriage migrants’ family lives 
(MOGEF, 2012; MOHW, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Trend in divorce of marriage migrants in Korea (cases, %) 
Source: Statistics Korea, Population trend (2014) 
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Apart from the challenges posed by being of different ethnic, cultural and language 
backgrounds, there are other factors that potentially contribute to undermining the 
stability of multicultural couples in Korea. These are problems commonly associated 
with the so-called 'male-order bride' industry, and include gaps in age and education 
level (Chun, 2013; S-k Kim et al., 2010). It is especially true for the couples of female 
marriage migrants and Korean husbands: female migrant wives are much younger, and 
some female migrants 'marry down' educationally and socio-economically - a gender 
pattern not conventional in Korea. A national survey of multicultural families conducted 
in 2012 (Chun, 2013) reveals that the three most common main reasons for divorce 
among these couples are 'desertion' (32.8 per cent) (most commonly of the female 
spouse), 'spousal conflict' (30.9 per cent) and 'economic incompetence of spouse' (10.9 
per cent); reasons which are likely to be interlinked. The role of financial tensions in the 
high rate of marriage failure among multicultural families is not a surprising finding 
considering that households consisting of marriage migrants are typically economically 
disadvantaged in Korea. As presented in Figure 7.2, almost 90 per cent of marriage 
migrant households earn less than the national average monthly income (4,076,876 
KRW).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Income (monthly) distribution of marriage migrant households, 2012 (1,000 
KRW, %) 
Source: Adapted from Chun (2013: 60) 
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In an attempt to address the increasing divorce rate among marriage migrant 
families a policy priority was placed on preventing 'sham' marriages, since the 
government linked these to spousal desertion. International marriages became subject to 
a 'genuineness' test prior to the granting of a marriage migrant visa or, further down the 
line, nationality, and marriage migrants are regularly monitored for continuing 
cohabitation with their Korean (male) spouse (IPC, 2012a: 46-7). These measures, 
combined with the introduction of an income threshold for marriage migration and 
accommodation and language proficiency conditions (refer to Section 5.5.2 in Chapter 
5), have been introduced with the aims of increasing the likelihood of successful 
integration of marriage migrants and optimising the conditions in which international 
marriage couples can start and maintain a family.  
 
 
7.3.3. Marriage Migrants as Mothers 
 
The focus on marriage migrants themselves in the early stage of the multicultural family 
policy has been extended to marriage migrants’ roles as parents (mothers) and their 
children (IPC, 2012a; MOGEF, 2012; MOHW, 2008). The government asserted that 
“growth in multicultural families can curb the low-fertility and the ageing trend in 
Korea, especially in rural areas, by increasing the fertility rate” (MOHW, 2008: 8). In 
this regard, promoting international marriages can have dual benefits: marriage migrants 
themselves can become additional members of the society and they can replenish the 
population by bearing the next generation. So the Korean government provides a range 
of health and maternity/infant care services to assist marriage migrants in maternity and 
childrearing stages (MOGEF, 2012). At first, young children at nursery/kindergarten 
ages (0 to 6) were a main policy focus. However, as the number of marriage migrant 
children at school ages (7 to 18) has been increasing, school adaptation and educational 
performance have become equally important policy issues (Figure 7.3). On the one hand, 
the government has been concerned that their failure in integration and in school would 
be a social ‘burden’ later on, but, on the other hand, the government has valued these 
children for they have “potential to be global leaders” working for the country (MOHW, 
2008: 1), incorporating them into the existing social investment policy frame.  
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Figure 7.3: Growth in children of marriage migrants by age cohort in Korea, (person, %) 
Note: The figure includes children of both female and male marriage migrants and those already 
naturalised. 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015h) 
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to migrants who are yet to be naturalised is an unprecedented move in the history of the 
Korean welfare state. These policies connecting the social rights of marriage migrants to 
their motherhood (parenthood) status clearly demonstrate that the role of the (female) 
marriage migrant as mother (parent) is effectively facilitated by the Korean government.  
Furthermore, the Korean government has been directly involved in the provision of 
care for marriage migrant children. Having investigated the care environment for the 
children of marriage migrants, the Korean government identified that the most common 
challenge multicultural families encounter when raising children is the financial burden 
for children's care and education (49.6 per cent) and access to care services (11.2 per 
cent) (Chun, 2013: 48). In 2008 when the government began implementing its 
multicultural family policy, only 17 per cent of children in marriage migrant families, a 
third of the rate of all children, were enrolled in institutional childcare, and affordability 
issues were reportedly the main reason for the low enrolment rate (MOHW, 2008: 29). 
The comparatively low childcare enrolment rates among the children of marriage 
migrants was perceived as problematic by the Korean government because it deprived 
these children of learning and socialisation opportunities, as well as their (low income) 
mothers of the opportunity to participate in the labour market. To address this, in 2009 
the government began to fully cover institutional childcare fees for marriage migrant 
families whose income level was lower than 70 per cent of the urban employees’ 
average monthly income regardless of their citizenship status. In 2010, the government 
decided to expand free institutional childcare to the entire multicultural family 
population regardless of income level. This was an unusual step given that free 
institutional childcare was not yet available to the general population of families until 
2013, and as such resulted in controversy leading the government to universalise the 
support to all families with children later on (IPC, 2012a: 18). Added to the financial 
support for care, the government also provides a range of parenting support (education 
and consultation) for marriage migrant families: for example, the MOGEF runs a 
‘Parenting School’ for marriage migrants to teach specific information and skills for 
parenting (MOGEF, 2012: 34).64 
                                                         
64 Apart from social security and care programmes, the multicultural family policy includes education 
programmes to assist migrant children’s general learning and participation in school, which are beyond 
the focus of this research (refer to Table 7.8).  
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The Korean government’s intervention has not been limited simply to protecting or 
caring the migrant children; it has also attempted to enhance parents’ social and 
economic capacity with which they can better raise their children. The government has 
actively encouraged marriage migrants’ labour market participation either by training 
them or by giving incentives to the companies hiring them (MOGEF, 2012; MOHW, 
2008). Social service jobs and decent part time jobs have been recommended as 
“suitable” for them by the government, since many of them are expected to work part-
time due to their caring commitment in home (MOGEF, 2012: 38-40). What it implies 
is that marriage migrants are actively integrated into the recently developing work-home 
reconciliation policy frame in the Korean care regime (refer to Chapter 6). One official 
working on this policy in an interview with the author told what the government 
approach is:  
 
Policy-wise, employment of marriage migrant women is approached in the general 
labour market policy frame for female workers whose career has been disrupted 
due to care. ······· They [women currently out of the labour market] prefer flexible 
jobs so many come to find a job in the social service. To promote marriage 
migrants’ employment opportunity in better and stable workplaces, the 
government runs a paid internship programme for them. It provides a subsidy to 
participants and hiring companies as long as months. (Interviewee C, 13 January 
2014) 
 
 
7.3.4. Marriage Migrants as Daughters-in-law 
 
My examination in Chapter 4 has shown that the incidence of international marriages 
with foreign wives and the subsequent formation of multicultural families are more 
prevalent in Korea’s rural areas than elsewhere in the country. Marrying foreign brides 
often involves the notion of ‘the last resort for marriage’ for those who have lower 
socio-economic status (J Kim et al., 2014: 101). Living in rural areas can be an added 
factor for seeking out foreign wives in Korea, since the sex ratio among people in 
typical marriage ages is more heavily skewed towards males than females in rural than 
in urban areas. Thus, for example, in 2010, the average sex ratio across the age range 20 
to 49 was 120.6:100 in rural areas compared with 101.3:100 in urban areas (Statistics 
Korea, 2011). The higher rate of international marriage in rural areas, however, does not 
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necessarily mean that marriage migrants are concentrated there; rather, most of them 
live in cities. As shown in Table 7.9, only 21.5 per cent of marriage migrants are 
residing in rural areas, which is more or less similar to that of the total population. 
However, there is a gendered difference in the geographical distribution: about 25 per 
cent of female marriage migrants live in rural areas, which is a higher proportion than 
their male counterparts (9 per cent) and the total population (19 per cent).  
 
Table 7.9: Regional distribution of marriage migrants by sex, 2012 (%) 
Area Total Female Male National (2010) 
Urban 78.5 75.4 90.9 80.9 
Rural 21.5 24.6 9.1 19.1 
Note: Data includes the naturalised. 
Source: Adapted from Chun (2013: 119) 
 
The disproportionate concentration of female marriage migrants in rural areas is 
related to the heavier dependence on women’s care labour and more traditional 
care/gender norms in rural areas (Castles and Miller, 2009; J Kim et al., 2014). In the 
Korean context, it means that female marriage migrants are needed not only to be wives 
and mothers, but also daughters-in-law who can take care of their ageing parents-in-law. 
Traditionally, although being challenged in recent years, elder care provision in Korea 
has depended heavily on daughters-in-laws as informal caregivers (Sung, 2003; Um, 
2012).  
Indeed, the latest (2010) National Census data confirm that multi-generational (3 
or more) families are more common among marriage migrant households, especially in 
rural areas (16 per cent compared to the national average of 6.2 per cent) (Statistics 
Korea, 2011). A large scale government survey conducted in the similar time point 
shows similar but more detailed patterns (Table 7.10). Although the most common 
household pattern of marriage migrants is, as for the Korean population as a whole, the 
nuclear family including one-person household, a significant number of marriage 
migrants with or without children, are cohabitating with extended family members. This 
is especially the case for female marriage migrants: 27.5 per cent of them are living 
together with their spouse’s family members while the corresponding figure among 
male marriage migrants is only 8.4 per cent (S-k Kim et al., 2010: 331). Another survey 
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found that about 44 per cent of female marriage migrants live with one or both parents-
in-law, and in half of those cases they live with mothers-in-law (Y-k Kim, 2009: 52). 
 
Table 7.10: Household compositions of ‘multicultural families’ by sex, 2009 (%) 
Household Compositions Female Male Total 
Couple with children 36.5 39.1 36.7 
Couple only 25.0 41.6 26.3 
Couple with children and spouse’ family members 17.2 4.4 16.1 
Couple with spouse’s family members 10.3 4.0 9.7 
Couple with children and own family members 3.8 2.4 3.7 
One person 3.1 5.2 3.3 
One person with children 2.8 1.4 2.7 
Couple with own family members 1.4 1.8 1.4 
Total 100 100 100 
Note: ‘Family members’ include brothers, sisters, parent(s) and parent(s)-in-law 
Source: S-k Kim et al. (2010: 331) 
 
Living together with their Korean husbands’ ageing parents can affect marriage 
migrant families in terms of care provision. Research has found that those migrant 
daughters-in-law tend to experience significant physical, emotional and financial strain, 
which can be exacerbated by language barriers (Y-k Kim, 2009). In 2009 the 
government intervened to financially assist low-income marriage migrant families 
living with their parents (either maternal or paternal) through the national social 
assistance system, which had previously only been available to marriage migrant 
families with young children. The government also introduced counselling and 
education programmes to help solve conflicts between typically mothers-in-law and 
their migrant daughters-in-law. It is interesting to note that compared to the case of 
childcare, less policy effort has been made specifically aiming to support female 
marriage migrants’ care roles for adult family members.  
As for all Korean households with ageing parents, marriage migrants’ elder care 
role is less socialised but depends on female family members’ unpaid care labour. The 
institutional eldercare deficit in rural areas has not been sufficiently addressed even with 
the Long-Term Care Insurance system. The LTCI is to provide a cash benefit, called 
‘family care allowance’, to households in rural or remote areas where no eldercare 
facilities are available in the vicinity so the recipient has to be looked after by his or her 
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family members. However, it can hardly meet the eldercare need in marriage migrant 
families in rural areas because the rule for the cash benefit is very stringent and the 
benefit level is just nominal. If this situation continues, female marriage migrants will 
continue to assume multiple care roles as daughters-in-law as well as wives and mothers.  
 
 
7.3.5. Discussion 
 
The above section examined the reproductive roles of female marriage migrants in 
Korea and the government policies related to these roles. I have found that female 
marriage migrants have been sought out to address Korea’s reproductive crises at 
personal, family and national levels. The Korean government has been promoting 
marriages with foreign brides and their migration into Korea, and has been supporting 
them with targeted policies so that they can settle well and perform their expected social 
reproductive roles better. These targeted policies, ‘multicultural family’ policies, are 
structured according to the life-course of female marriage migrants in order to meet 
their specific needs for each stage.  
For the best possible start to married life, the Korean government provides 
orientation, adaptation and integration programmes, and marriage migrants can enjoy a 
comparatively high level of social protection. While there are no policies explicitly 
aimed at encouraging marriage migrants to have children, there is targeted support for 
their maternity and child rearing. Thus, the childcare and child education 
responsibilities of marriage migrants have been actively socialised, and it is remarkable 
to see that, at some point, social care provision for the children of multicultural families 
had been more generous than that for children more generally. In contrast, however, 
marriage migrants’ care labour for elderly parents-in-law (or other adult family 
members) has not been the receipt of the same level of support.    
Despite the Korean government’s political rhetoric of a multicultural society, it has 
always been cautious about migration growth due to a fear of integration failure. This is 
why the Korean migration regime is characterised in the main by a circulatory labour 
migration policy combined with a special track for co-ethnic migrants. Marriage 
migration and the associated polices seem to contradict those policy orientations since 
marriage migrants are actively supported to settle and their ethnic backgrounds are far 
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from being homogenous. The Korean government tries to solve this apparent 
contradiction by subsuming marriage migrants to the notion of family. As a family 
member, marriage migrants become Koreans’ wives, mothers and daughters-in-law, and 
they themselves may become Koreans eventually. By doing so, the Korean society can 
secure much needed reproductive labour through a seemingly similar system to the 
‘migrant-in-the-family care model’ (Bettio et al., 2006: 272) that has emerged in 
Southern Europe; however, unlike the Southern European case, migrants in the Korean 
case are not integrated as paid care workers in the family, but rather as unpaid care-
giving family members.  
At the same time, the ‘Koreanisation’ of marriage migrants can effectively reduce 
the risk of integration failure or ethnic tensions. The government repeatedly emphasises 
a ‘sense of belonging’ and ‘identity as Koreans’, and that this should be a prerequisite 
for long-term residence rights and social benefits (IPC, 2012a: 19, 40). The process of 
‘familisation’ and ‘Koreanisation’ of female marriage migrants is well demonstrated in 
the following episode. A Chinese marriage migrant named Hongyoung Lee was 
awarded 'Korean Hyoboosang' in December 2012 with much media coverage, in the 
recognition of her ten years' dedicated care of her mother-in-law who had suffered a 
stroke while being an excellent wife and mother at the same time (Asia Today News, 
2012). The award, 'Hyoboosang' in Korea is a several-centuries-old traditional way of 
honouring exemplar daughters-in-law having shown exceptional filial piety. The 
awarded migrant woman seems to have changed her name to a Korean one and her 
multiple care roles as a wife, mother and daughter-in-law of a Korean family were 
publicly complimented in a very Korean way.  
It is important to note that the roles of marriage migrants are not fixed to the social 
reproductive sphere; rather, there is increasing mobility between reproductive roles and 
productive roles. While there is no attempt to facilitate crossing the boundary between 
labour migration and marriage migration, the Korean government supports migrant 
wives to ‘extend their migrant reproductive labour from domestic spheres to labour 
markets’ (Lan, 2008: 1807). Increasing the labour market participation of female 
marriage migrants is one of the key objectives in the multicultural family policy 
package because the government believes that having a paid job can reduce poor 
migrant families’ dependence on the government. So, the government, on the one hand, 
provides necessary training and education to increase employability, and on the other 
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hand, it provides universal non-contributory public childcare to marriage migrants even 
without citizenship to help them maintain work-home balance.  
 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
Some researchers have demanded that analysis of the care-migration nexus using the 
concept of social reproduction should incorporate more diverse patterns of migration, 
notably marriage migration, so that we can observe a wider landscape of care activities 
and configurations around the care work (Kofman, 2012; Lan, 2008). This chapter has 
been a response to that call. Focusing on the Korean government policies, this chapter 
has examined how both routes of labour migration and family (marriage) migration are 
interconnected to two main care areas: childcare and eldercare. In the matrix of 
migration (regime) and care (regime) emerge two intersecting fields: the intersection of 
co-ethnic labour migrants in paid care work and the intersection of marriage migrants in 
unpaid care work.  
In the first intersection, I have found that co-ethnic migrant workers are hired in 
private homes as domestic workers and nannies, and in care facilities as elder care 
workers. The Korean migration regime privileging co-ethnic migrants is providing new 
employment chances in the service sector, including care jobs. Due to the increasing 
tendency of institutionalisation and professionalisation of care work in Korea, co-ethnic 
migrant workers are concentrated on less-regulated domestic jobs, or working as 
informal or unprofessional care workers outside of the formal elder care system.  
My examination of the second intersection shows that the Korean government has 
developed special policies targeted to female marriage migrants and their families. 
These policies are operating with an extensive array of policy areas from migrant-
specific policies such as migration, integration and nationality to general social polices 
e.g. social security and labour market policies. This complicated policy overwrapping 
reflects the female marriage migrants’ unique position in the Korean welfare state: they 
are not merely migrants but the migrants becoming Koreans and reproducing Koreans 
socially and biologically. In a word, the whole marriage migrant-related policies are 
meticulously designed to assist them in performing their roles as wives, mothers and 
daughters-in-law.  
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Combined, these two types of care-migration nexus provide what Lan (2008: 1803) 
called ‘parallel solutions’ to the care crisis in the Korean society. For Korean families, it 
means that they can hire migrants to outsource housework and care work, or seek 
foreign wives to provide unpaid care labour depending on their social and economic 
status (Wang, 2007). For the Korean government, these are the solutions to deal with 
care worker demand for the ever expanding social care programmes and, more 
fundamentally, to reproduce the society itself by replenishing population. It is worth 
noting that that Korea has been developing these rather unique patterns of care 
outsourcing strategies without compromising the sense of racial and cultural 
‘homogeneity’ by adopting an extremely ethno-specific labour migration regime and 
marriage-based family migration/settlement regime presuming the eventual 
naturalisation.  
Along with the highly instrumental migration regime and the persistent adherence 
to the ideas of ethnically-homogenous nation state and citizenship, the nature of the 
Korean welfare regime has played an important role. Its productivist approach has been 
encouraging women to choose to work while the government helps addressing the care 
gap created by them. So the expansion of social care programmes and growing demand 
for care workers are inevitable. However, difference has been emerging between 
childcare and eldercare with regard to the degree to which each area is familialised, 
marketised and socialised. The strong commitment to social investment prioritises 
socialising care and education for children, while older people (and eldercare) tend to be 
less valued. Consequently, unskilled migrant care workers are finding a niche in the 
private and less regulated domestic work or eldercare area at the bottom of the care 
profession hierarchy, whereas marriage migrants who live in rural areas with ageing 
parents-in-law tend to have a particularly heavy care burden due to the lack in 
alternative (social) care sources around.  
Put in perspective, ‘care’ or the reproductive function of society has been actively 
redistributed by the government policies not only between the state, the family and the 
market (Chapter 6), but also between nationals and migrants, and the mode of 
redistribution has been structured along the axes of gender, ethnicity/race, skill-level 
and class, while leaving largely untouched the gendered division of labour within the 
home. It remains to be seen, however, how sustainable the Korean strategies of 
migration-care combination can be. The largest pool of co-ethnic migrants in China is 
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quickly draining and the second or third generation of Korean diasporas neither can 
speak Korean nor maintain cultural similarities. In this situation, co-ethnic migrant 
workers alone will not be able to meet the demand for domestic workers or elder care 
workers. In addition, the situation around marriage migrants is quickly changing. Unlike 
the first wave of marriage migrants in the 1990s, many marriage migrants are settling in 
major cities as nuclear families, and they are also becoming working mothers. So they 
are also creating their own care deficits which need addressing by other care resources. 
That is the reason why it is as much crucial and timely to discuss how care 
responsibility in Korea is distributed between family members and between genders, as 
between state, family and the market. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In this study I have investigated how care, defined as reproductive labour, has been 
transnationalised through both the migration regime and the care regime in Korea. In 
doing so, my primary purpose has been to expand knowledge of the intersections of 
international migration, care and welfare states. While these intersections have attracted 
increasing attention from social policy scholars, the scope of research has been largely 
limited to the experiences of western welfare states and aspects of paid-care work. It is a 
serious lacuna when considering the increasing diversification of global migration 
patterns, one of which is the emergence of East Asian countries, including Korea, as a 
new migration pole within Asia. Therefore the study has aimed to contribute to not only 
broadening the regional application of the migration-care intersection scholarship to 
East Asia, but also extending the theoretical application to new dimensions of migration 
- co-ethnic migration and marriage migration.  
In this concluding chapter, I first overview how the research questions I raised in 
the introduction chapter have been addressed by the findings in the empirical chapters, 
and evaluate the contribution this study makes in respect of the research purpose. On the 
basis of an assessment of the substantive knowledge yielded by the study, and of the 
remaining knowledge-gaps, I discuss what can be suggested for Korea’s policy fields of 
care and migration and for future research. Lastly, personal reflection on the research 
and overall process will follow as an epilogue.  
 
 
8.2. Findings and Contributions 
 
The research was designed and conducted in essence by the two theoretical approaches 
(Chapter 1 and 3). Firstly, I adopted the feminist theorisation of care as a key to 
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analysing the (trans)formations of the care regime and its complex interplay with the 
migration regime in Korea. Secondly, I employed an (new) institutionalist approach to 
analysing such regimes broadly indicated by both formal and informal factors (refer to 
Table 1.1 in Chapter 1) although the focus lies in the former. Here I summarise how the 
research findings have addressed the three research questions I raised in the introductory 
chapter, feeding back to the focal theories.  
 
What are the characteristics of the migration flows to Korea and the 
drivers/motivations propelling the flows? 
Korea has rapidly transformed itself from a non-migration country to a migrant-
destination country over the last three decades. This transition is a result of the changing 
political and economic terrain in Asia. Korea has created a severe labour shortage from 
inside and has given strong incentives for migration from outside thanks to Korea’s 
economic outperformance (thus, inequality in social and economic conditions) within 
Asia. In addition, political liberalisation throughout the region as well as development 
of transportation/communication has made international mobility a possible option for a 
growing number of people.  
In Chapter 4, I have found that ‘economic motives’ of individuals, markets and 
states of origin and destination were the most significant contributor to the migration 
growth in Korea. Consequently, migrants for employment have constituted the largest 
portion in the total migrant stock in Korea. I have also found that the labour migration 
flow to Korea has been concentrated on the unskilled jobs in the manufacturing, 
construction, farming/fishing, hospitality and personal service industries which native-
born workers tend to avoid if possible. In parallel, family migration, notably marriage 
migration, has also become an increasingly important migration route to Korea. 
Growing international marriages reflect, in part, liberalising attitudes toward marriage 
and family, but they are also driven by practical considerations from both parties 
involved in the marriage such as desires for livelihood, new life chances or social 
reproduction. 
Most migrants to Korea originate from the economically less developed nearby 
South and South-east Asian countries. Despite the increasing number of origin countries, 
China has remained the most important origin country for both labour and marriage 
migration growth in Korea. It should be highlighted, however, that those Chinese who 
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share the same Korean ethnicity, called Joseonjok, occupy the largest proportion. This 
ethnic tie as well as geographical and cultural similarities has helped Korean Chinese to 
dominate the actual migration flow to Korea.  
 
What are the features of the regimes of migration and care in Korea, and how are 
they [regimes] interconnected to facilitate migrants’ involvement in care in Korea? 
This question has been investigated in two separate chapters, Chapter 5 and 6. To begin 
with, I have found in Chapter 5 that both the salience of two migration routes - unskilled 
labour migration and marriage migration and the dominance of co-ethnic migrants are 
the intended results of the Korean migration regime. The Korean government has 
developed a multi-faceted migration regime by which migrants are systematically 
stratified along the axes of skill, ethnicity, gender and class.  
First of all, the Korean migration regime is characterised by both skill level and 
ethnicity-specific approaches. The Korean government has made a significant effort to 
establish a circulatory unskilled labour migration scheme to expedite the supply of 
affordable foreign labour to the industries suffering from the labour shortages. However, 
unlike the case for skilled foreign labour, the government has tried to keep the number 
of unskilled labour migrants in check by placing various restrictions on their entry and 
residence, settlement and social/political rights. In addition, the Korean government has 
developed a (labour) migration regime explicitly privileging migrants having the same 
ethnic origin. It has developed special migration programmes for co-ethnic migrants to 
grant them easier entry, freer economic activity, longer residence or settlement, and 
higher social/labour rights. At first, only skilled co-ethnics from rich western countries 
enjoyed these privileges, but those from China and CIS countries have gradually been 
subject to these special treatments. One of the most important differences between co-
ethnic migrant workers and other migrant workers is that co-ethnic migrant workers are 
given access to the service sector including care jobs in homes, businesses and facilities.  
Secondly, the Korean migration regime is featured with a comprehensive marriage 
migration policy. In contrast to labour migration policy, ethnicity is not the most visible 
divide in marriage migration policy, rather gender is. Marriage migration is highly 
feminised whereas the unskilled labour migration is extremely male dominated. The 
Korean marriage migration policy, called ‘multicultural family policy’, aims to support 
female marriage migrants marrying Korean males. The government intervenes through 
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the entire life-course of (female) marriage migrants and their families, especially the 
children, from marriage preparation before arrival to adaption, family forming, 
bearing/rearing/educating children and social/economic participation after migration to 
Korea. At some point in the policy development, marriage migrant families enjoyed 
even higher social rights than nationals.  
Thirdly, its pragmatic approaches to different types of migrants are the key to 
understanding the Korean migration regime. The Korean government has admitted that 
Korea needs to channel in migrant labour force to fuel the Korean economy even in the 
future. However, the government wants to avoid possible consequences of migration 
growth such as a systematic dependence on migrant workers and racial/cultural conflicts 
between migrants and natives. In this regard, co-ethnic migrants and marriage migrants 
must have been viable alternatives to opening the door wide to all different migrants. 
Co-ethnics not only can make affordable migrant workforce, but they also in a better 
position for adaptation thanks to their linguistic and cultural proximity. Marriage 
migrants are also in a better position for social integration (or assimilation, ultimately) 
due to their higher chance of settlement and naturalisation. To sum up, Korea has 
become a land of migration but it has not been necessarily accompanied by racial/ethnic 
and cultural diversities to a large extent.  
The Korean care regime has also experienced transformation over recent decades. 
Care has surfaced as a leading social policy agenda especially from the early 2000s. It 
was mainly because Korea, like other advanced welfares states, was facing the crisis of 
care resulting from various societal changes, such as population ageing with the low 
fertility, weakening familial care capacity, and increase in women’s (desire for) labour 
market participation. The Korean government has been more concerned with the decline 
of social reproduction function of the family, i.e., declining fertility, rather than the care 
deficit itself. Believing ‘socialising care’ is a key to reversing the demographic 
challenges and sustaining the economic vitality of the country, the government has 
rapidly expanded social care programmes. The Korean government intends to de-
familialise care by primarily expanding institutional care for children and older people. 
As a result, Korea’s traditional care regime associated with heavy reliance on the family 
and women’s uncommodified care labour has begun to change. It is evident that the 
state is assuming more responsibility in financing, providing and regulating care, and 
the roles of market and family have changed accordingly on the macro-level. 
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Nonetheless, care division within the family has remained largely unaltered as 
disproportionately women’s role despite the introduction of work-home reconciliation 
policies, notably various leave arrangements for both parents (including one specifically 
for fathers).  
The Korean government’s approach to childcare and eldercare has been different. 
Childcare has been completely universalised and institutionalised although home-based 
care is often recommended for very young children. Now Korean families with under 
school aged children can enjoy enhanced choices from different types of social care 
provision in cash, service or time (leave). Eldercare has also been collectivised; 
however, unlike the tax-based childcare system, it has been reformed to a social 
insurance whose finance depends on the family (premium contribution and user charge). 
The coverage of the formal eldercare is also limited: despite the increase in eldercare 
facilities, entitlement for a full long-term institutional care is reserved for those elderly 
having severe disability or the very poor. So in many cases, family’s input in personal 
care provision as well as in the finance is far more important in the Korean eldercare 
system than in the childcare system. Besides, the regulations on eldercare institutions 
and care workers within them are less tight, which in turn allows greater possibility for 
migrant care workers to get involved in. I have argued that these differences between 
childcare and eldercare have originated from the different policy frames applied to each. 
The social investment approach has justified the high allocation of policy resources for 
children and childcare. Furthermore, socialisation of childcare has been strongly 
supported as an essential tool to harness women’s (potential) labour force in the Korean 
welfare state’s productivist approach. However, older people have given lower priority 
in both policy approaches, so, as a consequent, the eldercare system has been 
collectivised to a lesser degree. In addition, despite the recent extensive care reforms, 
some care areas/jobs have been almost completely out of scope such as private domestic 
workers, nannies or informal nursing care workers.  
 
To what extent does the Korean case prove or disprove the ‘care transnationalisation’ 
thesis? 
As reviewed in the literature review chapter (Chapter 2), the provision of care has been 
increasingly transnationalised in Europe and other countries especially through the 
mechanism of cross-border migration. Outsourcing care to migrants (migrant workers, 
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typically) has been associated with the increasing tendency of the commodification of 
care in the context of the welfare state transformation, ‘retrenchment’ usually. States 
often arrange both care policies and migration policies in specific ways which facilitate 
families or institutions to recruit migrant care labour. The migrantisation of care 
happens at the very intersections of such policies. Korea has shared the same 
experiences with the European or western countries to a large degree including care 
crisis deficit resulted from demographic transition and changes in the family and 
women’s participation in paid work, and growing dependence on migrants to fill the 
deficit. This suggests universality in care-migration nexus beyond the cultural and 
geographical divides. 
However, my examination has also discovered differences. As the care-migration 
intersection researchers have predicted, what sets the Korean experience apart from 
those of other countries is the national ‘regimes’ of care and migration. The Korean 
welfare state has not only been concerned with the productive system, but also the 
reproductive system, for both of which the Korean welfare state has been operating its 
policies beyond the national border. In doing so, Korea has developed a very interesting 
combination of care outsourcing strategies. To begin with, migrants’ involvement in 
care work is restricted to the bottom of care worker hierarchy (unskilled and 
unprotected) and to co-ethnic migrants. The Korean care regime reserves skilled and 
institutional care jobs for native-born care workers. Co-ethnic migrants are encouraged 
to work as paid-care workers in less regulated care areas such as home-employment or 
informal personal (nursing) care which native-born workers would avoid. Such migrant 
care workers are vital in meeting the increasing demand for personal care, but they are 
effectively excluded from the welfare state. They earn no legal status as workers and 
‘no worker status’ means ‘no social protection’ let alone social recognition in the 
Korean welfare state which has a social insurance based social security system. The 
policy rationale of ‘protecting the internal labour market’ and strong preference to ‘the 
same culture (appearance, language and custom)’ have completely excluded non-ethnic 
migrant workers from the care sector in Korea.   
In addition, if we adopt a broad understanding of care as reproductive labour, 
marriage migration policy in Korea is also a care outsourcing strategy to secure not only 
unpaid care work for the family but also the reproduction of human beings. The Korean 
government supports female marriage migrants to successfully act as wives, mothers 
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and daughters-in-law, who assume indispensable roles to maintain and regenerate the 
family, the building unit of social reproduction system of a society. For the government, 
marriage migrants themselves and their children, are important in replenishing the 
population. On the family level, female marriage migrants, often as daughters-in-law, 
complement the limited formal eldercare provision especially in the rural areas. In 
southern European countries, female migrant domestic/care workers are often working 
‘like family members’ when hired by the family, but in Korea migrants are often 
assuming care roles by ‘becoming family members’ through marriage. Development of 
the marriage migration policy in Korea demonstrates how social norms and cultures 
regarding family and gender can be translated into actual public programmes. Naming 
marriage migrants as ‘multicultural families’ is, I argue, an ultimate compromise 
between the political ideals of global Korea and the adherence of culturally homogenous 
Korea. As marriage migrants become ‘family’, then they are Koreans although they 
have other racial and cultural backgrounds. So the Korean welfare state has been very 
inclusive of marriage migrants regardless of their origins even before they acquire 
citizenship.  
The Korean case of care transnationalisation through the intersections of migration 
and care regimes complements the existing knowledge of care-migration nexus in 
various ways. I have confirmed that the modality of care transnationalisation is 
intermediated by the national regimes of migration and care (and the welfare state, more 
broadly). My study has geographically expanded the intersection research to East Asia 
and added a new regime type, East Asian (or productivist) welfare state regime into the 
scholarship. I have shown that the state (government) can function on the transnational 
level to help secure not only migrant productive workers but also reproductive workers 
even before the actual migration happens. Furthermore, I have examined how migrants 
are involved in both childcare and eldercare; both in paid and unpaid forms of care work. 
In doing so, I have revealed that different policy rationales can be applied to childcare 
and eldercare, which can, in turn, result in different degrees of care migrantisation. 
Lastly, I have argued that norms, cultures and historical understanding of nationhood 
can exert a strong influence on the way in which migrants are involved in care labour 
and they are included or excluded from the welfares state.  
This case study is arguably the first comprehensive research attempting to analyse 
the intersections of migration policies and care policies in terms of care 
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transnationalisation focusing on an East Asian country, here Korea. The existing similar 
research on the Korean case tends to be characterised by limited scope, either narrowly 
focused on paid care or one area (eldercare), or neglecting to include marriage migration 
into the care (reproductive) perspective. Failing to engage with wider welfare state 
(regime) transformations is another limitation, which diminishes the potential to be 
compared to the existing intersection research contextualised in the European welfare 
state regimes. This case study has added one more piece to the puzzle which allows us 
to grasp a fuller picture than we had before of how welfare states can differ in 
formulating policies by which care labour is transnationally outsourced and socially 
divided.  
 
 
8.3. Policy Implications for Korea 
 
It has been found that the Korean government is socialising care to help plug the care 
deficit. At the same time it involves extensive transnational care-outsourcing practices. 
Consequently, the division of reproductive labour has been further complicated in the 
Korean welfare state as race/ethnicity was added to the conventional axes of gender, 
class and skills. Those findings would seem to hold some key implications for the 
current migration and care policies in Korea. The implications are essentially related to 
the old policy rationales vis-à-vis new challenges. 
First of all, the Korean government has been slow to acknowledge the reproductive 
roles of migrants. The Korean migration regime has long been preoccupied with 
securing a productive foreign work force throughout several reforms. So, migrant 
productive workers have been granted a full recognition of worker status, thus protected 
and monitored by relevant labour laws and the social security system. In contrast, 
migrant care workers, as noted earlier, often find themselves outside the formal labour 
regulations and the social security system. This lack of legal recognition/protection of 
care workers, the unskilled ones particularly, is not exclusive to migrants. Even native-
born unskilled care workers such as domestic workers, nannies or private nursing 
workers are not covered by labour laws or employment-related social protections. It is 
often said that Korea has care policies but no ‘care worker’ policies (see Peng, 2010). 
The absence of a proper legal basis for such workers has made care workers vulnerable 
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to social risks but also compromised the quality of their care labour in homes or 
facilities. The Korean government recently announced that it will formalise domestic 
workers to be a care profession from 2016, and they will be covered by labour laws and 
welfare benefits.65 It is a welcome but long overdue reform. However, it remains to be 
seen how this new legislation will affect the status of migrant domestic workers and 
nannies.  
Secondly, the Korean government has been facing a difficult dilemma whether it 
should open service sector jobs (including care jobs) to other foreign nationals beside 
co-ethnics. Apparently, co-ethnic migrants alone cannot meet the demand (S Choi et al., 
2013); otherwise the Korean government would not have adopted various incentive 
measures for them to work in care jobs longer. In addition, the pool of unskilled co-
ethnic migrant workers in China is expected to deplete soon as older generations of 
ethnic Koreans in China have died and younger generations have rapidly been 
assimilated into mainstream Chinese culture. It is not surprising to see younger ethnic 
Koreans overseas quickly losing cultural similarities including the Korean language. It 
may mean that an ethnicity-based migration regime assuming the cultural commonness 
with the native-born Koreans may not be sustainable. Moreover, as China further 
develops economically, it is reasonable to assume that someday co-ethnic migrants from 
China may not be in a position to willingly take care jobs with inferior working 
conditions in the Korean labour market. Conversely, Korean people may not turn to co-
ethnic migrant workers in the future simply because they have the same ethnicity or 
culture as care preferences are diversifying. It is interesting to see the language 
difference can be an incentive rather than a hindrance for some Korean families hiring 
illegally Filipina domestic workers/nannies: those parents value the potential that their 
children learn English from the domestic workers (Donga Ilbo, 2012). It is difficult to 
imagine if co-ethnic migrant care workers change their position in the care worker 
hierarchy, who would fill the gap without the entry of other foreign nationals into the 
service sector.  
Thirdly, the policy environment regarding marriage migration is also changing. So 
far, marriage migrants have enjoyed a comparatively high level of social 
                                                         
65 Civil society groups and experts have long requested the Korean government to acknowledge domestic 
workers’ worker status by amending Labour Standard Act and enhance social protection for them. The 
ILO’s adoption of Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189) in 2011 must have provided a momentum for 
this social movement (see Segye Ilbo, 2013), but the Korean government has not yet ratified it.  
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inclusion/protection through various policy instruments. This is because the 
international marriages and marriage migrants initially happened in the context of 
economically and socially less privileged rural bachelors’ last hope for family formation 
and reproduction, which was politically supported. However, as their number was 
increasing, so was the input of policy resource, and such ‘special treatment’ began to be 
questioned. Furthermore, as the industrialisation of the society continued, the rural 
population has diminished, and urban work/life and nuclear family have become a norm. 
As a consequence, the stereotype of marriage migration/migrants is becoming outdated. 
In fact, more and more marriage migrants are now marrying salaried workers and 
forming an unclear family in cities (Chun, 2013). The social and economic lives of 
marriage migrants and their families will become ever more similar to the native-born 
citizen. So, the policy approach viewing marriage migrants a special group or simply 
‘beneficiaries’ of the welfare state will gradually lose its legitimacy. The migration and 
welfare policies should be ready to acknowledge marriage migrants are becoming 
‘active agents’. So a recommendation is to develop a more integrative and simplified 
policy frame in which different types of migrants are subject to similar, if not equal, 
treatments rather than constantly segregating and stratifying migrants by enacting 
numerous ‘special acts’.   
 
 
8.4. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Comprehensive as it is, this study is not without limitations. Such limitations of the 
current research invite, at the same time, new agendas for future research. The 
limitations basically come from its research purpose and design. First of all, it is a 
policy study. Despite the profound interest in ‘care workers’, this study does not deal 
with migrants’ ‘experiences’ of care labour due to its focus on ‘policies’. Policy 
research should be complemented by research on lived experiences not least because it 
is often the case that policy intentions and goals are modified in the implementation 
process, often yielding unexpected outcomes. Evidence on how and under what 
conditions migrants (of either female or male; paid or unpaid) are actually performing 
care labour in different care settings and of different nature can verify my propositions 
on the policy level interactions.  
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Secondly, linked to the first point, the current research predominantly focuses on 
explaining observable and relatively recent policy development on the government level. 
Consequently, the research has not spared enough room for examining the (often hidden) 
dimension of ‘political negotiation and struggle’ among various stakeholders such as 
trade unions or advocacy groups operating on the different levels as Williams (2010) 
suggested for the analysis of care and migration regimes (refer back to Table 1.1). As 
the history of (im)migration continues in Korea, such political dimension will become 
increasingly important in explaining the policy making.66  
Thirdly, the current study only deals with one end of migration, in other words, the 
policies of the destination country. Intergovernmental cooperation and interaction are an 
influential factor in the care transnationalisation process. In the example of marriage 
migration, sending countries cooperate with the destination country (Korea) in finding, 
educating and arranging the marriage and migration. It will be very interesting to 
research how policies are connected cross the border, just as the personal links of care 
have been researched in the frame of ‘global care chains’.  
Lastly, it is a single-country case study, claiming that this study geographically 
extends the intersection research to East Asia. There are other emerging migration 
destination countries in East Asia such as Hong-Kong and Taiwan. Throughout the 
thesis, I have tended to treat Korea as an exemplar country of the East Asian welfare 
regime. However, there are significant differences between East Asian countries in the 
characteristics of their care and migration regimes (Chan et al., 2011; Le et al., 2014; 
Martin, 2009; Ochiai, 2009; Soma et al., 2011; Yamanaka and Piper, 2005). Additional 
in-depth cases studies of each of these countries are prerequisites before systematic 
comparative research eventually can reveal the fuller picture of migration-care 
intersection in the East Asian new (im)migration countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
66 After some ten year-long attempt, the Migrants' Trade Union (MTU) in Korea was just legalised on 20 
August 2015, following a Supreme Court ruling recognising its legitimacy (Korea Times, 
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/08/113_185345.html, accessed on 22 August 2015) 
 234 
 
8.5. Epilogue 
 
For welfare states, international migration and migrants can be unfamiliar and/or 
uncomfortable issues. It could not be more true than in the case of the Korean welfare 
state. Policy-wise, migration and migrants have been simply instrumentalised under the 
economic policy. Meanwhile, migration researchers have not actively engaged with 
social policy researchers, and social policy researchers, in turn, have failed to stage 
migration/migrant-issues on the wider discussion of the welfare state. Lack of 
recognition of the relationship between the migration policy and the care (welfare) 
policy both on the policy level and the academic level has posed a significant challenge 
to my research. I have developed ‘eyes’ to see the intersections between the two policy 
areas from the existing literature, but the whole process of the research has been 
persuading both myself and others (officials and academics alike) of such intersections 
operating in Korea. After all, I have become increasingly convinced of the importance 
of the research on intersections. From my personal experience of having been a migrant 
with a young child, I have earned some insights on how migrants’ life chances and 
wellbeing can be moulded by the very combinations of migration and care policies. I 
hope this piece of research helps migration and migrants to become an integral research 
agenda to social policy and welfare state research in Korea and, ultimately, contribute to 
Korea’s becoming a better welfare state for every member of society including migrants.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 3.1: List of key policy documents 
Title [Korean] Year Ministry 
A Road to Productive Welfare for a new Millennium  
[새천년을 향한 생산적 복지의 길] 
1999 Office of the 
President 
Vision 2030 
[비전 2030] 
2006 The Government 
(joint taskforce) 
The 1st Basic Plan for the Low Fertility/Ageing Society: 2006-2010.  
[제 1 차 저출산고령사회 기본계획(2006-10)] 
2005 The Government 
The 2nd Basic Plan for the Low Fertility/Ageing Society: 2011-2015  
[제 2 차 저출산고령사회 기본계획(2011-15)] 
2010 The Government 
The 1st Basic Plan for Immigration Policy: 2008-2012  
[제 1 차 외국인정책기본계획(2008-12)] 
2008 Ministry of Justice 
The 2nd Basic Plan for Immigration Policy: 2013-2017  
[제 2 차 외국인정책기본계획(2013-17)] 
2012 Ministry of Justice 
Assistant Measures for Multicultural Families across their Life-cycle.  
[다문화가족 생애주기별 맞춤형 지원 강화대책] 
2008 Ministry of Health 
and Welfare* 
The 1st Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy: 2010-2012 
[제 1 차 다문화가족정책 기본계획 2010-12] 
2009 Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family 
The 2nd Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy: 2013-2017 
[제 2 차 다문화가족정책 기본계획 2013-17] 
2012 Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family 
Saessak Plan 2006 - 2010  
[제 1 차 중장기 보육계획 (새싹플랜) (2006-2010)] 
2006 Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family 
Aisarang Plan 2009 – 2012 
[아이사랑플랜 (2009-2012)] 
2009 Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
The 2nd Childcare Mid to Long-term Policy Plan 2013 - 2017 
[제 2 차 중장기보육 기본계획 (2013~2017)] 
2013 Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
Note: *‘Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs’ at that time.  
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Appendix 6.1: Total social expenditure in selected countries as percentage of GDP (%) 
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Korea n/a 2.8 3.2 4.8 6.5 9 10.4 
France 25.8 24.9 29 28.4 29.6 31.7 31.9 
Germany 22.2 21.4 25.9 26.2 27 26.8 25.8 
Greece 16.1 16.5 17.4 19.2 21.1 24.2 24 
Italy 20.8 21.4 21.7 23.3 24.9 27.8 28.6 
Japan 11.1 11.1 14.1 16.3 18.4 22.1 n/a 
Norway 17.5 21.9 22.9 20.8 21.1 22.4 22 
Sweden 28.2 28.5 31.8 28.2 28.7 27.9 28.1 
UK 19.2 16.3 19.2 18.4 20.2 22.8 21.7 
US 12.8 13.1 15 14.2 15.5 19.3 19.2 
OECD total 17 17.5 19.3 18.6 19.4 21.7 21.6 
Note: The 2014 data is an estimate by OECD. 
Source: OECD, SOCX, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG (accessed on 15 May 
2015) 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: Trend in the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate in Korea (%) 
 
Source: e-National Index, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/PotalMain.do (accessed on 20 May 2015) 
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Appendix 6.3: Percentage of those aged 65 or above of the total population, selected 
countries and years (%)  
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Japan 7.1  7.9  9.1  10.3  12.1  14.6  17.4  20.2  23.0  25.1  
Germany 13.2  14.5  15.5  14.8  15.3  16.1  17.2  19.2  21.0  21.3  
Italy 11.1  12.2  13.3  13.1  14.9  16.7  18.2  19.8  20.4  20.8  
France 12.9  13.5  13.9  12.9  14.0  15.2  16.1  16.5  16.9  n/a 
UK 13.0  14.1  15.0  15.2  15.7  15.8  15.8  15.5  16.0  17.0  
Canada 8.0  8.5  9.4  10.3  11.3  12.0  12.6  13.1  14.2  15.3  
Australia 8.3  8.7  9.6  10.3  11.1  11.9  12.4  12.9  13.6  14.4  
US 9.8  10.5  11.3  11.9  12.5  12.7  12.4  12.4  13.1  14.1  
Russia 7.7  8.9  10.2  9.7  10.0  11.9  12.4  13.9  12.8  13.0  
Korea 3.1  3.5  3.8  4.3  5.1  5.9  7.2  9.1  11.0  12.2  
Turkey 4.4  4.6  4.7  4.2  4.4  5.5  6.7  6.7  7.1  7.6  
Brazil n/a n/a 4.0  4.1  4.4  4.9  5.4  6.8  6.8  8.9  
Mexico 4.6  4.3  4.1  4.0  4.1  4.3  4.7  5.7  6.2  6.5  
Source: OECD, Elderly population (indicator). https://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm  
(accessed on 14 May 2015) 
Note: Ordered from the highest by the 2010 entries 
 
 
Appendix 6.4: Public spending by area in Korea as percentage of GDP (%) 
 
Source: MOHW (2014b) 
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Appendix 6.5: Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, in per 
cent of GDP, 2011 
 
Source: OECD, SOCX, www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm (accessed on 7 May 2015) 
 
 
Appendix 6.6: Ratio of Fathers to Mothers using their entitlement to leave, 2011 
 
Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_2_Use_of_leave_benefits_by_mothers_and_fathers_ 
Aug2014.pdf (accessed on 18 May 2015) 
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Appendix 7.1: Division of care work between parents and migrant domestic workers (%) 
Activity Parents 
Mainly 
parents 
Equally 
shared 
Mainly 
domestic 
workers 
Domestic 
workers 
Other Total 
Feeding 5.0  18.5  37.8  31.3  6.9  0.4  100  
Playing 8.5  22.0  45.6  19.7  3.9  0.4  100  
Caring when ill 15.4  29.3  34.7  16.2  4.2  0.0  100  
Helping with study 39.0  25.9  19.7  10.0  5.0  0.4  100  
Pick-up 12.7  14.7  23.9  27.0  20.5  1.2  100  
Bathing 11.6  13.5  30.5  30.9  13.5  0.0  100  
Sleeping 37.1  18.9  22.8  13.5  6.9  0.8  100  
Cooking for children 13.9  13.1  29.7  27.0  14.7  1.5  100  
Cooking for family 17.4  20.1  23.2  23.2  14.3  1.9  100  
Other domestic work 7.7  12.7  21.6  28.6  29.0  0.4  100  
Note: Total n=259 
Source: Y-k Choi (2014: 264) 
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